Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

[Scotsman]

[The topic, Generalplan Ost, is also discussed at the CODOH 'Holocaust' Forum in a various threads, i.e.: 'Myths about Generalplan Ost and Lebensraum' : viewtopic.php?f=2&t=12639 Thanks, Moderator]

Hey all, as I said in my earlier post in the General board, I am somewhat new as a Revisionist reader, though I have been aware of the 'Denial' position since 2005 - which was actually responsible for making my political views take a 'right turn'. (specifically, when I found out about Holocaust Denial laws) But for a long time, I only noted the Denial position but did not really go one way or the other. Lately I have become a believer in the revisionist take on WW2 generally.

One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.

I was hoping there would be more deconstruction of 'Generalplan Ost' in revisionist literature, but there wasn't a whole lot out there, and just a little bit on this website. Is there a definitive take on it written by any revisionists, be it an article, book, etc? It features so prominently in 'what if Hitler had won the war' scenarios of impending doom that I feel it is more important than maybe some realize.

[Hektor]

Staff like this, doesn't get that much Revisionist attention, since
In my opinion the "Generalplan Ost" seems to be highly overrated. Leaving skepticism over authenticity of sources aside. It makes sense that there were proposals on how to deal with a new order after the war. The notion that "Hitler started war to conquer 'Lebensraum' and ultimately the world" I consider a myth. Personally I'd rather go in line with actually practice. And there countries were occupied as a war measure. But there is lots that doesn't fit the fantasy image generally portrayed. For instance were Germans from the East resettled into areas arondated to Germany as a measure of consolidation and population exchange. That doesn't fit into the imperialist image of Lebensraum.

[hermod]

One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.

Would there have been so many Slavs fighting on the Reich's side if the Nazis had really been perpetrating a genocide of 30 million Slavs at that time? Wouldn't Hitler have stopped his repatriation operation of all ethnic Germans living outside the Reich's borders (the "Heim Ins Reich" -Home in the Reich- operation) if he had been planning to populate those areas with Germans after victory?


German "Heim Ins Reich" propaganda poster.

The word "Lebensraum" is often misinterpretated. In January 1939, after uniting the Austrian, Sudenten and German brothers in a German Reich, Hitler said that the process of the formation of the German nation - the German "Lebensraum" - had reached its conclusion (see speech below). One would have expected Hitler to prepare his people for a "Lebensraum war" to come at that time, but that's not what he did. In 1938 and 1939 Hitler also offered to guarantee the Polish borders established at Versailles* and so proposed to renounce the lost German "Lebensraum" in Poland once and for all. Do "land-eaters" planning wars for living space act that way? In Mein Kampf Hitler talked about potential "Lebensraum" in Russia. That's true. But he wrote that because he thought that the Soviet Union was about to collapse and dislocate on its own (because the jews - leading Russia at that time - were a "ferment of decomposition" according to Hitler's words). If that had happened, Germany and other big Powers would have seized parts of the dislocated Soviet cake. But that doesn't mean that Hitler wanted a war for "Lebensraum" with the mighty Soviet Union 17 years after writing Mein Kampf.



*
« The fact is that the only real offer of security which Poland received in 1938 and 1939 emanated from Hitler. He offered to guarantee the boundaries laid down in the Versailles Treaty against every other country. Even the Weimar Republic had not for a moment taken this into consideration. Whatever one may think of Hitler’s government or foreign policy, no doubt exists on this point; his proposals to Poland in 1938/39 were reasonable and just and the most moderate of all which he made during the six years of his efforts to revise the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means. » – Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, prominent American historian.

« Poland’s decision of August 30, 1939 that was the basis for general mobilization marked a turning point in the history of Europe. It forced Hitler to wage war at a time when he hoped to gain further unbloody victories. » – Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Polish General and Government-in-Exile’s commander-in-chief, August 31, 1943.

"Of all the Germans, Believe it or not, Hitler is the most moderate as far as Danzig and the Corridor are concerned." - Sir, Neville Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, 16th August, 1939.

« The last thing Hitler wanted was to produce another great war. His people, and particularly his generals, were profoundly fearful of any such risk — the experiences of World War One had scarred their minds. » – Sir. Basil Liddell Hart, The History of the Second World War.

« The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all. » – Professor AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 267.

« Even in 1939 the German army was not equipped for a prolonged war; and in 1940 the German land forces were inferior to the French in everything except leadership. » – Professor AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 104-5.

[Scotsman]

One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.

Would there have been so many Slavs fighting on the Reich's side if the Nazis had really been perpetrating a genocide of 30 million Slavs at that time? Wouldn't Hitler have stopped his repatriation operation of all ethnic Germans living outside the Reich's borders (the "Heim Ins Reich" -Home in the Reich- operation) if he had been planning to populate those areas with Germans after victory?

Hold on, I wasn't saying I believed it, I merely put those forward as devil's advocate. Since I am largely in agreement with the revisionist position (though I have read less about Chelmno and some of the other camps), I was inclined to disbelieve Ost anyway because part of the Holocaust myth in included in the so called plan ("extermination of XX% of the Slavic nations"). But I was hoping there might have been a refutation of it in detail, but there doesn't seem to be.

The way I look at it is this; if Germany was able to pull off a victory, there would have to be a long cooling off period diplomatically to normalize international relations. It is not believable that they would have just start killing half the population of a country in the midst of a thaw.

[Hannover]

Scotsman:

... I was inclined to disbelieve Ost anyway because part of the Holocaust myth in included in the so called plan ("extermination of XX% of the Slavic nations"). But I was hoping there might have been a refutation of it in detail, but there doesn't seem to be

How can there be a refutation in detail when there is no thorough, detailed proof given for the vague claims made about 'Generalplan Ost' and the absurd claim that the Germans wanted to 'exterminate' the Slavs? It's all just superficial, marketed propaganda.

- Hannover

[Hektor]

If you can read German, here is how a bunch of main-streamers debates the issue:
http://www.geschichtsforum.de/f68/der-g ... post678503

[Mkk]

This is a thesis exploring some of the various plans for the GPO:

http://web.archive.org/web/200407220151 ... anung.html

For those who cannot speak German, here is a summary:

The 1996 MA thesis by Karsten Schulz "Nationalsozialistische Nachkriegskonzeptionen für die eroberten Gebiete Osteuropas vom Januar 1940 bis zum Januar 1943", presented at the Berlin Technical University Institute for Political Science, contains a detailed exposition of the various versions of the Generalplan Ost, as well as of other, competing plans for German rule over the conquered Soviet territories put forward by Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the German Labour Front, and some individuals.

It appears that there were six versions of the Generalplan Ost, which need to be carefully distinguished from each other in terms of what they actually propose. Four of them were prepared by the planning staff of the Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKF), headed by Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling. and two by the RSHA, specifically by Standartenführer Ehlich, head of Gruppe III B Volkstum of Abteilung III Sicherheitsdienst-Inland.

The six variants were:

1. The Generalplan of the RKF, dating from about January 1940. This is preserved in a document bearing the title "Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete", and deals only with the planned germanisation of the annexed western Polish territories (Danzig-Westpreußen, Wartheland, Zichenau, Suwalki, Ost-Oberschlesien).

2. Generalplan Ost of the RKF, dated 15 July 1941. The plan itself has not been found, and is known only from a covering minute from Meyer-Hetling to Himmler with the above date. Judging from material contained in the unpublished autobiography of Professor Meyer-Hetling, in addition to the annexed territories included in the Generalplan, it proposed German settlement in the east of the Generalgouvernement, thereby encircling the ethnic Polish population. The estimated settler requirement is 4.55 million persons over 30 years.

3. Generalplan Ost of the RSHA, dated toward the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. The plan itself has never been found, but its main points can be reconstructed from the detailed (and highly critical) commentary on it by Dr Erhard Wetzel of Rosenberg's Ostministerium, dated 27 April 1942.

This is the plan that is usually meant when the Generplan Ost is referred to in secondary literature. It is the plan that, judging from Wetzel's comments, proposed the resettlement in West Siberia of 31 million (including 5-6 million Jews) of the estimated 45 million non-German inhabitants of the specific areas designated for German settlement, over a period of 30 years. The plan calls for the settlement of 10 million Germans on the territory, consisting of Danzig- Westpreußen, Wartheland, Oberschlesien, Generalgouvernement, South Ostpreußen, Bialystok, the Baltic States, Ingermanland, Weißruthenien and some areas in Ukraine.

Wetzel is highly critical of the RSHA plan and clearly considers it infeasible, although he supports the concept of germanisation of territory and the deportation of population groups considered hostile to Germany. He proposes alternative actions, which are most probably to be regarded as representing the views of Rosenberg. There is no indication that this plan was ever given official approval in full by either Himmler or Hitler.

4. The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA. The existence of this plan can only be inferred indirectly; it is referred to in a letter of 12 June 1942 from Himmler to Ulrich Greifelt, head of the RKF. It also seems that certain of the comments made by Wetzel in April 1942 refer to this extended plan rather than the original RSHA plan.

The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA extended the area of proposed German settlement to the line Lake Ladoga - Valdai Heights - Briansk, and added as settlement areas Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilsk and parts of Vynnytsia.

5. The later Generalplan Ost of the RKF. This is known from a document of 71 pages dated 28 May 1942. In addition to the germanisation of the Polish territories annexed to the Reich, it proposes the establishment of three "borderlands" (Marken), Ingermanland, Narew-West Lithuania, and Gotengau (Crimea and Kherson province), and of 36 settlement bases, 14 in the GG, 14 in Ostland, and 8 in Ukraine. The period for the proposed resettlement is 25 years. The plan also gives a detailed estimate of the costs of the proposed ethnic German settlement, totals of 45.7 billion RM for the annexed Polish territories and 20.9 billion for the borderlands and bases, the greater part of which is to be raised by borrowing in the private capital market.

Nowhere does this plan talk of deporting any part of the existing non-German population to Siberia. Rather, it proposes the resettling of the population of land required for German settlement on alternative kolkhozes and sovkhozes within the area under German rule; the rationale for that mild treatment is stated to be the need to retain the cooperation of the native population. The previous method of "evacuation" is explicitly rejected. The desired level of germanisation will be reached when 50% of the population of the borderlands is ethnically German, and 25-30% of the population of the bases. The process of germanisation is estimated to take 25 to 30 years.

6. The "Generalsiedlungsplan" (global settlement plan) of the RKF. This is known from a preliminary draft dated 23 December 1942, written by Greifelt. There appears never to have been a final draft.

The plan defines a "Volksraum" with seven settlement areas: Luxemburg, Lorraine, Alsace, Upper Carinthia, Lower Styria, Bohemia-Moravia and the Incorporated Eastern Territories annexed from Poland. To that is added an "Ostsiedlungsraum" divided into six future Gaus, Litzmannstadt, Krakau, Lemberg, Lublin, Warschau und Bialystock. The Baltic area is increased through the addition of Pleskau (Pskov) and Ingermanland (the latter atributed to Estonia), but is not considered part of the "Ostsiedlungsraum", for unknown reasons.

The plan proposes a future population of around 23.1 million persons in the settlement areas of the Volksraum and in the Ostsiedlungsraum, consisting of an existing ethnic German population of 5.3 million, a residual germanised native population of 5.4 million, and 12.4 million German immigrants. As the existing population is 36.3 million, of which 5.6 million are already German(Reich citizens, ethnic Germans, settlers) and 5.4 million are germanisable natives, the plan implies the deportation of around 25 million persons, although such a deportation is not explicitly mentioned.

The same applies to the Baltic area. Of a population of 7.2 million, of which hardly any are considered German, 2.1 million are considered germanisable; the remaining 5.1 million disappear. 3.1 million German settlers are required to bring the total population back up to 5.2 million.

Thus, the deportation of a total of around 30 million non-Germans out of the settlement areas of the Volksraum, the Ostsiedlungsraum and the Baltic area is implied in the plan.

On 12 January 1943, Himmler demanded the inclusion of the Baltic area, the Crimea and Tauria in the "Ostsiedlungsraum". However, the events surrounding the fall of Stalingrad put all further planning activity on hold.

With regard to the question of whether any of the above plans could have been implemented in reality if Germany had retained control of the conquered territories, the thesis has this to say:

Die Generalplanungen basieren auf erobertem Raum im Osten, setzen also einen gewonnenen Krieg oder wenigstens mit vermindertem militärischem Aufwand haltbare Gebietsgewinne voraus. Das war, vom Generalplan des Jahres 1940 abgesehen, nicht der Fall. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß die Planungen Utopien bleiben mußten. Ob sie tatsächlich realitätsferne Hirngespinste geblieben wären, wie Heiber meint #49, oder ob nach Wasser "zwingend angenommen werden [kann], daß für den Fall, daß das nationalsozialistische Deutschland siegreich geblieben wäre, die SS Heinrich Himmlers auch den 'GPO' - so utopisch er auch heute scheinen mag - in vollem Umfang realisiert hätte" #50, ist in solcher Absolutheit nicht zu entscheiden. Es ist eher zu vermuten, daß mit Veränderungen der Gesamtlage entsprechend weitere Modifikationen gefolgt wären.

My translation:

The global planning was based on conquered territory in the East, therefore they assume a victorious war or at least territorial gains able to be held with a reduced military expenditure. That was not the case, apart from the global plan of 1940. Thus, it is no wonder that the plans had to remain utopian. Whether they indeed would have remained pipedreams divorced from reality, as Heiber believes, or whether according to Wasser "it [can] be conclusively assumed that, in the case where National Socialist Germany had remained victorious, Heinrich Himmler's SS would have implemented the "GPO" also in its full extent - no matter how utopian it may appear today", canot be decided with absolute certainty. Rather it is to be supposed that, corresponding with changes in the total situaiton, further modifications would have occurred.

The Heiber referred to is Helmut Heiber, author of "Der Generalplan Ost", in: Vierteljahreshefte Für Zeitgeschichte, 6, 1958, pp. 281ff. Heiber was a very respected German historian connected to the prestigious Institut für Zeitgeschichte in MUnich; he died a couple of years ago.

If such an experienced historian as Heiber judges that the variants of the Generalplanost were all "realitätsferne Hirngespinste" (pipedreams divorced from reality) then his opinion should be given some weight, and not simply dismissed by some jumped up petty dictator on the Forum staff.


With regard to the question of whether any of the variants of the plan were officially approved and put into practice, the thesis concludes:

Es muß zur Kenntnis genommen werden, daß es keine endgültige, von Himmler akzeptierte Version gab, die eine Realisierung bereits hätte legitimieren können. Bis zum äußerst unwahrscheinlichen Beweis des Gegenteils durch einen entsprechenden Quellenfund muß also davon ausgegangen werden, daß die GPO die Planungsphase nie überschritten haben.

Ausgeblendet wird bei der Diskussion um Realisierbarkeit oder bereits erfolgte Teilumsetzungen weiterhin, daß Himmler "diesen Generalplan zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt auch dem Führer übergeben" #23 wollte, das heißt, dessen Zustimmung bedurfte oder wenigstens darauf Wert legte.

Gegenwärtig wird die Bedeutung der Generalpläne eher überschätzt.

My translation:

It must be borne in mind that there was no definitive version accepted by Himmler which could have legitimated an implementation. So we must proceed from the position that, failing the extremely unlikely proving of the opposite by means of an appropriate discovery of a source, the variants of the GPO never went beyond the planning stage.

The discussion about practicability or partial implementations that had already occurred continues to mask the fact that Himmler wanted "to hand this global plan over to the Führer at some point in time", ie he needed the latter's agreement or at least saw it as important.

These days the tendency is to overestimate the importance of the global plans.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=90383

So there were a number of different plans but none of them ever went outside the planning stages and should not be presented as a definite NS plan/intention.

[Mkk]

This is a thesis exploring some of the various plans for the GPO:

http://web.archive.org/web/200407220151 ... anung.html

For those who cannot speak German, here is a summary:

The 1996 MA thesis by Karsten Schulz "Nationalsozialistische Nachkriegskonzeptionen für die eroberten Gebiete Osteuropas vom Januar 1940 bis zum Januar 1943", presented at the Berlin Technical University Institute for Political Science, contains a detailed exposition of the various versions of the Generalplan Ost, as well as of other, competing plans for German rule over the conquered Soviet territories put forward by Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the German Labour Front, and some individuals.

It appears that there were six versions of the Generalplan Ost, which need to be carefully distinguished from each other in terms of what they actually propose. Four of them were prepared by the planning staff of the Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKF), headed by Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling. and two by the RSHA, specifically by Standartenführer Ehlich, head of Gruppe III B Volkstum of Abteilung III Sicherheitsdienst-Inland.

The six variants were:

1. The Generalplan of the RKF, dating from about January 1940. This is preserved in a document bearing the title "Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete", and deals only with the planned germanisation of the annexed western Polish territories (Danzig-Westpreußen, Wartheland, Zichenau, Suwalki, Ost-Oberschlesien).

2. Generalplan Ost of the RKF, dated 15 July 1941. The plan itself has not been found, and is known only from a covering minute from Meyer-Hetling to Himmler with the above date. Judging from material contained in the unpublished autobiography of Professor Meyer-Hetling, in addition to the annexed territories included in the Generalplan, it proposed German settlement in the east of the Generalgouvernement, thereby encircling the ethnic Polish population. The estimated settler requirement is 4.55 million persons over 30 years.

3. Generalplan Ost of the RSHA, dated toward the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. The plan itself has never been found, but its main points can be reconstructed from the detailed (and highly critical) commentary on it by Dr Erhard Wetzel of Rosenberg's Ostministerium, dated 27 April 1942.

This is the plan that is usually meant when the Generplan Ost is referred to in secondary literature. It is the plan that, judging from Wetzel's comments, proposed the resettlement in West Siberia of 31 million (including 5-6 million Jews) of the estimated 45 million non-German inhabitants of the specific areas designated for German settlement, over a period of 30 years. The plan calls for the settlement of 10 million Germans on the territory, consisting of Danzig- Westpreußen, Wartheland, Oberschlesien, Generalgouvernement, South Ostpreußen, Bialystok, the Baltic States, Ingermanland, Weißruthenien and some areas in Ukraine.

Wetzel is highly critical of the RSHA plan and clearly considers it infeasible, although he supports the concept of germanisation of territory and the deportation of population groups considered hostile to Germany. He proposes alternative actions, which are most probably to be regarded as representing the views of Rosenberg. There is no indication that this plan was ever given official approval in full by either Himmler or Hitler.

4. The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA. The existence of this plan can only be inferred indirectly; it is referred to in a letter of 12 June 1942 from Himmler to Ulrich Greifelt, head of the RKF. It also seems that certain of the comments made by Wetzel in April 1942 refer to this extended plan rather than the original RSHA plan.

The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA extended the area of proposed German settlement to the line Lake Ladoga - Valdai Heights - Briansk, and added as settlement areas Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilsk and parts of Vynnytsia.

5. The later Generalplan Ost of the RKF. This is known from a document of 71 pages dated 28 May 1942. In addition to the germanisation of the Polish territories annexed to the Reich, it proposes the establishment of three "borderlands" (Marken), Ingermanland, Narew-West Lithuania, and Gotengau (Crimea and Kherson province), and of 36 settlement bases, 14 in the GG, 14 in Ostland, and 8 in Ukraine. The period for the proposed resettlement is 25 years. The plan also gives a detailed estimate of the costs of the proposed ethnic German settlement, totals of 45.7 billion RM for the annexed Polish territories and 20.9 billion for the borderlands and bases, the greater part of which is to be raised by borrowing in the private capital market.

Nowhere does this plan talk of deporting any part of the existing non-German population to Siberia. Rather, it proposes the resettling of the population of land required for German settlement on alternative kolkhozes and sovkhozes within the area under German rule; the rationale for that mild treatment is stated to be the need to retain the cooperation of the native population. The previous method of "evacuation" is explicitly rejected. The desired level of germanisation will be reached when 50% of the population of the borderlands is ethnically German, and 25-30% of the population of the bases. The process of germanisation is estimated to take 25 to 30 years.

6. The "Generalsiedlungsplan" (global settlement plan) of the RKF. This is known from a preliminary draft dated 23 December 1942, written by Greifelt. There appears never to have been a final draft.

The plan defines a "Volksraum" with seven settlement areas: Luxemburg, Lorraine, Alsace, Upper Carinthia, Lower Styria, Bohemia-Moravia and the Incorporated Eastern Territories annexed from Poland. To that is added an "Ostsiedlungsraum" divided into six future Gaus, Litzmannstadt, Krakau, Lemberg, Lublin, Warschau und Bialystock. The Baltic area is increased through the addition of Pleskau (Pskov) and Ingermanland (the latter atributed to Estonia), but is not considered part of the "Ostsiedlungsraum", for unknown reasons.

The plan proposes a future population of around 23.1 million persons in the settlement areas of the Volksraum and in the Ostsiedlungsraum, consisting of an existing ethnic German population of 5.3 million, a residual germanised native population of 5.4 million, and 12.4 million German immigrants. As the existing population is 36.3 million, of which 5.6 million are already German(Reich citizens, ethnic Germans, settlers) and 5.4 million are germanisable natives, the plan implies the deportation of around 25 million persons, although such a deportation is not explicitly mentioned.

The same applies to the Baltic area. Of a population of 7.2 million, of which hardly any are considered German, 2.1 million are considered germanisable; the remaining 5.1 million disappear. 3.1 million German settlers are required to bring the total population back up to 5.2 million.

Thus, the deportation of a total of around 30 million non-Germans out of the settlement areas of the Volksraum, the Ostsiedlungsraum and the Baltic area is implied in the plan.

On 12 January 1943, Himmler demanded the inclusion of the Baltic area, the Crimea and Tauria in the "Ostsiedlungsraum". However, the events surrounding the fall of Stalingrad put all further planning activity on hold.

With regard to the question of whether any of the above plans could have been implemented in reality if Germany had retained control of the conquered territories, the thesis has this to say:

Die Generalplanungen basieren auf erobertem Raum im Osten, setzen also einen gewonnenen Krieg oder wenigstens mit vermindertem militärischem Aufwand haltbare Gebietsgewinne voraus. Das war, vom Generalplan des Jahres 1940 abgesehen, nicht der Fall. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß die Planungen Utopien bleiben mußten. Ob sie tatsächlich realitätsferne Hirngespinste geblieben wären, wie Heiber meint #49, oder ob nach Wasser "zwingend angenommen werden [kann], daß für den Fall, daß das nationalsozialistische Deutschland siegreich geblieben wäre, die SS Heinrich Himmlers auch den 'GPO' - so utopisch er auch heute scheinen mag - in vollem Umfang realisiert hätte" #50, ist in solcher Absolutheit nicht zu entscheiden. Es ist eher zu vermuten, daß mit Veränderungen der Gesamtlage entsprechend weitere Modifikationen gefolgt wären.

My translation:

The global planning was based on conquered territory in the East, therefore they assume a victorious war or at least territorial gains able to be held with a reduced military expenditure. That was not the case, apart from the global plan of 1940. Thus, it is no wonder that the plans had to remain utopian. Whether they indeed would have remained pipedreams divorced from reality, as Heiber believes, or whether according to Wasser "it [can] be conclusively assumed that, in the case where National Socialist Germany had remained victorious, Heinrich Himmler's SS would have implemented the "GPO" also in its full extent - no matter how utopian it may appear today", canot be decided with absolute certainty. Rather it is to be supposed that, corresponding with changes in the total situaiton, further modifications would have occurred.

The Heiber referred to is Helmut Heiber, author of "Der Generalplan Ost", in: Vierteljahreshefte Für Zeitgeschichte, 6, 1958, pp. 281ff. Heiber was a very respected German historian connected to the prestigious Institut für Zeitgeschichte in MUnich; he died a couple of years ago.

If such an experienced historian as Heiber judges that the variants of the Generalplanost were all "realitätsferne Hirngespinste" (pipedreams divorced from reality) then his opinion should be given some weight, and not simply dismissed by some jumped up petty dictator on the Forum staff.


With regard to the question of whether any of the variants of the plan were officially approved and put into practice, the thesis concludes:

Es muß zur Kenntnis genommen werden, daß es keine endgültige, von Himmler akzeptierte Version gab, die eine Realisierung bereits hätte legitimieren können. Bis zum äußerst unwahrscheinlichen Beweis des Gegenteils durch einen entsprechenden Quellenfund muß also davon ausgegangen werden, daß die GPO die Planungsphase nie überschritten haben.

Ausgeblendet wird bei der Diskussion um Realisierbarkeit oder bereits erfolgte Teilumsetzungen weiterhin, daß Himmler "diesen Generalplan zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt auch dem Führer übergeben" #23 wollte, das heißt, dessen Zustimmung bedurfte oder wenigstens darauf Wert legte.

Gegenwärtig wird die Bedeutung der Generalpläne eher überschätzt.

My translation:

It must be borne in mind that there was no definitive version accepted by Himmler which could have legitimated an implementation. So we must proceed from the position that, failing the extremely unlikely proving of the opposite by means of an appropriate discovery of a source, the variants of the GPO never went beyond the planning stage.

The discussion about practicability or partial implementations that had already occurred continues to mask the fact that Himmler wanted "to hand this global plan over to the Führer at some point in time", ie he needed the latter's agreement or at least saw it as important.

These days the tendency is to overestimate the importance of the global plans.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=90383

So there were a number of different plans but none of them ever went outside the planning stages and should not be presented as a definite NS plan/intention.

[LKofEnglish]

History is all about perspective and very rarely truth but my view is the term "Generalplan Ost" means "the plan for the Invasion of Russia" and not any "ulterior motive" per se.

I think this is why there are so many conflicting points of view on the term because many presuppose some form of Governance structure to be "animated" but the only thing we in fact know was that there was a War in the East and in fact that is all we know that happened.

If you read the Nuremberg Transcripts you will see a long discussion about "the fog of night" order I think it was called ... which in military terms means basically "people just get disappeared" in all the "hub-bub" of War.

Needless to say this was the biggest series of Battles in Human History (meaning between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia)...so if you "wanted to get away with a crime" this was the perfect venue.

Many Germans were of course "disappeared" too...so this in indeed the most "real" of venues (a War) in which to attempt such a thing.

Of course if you are attempting to "disappear your 'selves'" there is a question of a crime.

In other words while guilt is easily established....some simply admit what is in fact true did indeed happen...the question does remain "just what was the crime and who was in on it?"

And that is what Historians are for.

Did "Generalplan Ost" occur? Absolutely....Nazi Germany launched a massive invasion of Soviet Russia with the explicit purpose of "wiping it off the map." Needless to say what became the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" had other ideas....

[Hektor]

OK, LKofEnglish.

Show us the General Plan in terms of the document and explain why you think that this was really the plan for the East.

[karl_fallout4]

Does the argument that Hitler wanted Slovakia, South-Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine integrated into Germany make any sense? The argument is that since these zones were occupied officially by Germany, Germany was pursuing a policy of expansionism, in a similar fashion to how they took over the formerly Prussian areas of Poland (see: Bialystok, East Prussia and Posen)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... g_1944.png

[Otium]

Does the argument that Hitler wanted Slovakia, South-Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine integrated into Germany make any sense? The argument is that since these zones were occupied officially by Germany, Germany was pursuing a policy of expansionism, in a similar fashion to how they took over the formerly Prussian areas of Poland (see: Bialystok, East Prussia and Posen)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... g_1944.png

South-Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine were German territories that Hitler initially renounced. The former was only occupied in September 1943, by which time Mussolini had already been deposed.

Slovakia was apart of the Axis, but not apart of Germany. She was essentially a client state due to the signing of the protection treaty with Germany on March 23, 1939. Germany offered her protection, and Slovakia benefitted from it. Client states still exist, and have always existed.

Anyway, using the word 'expansionism' is misleading, because technically speaking Germany was expansionist, in that she sought to 'expand' into her lost territories, thereby pursuing an irredentist aim. There is nothing wrong with this. And in fact, in August 1938, Goebbels (and Hitler) lamented Britain's opposition to Germany's 'expansive drive' into her own territories:

Evening with the Führer. We talk about England. He explains again how much he would like to have a good relationship with England. He does everything for that. But England stands in the way of our expansive drive [Aber England steht unserem expansiven Drang im Wege]. Certainly, the relationship with Italy is not popular, but Italy is on our side. The German people have not yet forgotten Italy's breach of faith during the war. England still has a good master race [Herrenrasse]. But for how much longer? Its popularity among the German people is steadily declining. And that is quite inevitable.

21 August 1938; Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part 1, Vol. 6 (Munich: K.G. Sauer Verlag, 1998), pp. 52-53.

Anyone with a mind for conspirisicing, or simply stuck on their own preconceptions would take these comments out of context and find in them (as some historians have) 'proof' of 'world conquest' or at least a plan to seek "Lebensraum im Osten". When in reality it was banal to state what Germany was indeed pursuing as 'expansion' - expansion into her own former territories, and indeed the decommissioning of Czechoslovakia for very good reason.

A good example of how historians take such sources out of context would be that of Rolf-Dieter Müller, who claims that in 1935 Hitler was already thinking of a war with Russia. He asserts that his naval agreement with Britain allowed him to have his hands free in the East, and hoped that despite Italy's war in Abyssinia 'his march on Russia would soon be able to begin.' A bold claim indeed:

Hitler countered the French initiative on 18 June with the Anglo–German Naval Agreement. Concluding that agreement encouraged his belief that London would let him have his free hand in the East. Two months later, the prospect of an Italian war in Abyssinia gave him hope that, despite the current lull in the Far East, his march on Russia would soon be able to begin.

Rolf-Dieter Müller, Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p. 56.

To support this claim he relies on a quotation from the Goebbels diary, the following is how he quoted it, notice the ellipsis:

Goebbels’s diary, 19 August 1935:

The Fuhrer is happy. Gives us an outline of his plans for foreign policy: eternal partnership with Britain. [...] But expansion to the east. [...] The conflicts Italy-Abyssinia-Britain and Japan-Russia are imminent. Then our great and historic hour will have struck. We must be ready. Wonderful moment. We are all deeply moved.!

Quoted in: Rolf-Dieter Müller, Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p. 56.

Wow! How convincing!

Except, it isn't.

Müller presents a botched quote, lacking vital information to understanding what was meant by 'expansion to the east'. The full quote reads:

Message Paris: Tripartite talks broken off without result. Now war in Abyssinia will be inevitable. The Führer is happy. Gives an outline of his foreign policy plans: eternal alliance with England. Good relations with Poland. Colonies on a limited scale. On the other hand, expansion to the East. Baltic belongs to us. Control of the Baltic Sea. Conflicts Italy-Abyssinia-England, then Japan-Russia on the doorstep. That is, in a few years, perhaps. Our great historical hour will come in Darmstadt. We must be ready then. Magnificent view. We are all deeply moved. We drive back through the night to Munich.

Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part 1, Vol. 3/1 (Munich: K.G. Sauer Verlag, 2005), p. 279.

From the full quotation it's obvious that the mentioning of the Baltic was omitted because it would remove the ambiguity of the quotation, thus ruining Müller's argument. So he decided to distort the evidence in order to trick the reader, who has been primed to assume Hitler was talking about Russia when he spoke of 'expansion to the east'. If Russia was intended, there's no reason why Goebbels wouldn't have made note of it.

The quote is still ambiguous of course, for the Baltic states in particular aren't mentioned. Obtaining Danzig, and perhaps the corridor would suffice for this desired control of the Baltic, and would also allow Germany to theoretically maintain good relations with Poland while expanding eastward. It was 1935, and thus far no German territory which did lie to the east had been obtained. So it is impossible for us to know what was meant by 'expansion'. The fact that Hitler spoke of 'good relations with Poland', is itself a refutation of Müller (and those like him) who believe the destruction of Poland was intended to serve as a 'springboard' for the 'programmatic' war against the Soviet Union. It shows that Hitler had no preconceived intentions against Poland.

Granted, to get around this Müller does subscribe to the idea that Hitler intended to 'recruit' Poland for his cause, a position which from my knowledge relies on very shaky documentary foundations indeed. Mostly it's an overinterpretation of Hitler's desire for Poland to choose Germany as a friend (which Hitler did want), rather than keeping at arms length (as was the aim Beck's foreign policy) of both Germany and Russia.

Also, in this instance, the phrase 'expansion to the east' was a mere statement of fact, a banal string of words turned into a 'programmatic phrase' by disingenuous historians like Müller.

[karl_fallout4]

Does the argument that Hitler wanted Slovakia, South-Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine integrated into Germany make any sense? The argument is that since these zones were occupied officially by Germany, Germany was pursuing a policy of expansionism, in a similar fashion to how they took over the formerly Prussian areas of Poland (see: Bialystok, East Prussia and Posen)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... g_1944.png

South-Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine were German territories that Hitler initially renounced. The former was only occupied in September 1943, by which time Mussolini had already been deposed.

Slovakia was apart of the Axis, but not apart of Germany. She was essentially a client state due to the signing of the protection treaty with Germany on March 23, 1939. Germany offered her protection, and Slovakia benefitted from it. Client states still exist, and have always existed.

Anyway, using the word 'expansionism' is misleading, because technically speaking Germany was expansionist, in that she sought to 'expand' into her lost territories, thereby pursuing an irredentist aim. There is nothing wrong with this. And in fact, in August 1938, Goebbels (and Hitler) lamented Britain's opposition to Germany's 'expansive drive' into her own territories:

My apologies, I typed in "Slovania" and my autocorrect changed it to "Slovakia" instead of "Slovenia", from the map alone it is clear that Slovakia was independent.
In the previous 1944 reichsgau map it says that it was attached to Germany particularly, part of the Carinthia district, and for the map of the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, it says that it was annexed by Germany.

After reading Hitler's speeches and the arguments disproving the "Hitler wanted to conquer the world" myth, it's clear that Germany wanted peace, so what was the purpose of this action?

Naturally one must wonder why the 21,000-strong Slovene collaborators would bother fighting the partisans if they knew that they were going to be part of Germany anyways?

[Prussian blue]

Advocatus diaboli:

While the facts are clear that Hitler didn't start the war in 1939 to conquer the world and he even sincerely tried to avoid a regional war with Poland, we can't be sure of the long-term goals. Even his confidants often didn't know what he was planning next. Sure, in 1939 the goal was to regain the lost territories, anything else would have been unrealistic at that time since the German military wasn't ready for a general war. But that doesn't rule out further aspirations.

In his Second Book, Hitler made clear that the mere restoration of the borders of 1914 couldn't be a satisfying solution for two reasons: a) It would only restore the situation that had led to WWI and b) it wouldn't solve the Lebensraum problem, i.e. that Germany didn't have enough land for her people and that this would have to be gained in the east. Granted, he wrote that in 1928, but these arguments were still valid in 1939. What had fundamentally changed by then was that he was now a statesman that had to pragmatically deal with political realities and to make concessions.

Hitler wanted a Polish state as a buffer between Germany and the Sowiet Union. So this could have been a temporary solution as long as the menace of bolshevism persisted. Likewise, before the war, Hitler had sacrificed the German populated territories South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine because he needed Italy as an allied and wanted to avoid a war with France a this point of time for military reasons. When these reasons were obsolete, those territories were annexed.

[knowthetruth]

Advocatus diaboli:

While the facts are clear that Hitler didn't start the war in 1939 to conquer the world and he even sincerely tried to avoid a regional war with Poland, we can't be sure of the long-term goals. Even his confidants often didn't know what he was planning next. Sure, in 1939 the goal was to regain the lost territories, anything else would have been unrealistic at that time since the German military wasn't ready for a general war. But that doesn't rule out further aspirations.

In his Second Book, Hitler made clear that the mere restoration of the borders of 1914 couldn't be a satisfying solution for two reasons: a) It would only restore the situation that had led to WWI and b) it wouldn't solve the Lebensraum problem, i.e. that Germany didn't have enough land for her people and that this would have to be gained in the east. Granted, he wrote that in 1928, but these arguments were still valid in 1939. What had fundamentally changed by then was that he was now a statesman that had to pragmatically deal with political realities and to make concessions.

Hitler wanted a Polish state as a buffer between Germany and the Sowiet Union. So this could have been a temporary solution as long as the menace of bolshevism persisted. Likewise, before the war, Hitler had sacrificed the German populated territories South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine because he needed Italy as an allied and wanted to avoid a war with France a this point of time for military reasons. When these reasons were obsolete, those territories were annexed.

Excellent summary! Thank you.