The Munich Agreement / correct and fair

[Hannover]

The propaganda about the 'appeasement' policy of Neville Chamberlain does not hold water when years of propaganda, bias, and anti-German racism is washed away.
I'll start with some quotes.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

“The undersigned who believe that real friendship and co-operation between Great Britain and Germany are essential to the establishment of enduring peace not only in Western Europe but throughout the world, strongly deprecate the attempt which is being made to sabotage an Anglo-German rapprochement by distorting the facts of the Czecho-Slovak settlement.

We believe that the Munich Agreement was nothing more than the rectification of one of the most flagrant injustices of the Peace Treaty. It took nothing from Czecho-Slovakia to which that country could rightly lay claim, and gave nothing to Germany which could have been rightfully withheld. We see in the policy so courageously pursued by the Prime Minister (Neville Chamberlain) the end of a long period of lost opportunities and the promise of a new era to which the tragic years that have gone since the War will seem like a bad dream.”

Signed by:
Lord Arnold, Captain Bernard Ackworth, Prof. Sir Raymond Beazley, Mr. C.E Carroll, Sir. John Smedley Crooke, M.P., Mr. W.H. Dawson, Admiral Sir, Barry Domville, Mr. A.E.R Dyer, Lord Fairfax of Cameron, Viscount Hardinge of Penshurst, Mr. F.C Jarvis, Mr. Douglas Jerrold, Sir. John Latta, Prof. A.P Laurie, The Marquess of Londonderry, Vice-Admiral V.B Molteno, Captain A.H Maule Ramsey, M.P., Mr. Wilmot Nicholson, Lord Redesdale, Captain Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers, Capt. Arthur Rogers, OBE, Maj-Gen, Arthur Solly-Flood, Mrs. Nesta Webster, Mr. Bernard Wilson. – The Times, October 6th 1938 (Note: This letter was held up for five days before The Times reluctantly agree to publish it.

and:

The Munich Pact “… was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life.”
– Prof. A.J.P. Taylor, Historian

Much more here:
http://justice4germans.wordpress.com/th ... t-germany/

- Hannover

[Mkk]

More then 3 million Germans lived in the Sudetenland. That's twice the population of Northern Ireland, and over 1,000 times larger then that of the Falkland islands. Britain went to war over the tiny population of the former ; and would do for the population of the later, who have unquestionably aired their wish to remain British.

Germany had ever right to her ancestral territory the Sudetenland.

[Hohenems]

To be fair, most of the Sudetenland had never been German. It was Austrian. Different people.

[Hannover]

To be fair, most of the Sudetenland had never been German. It was Austrian. Different people.

Wrong. The inconvenient fact is that Sudeten Germans overwhelmingly wanted to be united with Germany.

“The worst offence was the subjection of over three million Germans to Czech rule.”
– H.N Brailsford, Leading left wing commentator

“If the principle of self-determination had been applied in Germany’s favor, as it was applied against her, it would have meant the return of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, parts of Poland, the Polish Corridor and Danzig to the Reich.”
- Lord Lothian, in his last speech to Chatham House

“Personally I am sorry to say I am convinced that we cannot permanently prevent these Sudeten Germans from coming into the Reich if they wish it and undoubtedly, the majority today do so.”
– Neville Henderson to Lord Halifax

- Hannover

[Hohenems]

I think you missed my point, Hannover.

My point was that the German-speaking population in the Sudetenland had never politically been in union with Germany. They had been in political union with Austria until 1919.

My point had nothing to do with whether they wanted to become Germans in 1938.

Finally, Austria and Germany have been separate countries for some time, despite the Anschluss between 1938 and 1945. Bismarck notably decline to annex Austria in the 1860s, which he could have done if he'd so chosen. Prussia was certainly powerful enough.

[Hannover]

My point was that the German-speaking population in the Sudetenland had never politically been in union with Germany. They had been in political union with Austria until 1919.

My point had nothing to do with whether they wanted to become Germans in 1938.

Finally, Austria and Germany have been separate countries for some time, despite the Anschluss between 1938 and 1945. Bismarck notably decline to annex Austria in the 1860s, which he could have done if he'd so chosen. Prussia was certainly powerful enough.

Then your point is flawed. It has everything to do with whether they wanted to be part of Germany. Right to self determination is every ethnic group's right, and the Sudeten Germans were no different. Also, the Anchluss was overwhelmingly supported by 'Austrians' who thought of themselves as German.
Who cares what Bismarck did or did not want to do? That is not the period of this forum. Using your argument we could go all the way back to the Holy Roman Empire.
The Munich Agreement was not act of coercion and as quoted, was the right thing to do.

- Hannover

[Hohenems]

Nothing of what I've been saying has been for or against the Munich Agreement. In my opinion, since the Anschluss had already occurred, union with the Reich in 1938 made perfect sense. That they the Sudetens wanted union was icing on the cake.

The sum total of what I was saying is that Sudeten Germans couldn't have been "reunited" with Germany because they were never part of Germay to be begin with. I don't think that's terribly difficult to understand.

[Mkk]

To be fair, most of the Sudetenland had never been German. It was Austrian. Different people.

Austrians are Germans. That's a fact.

Under the rule of the German-Austrian empire, the Sudeten Germans were content. It was only when they were placed under Czech Slavic rule that they expressed the desire to unite with Germany (which had earlier also absorbed Austria).

[Kingfisher]

Although the Sudeten Germans were under Austrian rule for centuries they were a geographically-contiguous fringe to the other ethnic Germans in the multitude of small states that eventually became Germany, not with Austrian Germans, so, through interaction, culturally as well as geographically closer to them. In any case one glance at a map shows that, had Anschluss not occurred, union with Austria would have been geographically nonsensical and, as far as I am aware no one ever suggested it.

[Hohenems]

Whether Austrians are Germans is largely a matter of opinion. It depends on how you define "German."

If it's a definition based on common language, then certainly the "German" spoken in the town from which I draw my handle here would raise some questions, as it has to be subtitled on television in Berlin and can't be understood at all in Kiel.

If it's a definition based on genetics, then I'd say Austrians and Bavarians are kindred peoples with each other but not with Prussians.

The key thing that makes an Austrian an Austrian, however, is the role of the Catholic Church. So again, maybe Bavarians and Austrians are kindred, but not northern Germans.

Back on topic, Sudetens spoke Austro-Bavarian dialect and were Catholics and had not previously lived under a German government. Therefore, I'd call them Austrians before I'd call them Germans.

But I think they deserved union with Germany in 1938 if they wanted it, adn they did.

[Hannover]

Hohenems,
Regardless of what you think, the Sudeten Germans and the Germans of Germany proper all thought of themselves as German. And, the Sudeten Germans were being victimized by the 'Czechs" and wanted the protection of their brethren. Anyone with a sense of fair play has to allow the Sudetens to join with their own kind.

- Hannover

[MCP3]

Here is an ethnic map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1911. Both, the German-Austrians and the Sudeten-Germans are listed as: Germans

[Lamprecht]

Czechoslovakia was a creation of Versailles and did not exist before. It was an unhappy union of multiple ethnic groups, there are no "Czechoslovakian" people. They were never asked to be "Unified" in this way and clearly did not like it: The Slovaks seceded in March 1939, and the Czechs and Slovaks again broke apart at the first opportunity they had in 1991. Recommended:

Why did Germany annex all of Czechoslovakia? / Anschluss of the Sudeten Regions
viewtopic.php?t=9569

Allowing the Germans stranded in this failed state "Czechoslovakia" to unify with Germany (which they wanted) is construed as a begrudging "appeasement" but the reality is that it was no such thing. Rather, it was righting a wrong that was made at the so-called "Peace treaty" of Versailles.

From John Wear's book:

The Czechoslovakia Crisis & The Munich Agreement

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 3.25 million German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia were transferred to the new Czechoslovakia in a flagrant disregard of Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of self-determination. The new Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic, multilingual, Catholic-Protestant conglomerate that had never existed before. From 1920 to 1938, repeated petitions had been sent to the League of Nations by the repressed minorities of Czechoslovakia. By 1938, the Sudeten Germans were eager to be rid of Czech rule and become part of Germany. In a fair plebiscite, a minimum of 80% of Sudeten Germans would have voted to become part of the new Reich.[54]

It was clear to Czech leaders that the excitement among the Sudeten Germans after the Anschluss would soon force the resolution of the Sudeten question. The Czech cabinet and military leaders decided on May 20, 1938, to order a partial mobilization of the Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the false accusation that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. Czech leaders hoped that the resulting confusion would commit the British and French to the Czech position before a policy favoring concessions to the Sudeten Germans could be implemented. Although the plot failed, Czech leaders granted interviews in which they claimed that Czechoslovakia had scored a great victory over Germany. An international press campaign representing that Czechoslovakia had forced Hitler to back down from his planned aggression reverberated around the world.[55]

British Ambassador to Germany Nevile Henderson believed that the Czech mobilization of its army, and the ridicule heaped upon Hitler by the world press, led directly to the Munich Agreement:

The defiant gesture of the Czechs in mobilizing some 170,000 troops and then proclaiming to the world that it was their action which had turned Hitler away from his purpose was…regrettable. But what Hitler could not stomach was the exultation of the press. …Every newspaper in America and Europe joined in the chorus. “No” had been said and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc. It was, above all, this jubilation which gave Hitler the excuse for his…worst brain storm of the year, and pushed him definitely over the border line from peaceful negotiation to the use of force. From May 23rd to May 28th his fit of sulks and fury lasted, and on the later date he gave orders for a gradual mobilization of the army, which should be prepared for all eventualities in the autumn.[56]

By the 1930s, the majority of the British people believed that Germany had been wronged at Versailles. The British people now broadly supported the appeasement of Germany in regaining her lost territories. If appeasement meant granting self-determination to the Sudetenland Germans, the British people approved.[57]

Lord Halifax informed French leaders on July 20, 1938, that a special fact-finding mission under Lord Runciman would be sent to Czechoslovakia. President Benes of Czechoslovakia was disturbed by this news. It was a definite indication that the British might adopt a compromising policy toward Germany in the crisis. The British mission completed its study in September 1938, and it reported that the main difficulty in the Sudeten area had been the disinclination of the Czechs to grant reforms. This British report was accompanied by the final rupture of negotiations between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech leaders. The Czech crisis was coming to a climax.[58]

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Hitler’s mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the Czech problem directly with Hitler. At their meeting Hitler consented to refrain from military action while Chamberlain would discuss with his cabinet the means of applying the principle of self-determination to the Sudeten Germans. The result was a decision to transfer to Germany areas in which the Sudeten Germans occupied more than 50% of the population. President Benes of Czechoslovakia reluctantly accepted this proposal.[59]

A problem developed in the negotiations when Chamberlain met with Hitler a second time. Hitler insisted on an immediate German military occupation of regions where the Sudeten Germans were more than half of the population. Hitler also insisted that the claims of the Polish and Hungarian minorities be satisfied before participating in the proposed international guarantee of the new Czechoslovakia frontier. Several days of extreme tension followed. Chamberlain announced on Sept. 28, 1938, to the House of Commons that Hitler had invited him, together with Daladier and Mussolini, to a conference in Munich the following afternoon. The House erupted in an outburst of tremendous enthusiasm.[60]

The parties signed the Munich Agreement in the early hours of Sept. 30, 1938. Hitler got substantially everything he wanted. The Sudeten Germans had become a part of Germany. Chamberlain and Hitler signed a joint declaration that the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German naval accord symbolized “the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with each other again.” Chamberlain told the cheering crowd in London that welcomed him home, “I believe it is peace in our time.”[61]
War had been averted in Europe.

The British war enthusiasts lost no time in launching their effort to spoil the celebration of the Munich Agreement. On Oct. 1, 1938, First Lord of the Admiralty Alfred Duff Cooper announced that he was resigning from the British cabinet. In a speech delivered on Oct. 3, 1938, Cooper criticized the British government for not assuming a definite commitment during the Czech crisis. He asserted that Great Britain would not have been fighting for the Czechs, but rather for the balance of power, which was precious to some British hearts. Duff Cooper believed that it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a dominant position on the continent.[62]

Clement Attlee, the new Labor Party leader, spoke of the Munich Agreement as a huge victory for Hitler and an “annihilating defeat for democracy.” Of course, Attlee in his speech included the Soviet Union as a democracy. Anthony Eden gave a speech in which he criticized Chamberlain on detailed points, and expressed doubt that Britain would fulfill her promised guarantee to the Czech state. Eden advised the House to regard the current situation as a mere pause before the next crisis. He claimed that the British armament campaign was proceeding too slowly.[63]

In his speech on Oct. 5, 1938, Winston Churchill stated that Hitler had extracted British concessions at pistol point, and he loved to use the image of Hitler as a gangster. Churchill used flowery rhetoric and elegant phrases to describe the allegedly mournful Czechs slipping away into darkness. Churchill wanted to convince his countrymen that National Socialist Germany was governed by an insatiable desire for world conquest. The simple and stark purpose of the speech was to convince the British people to eventually accept a war of annihilation against Germany. Churchill was a useful instrument in building up British prejudice against Germany.[64]

The debate on the Munich Agreement surpassed all other parliamentary debates on British foreign policy since World War I. Other Conservatives who refused to accept the Munich Agreement include Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Leopold Amery, Harold Nicolson, Roger Keyes, Sidney Herbert, and Gen. Edward Spears. These men were joined by a score of lesser figures in the House of Commons, and they were supported by such prominent people as Lord Cranborne and Lord Wolmer in the House of Lords. Chamberlain won the vote of confidence, but he did not possess the confidence of the British Conservative Party.[65]

The warmongering that led to World War II was increasing in Great Britain. Hitler was dismayed at the steady stream of hate propaganda directed at Germany. In a speech given in Saarbruecken on Oct. 9, 1938, Hitler said: “…All it would take would be for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to come to power in England instead of Chamberlain, and we know very well that it would be the goal of these men to immediately start a new world war. They do not even try to disguise their intents, they state them openly.”[66]
...
[54] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-215.
[55] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 106-107.
[56] Henderson, Sir Nevile, Failure of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, pp. 142-143.
[57] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-227.
[58] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 108.
[59] Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 53-54.
[60] Ibid., p. 54.
[61] Ibid., p. 55.
[62] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 180-181.
[63] Ibid., p. 188.
[64] Ibid., p. 190.
[65] Ibid., p. 191.
[66] Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy, Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2012, p. 324.

Germany's War: The Origins, Aftermath and Atrocities of World War II
https://www.unz.com/book/john_wear__germanys-war/

[Otium]

Although the Sudeten Germans were under Austrian rule for centuries they were a geographically-contiguous fringe to the other ethnic Germans in the multitude of small states that eventually became Germany, not with Austrian Germans, so, through interaction, culturally as well as geographically closer to them. In any case one glance at a map shows that, had Anschluss not occurred, union with Austria would have been geographically nonsensical and, as far as I am aware no one ever suggested it.

I suppose I don't understand what you're trying to say. On the one hand you're saying it would've been geographically nonsensical for the Sudeten Germans to seek unification with Austria, which I agree with, they do not share a border. But then, you say that they're geographically contiguous, and that they share a culture through interaction with the Austrians? I would've expected the Sudeten Germans to have interacted more, and thus been more culturally similar to the (in whatever meagre way you could hope to differentiate) Germans.