Emainsteen wrote:Hello can anyone help me to provide proof of sources or authentic documents about Hitler's proposal to Poland. Thank you.
The German proposals were fairly consistent and changed very little throughout the October 1938 - August 1939 period.
It's often forgotten, if not totally ignored, that it was actually Poland who first floated to the Germans the prospect of a settlement over Danzig just prior to the signing of the Munich agreement. This offer was taken up by the Germans on October 24th 1938, with the 8 point proposal offered by Ribbentrop to the Polish ambassador Lipski. This fact, by the way, completely contradicts the narrative that some disingenuous actors have tried to promote, that Hitler had "no more territorial demands" to make in Europe. For the problem of Danzig, if not West Prussia, was a well known grievance resulting from Versailles.
Though objectively the German claim on Poland had been considered justified before the ink on the Versailles treaty was even dry [...] it seems doubtful whether Great Britain or France would have guaranteed Poland, had they known that it was the Polish foreign secretary, Colonel Joseph Beck, who had at the height of the Munich crisis initiated bilateral talks with Germany to settle the problem of Danzig and the Corridor and in which, after Germany had let him have the Teschen area of Czechoslovakia, he then refused to make concessions. Beck played his cards skilfully; only after having been offered and having accepted the British and French guarantees did he reveal that the Germans were making actual demands. In itself a diplomatic masterpiece, this had consequences for Poland which were hardly worth the gamble.
H.W. Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Macmillan, 1985), Pp. 192f. Also see: David L. Hoggan, The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed (Institute for Historical Review, 1989), Pp. 144ff; Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II? (Castle Hill Publishers, 2014), Pp. 223; Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland (Oxford University Press, 1976), Pp. 157-58; Stefan Scheil, Ribbentrop: Oder Die Verlockung des nationalen Aufbruchs: Eine politische Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 2013), Pp. 213.
The Poles therefore initiated the talks over Danzig, and they were even the first and last, to make the threat of war before the Germans took the initiative to right the wrongs of Versailles and restore Greater Germany.
As previously mentioned, the first German offer was presented to the Polish Ambassador by Ribbentrop on October 24, 1938:
Ribbentrop broached the German proposals in an interview with Lipski on 24 October 1938:1. The Free State of Danzig would revert to the German Reich.
2. An extra-territorial Reichsautobahn belonging to Germany and likewise an extra-territorial, multiple-track railroad would be laid through the Corridor.
3. Similarly, Poland would receive in the Danzig area an extra-territorial road or Autobahn, a railroad, and a free port.
4· Poland would receive a guarantee of a market for her goods in the Danzig area.
5. The two nations would recognize their common boundaries (guarantee) or each other's territories.
6. The German-Polish treaty would be extended 10 to 25 years.
7. Poland would accede to the Anti-Comintem Pact.
8. The two countries would add a consultation clause to their treaty.
Newman, op cit., p. 158.
The Poles had no intention of accepting this moderate German offer, which remained the basis for attempted negotiations on the part of Germany until war broke out. The sinister political maneuver that resulted from this initial German attempt at good-will was for Beck to tell the British that the Germans, specifically Ribbentrop, had made such an offer without Hitler's authority and never handed any such proposals over to him. This was a bald faced lie, Beck himself had had meetings with Hitler in January 1939:
These points were presented to Ambassador Josef Lipski by Ribbentrop and later handed over in writing together with the recording of the conversation. This last statement is important, because it was exactly this that the Polish government in the following months steadfastly denied to the entire Western world, even when Great Britain had already given its promises of guarantee. Josef Beck told Neville Chamberlain on April 4, 1939, that written German demands for a road to East Prussia had never been handed over. He could at most imagine that Herr von Ribbentrop had such ideas, but probably without the approval of his boss, he faithfully assured him. Such forms of disinformation were part and parcel of political debate, but Beck used them to such an unusual extent that in the end no one wanted to work with him anymore.
Scheil, op cit., p. 212.
Naughty naughty! The Poles seem to have a habit of digging their own grave and blaming others for it.
Hitler and von Ribbentrop on 24 October and 19 November 1938, on 5, 25, and 26 January 1939, and finally on March 21 and on 28 April ask the Polish government at first only indirectly and then directly and later pressingly to resolve and settle by way of negotiation the still open problem about Danzig and the extraterritorial transit connections through the Corridor.
George F. Held (trans.), Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, 1939 - The War that Had Many Fathers (Munich: Olzog-Verlag, 2011), Pp. 512.
After these above mentioned dates, there was basically no diplomatic contact between Germany and Poland over the Danzig question until August. Every single time Germany offered a reasonable solution, Poland shot them down and wouldn't budge. The only realistic option Hitler was left with after that, was to try and find a military solution to the problem. But even then, he by no means fully resigned himself to that outcome (Rhonhof, 1939, p. 522f.), even though I think he would've preferred it, simply because he didn't want to waste any time bartering over stolen goods that should be returned to her rightful owner. This is beyond reproach, regardless of the methods.
Nonetheless, the German offers remained remarkably consistent, and only changed slightly after the Soviet Union became more involved in the unfolding affairs:
The German demands on Poland went little beyond those already known - return of Danzig and the corridor after a plebiscite, but rejection of international guarantees without consultation with the Soviet Union.
Karlheinz Weißmann, Der Weg in den Abgrund: Deutschland unter Hitler 1933 bis 1945 (Herbig, 1997), Pp. 319.
For example, on March 21, 1939 Ribbentrop had reiterated to Lipski the German proposals from October and made no new adjustments:
Ribbentrop repeated to Lipski the terms of the October 24, 1938, offer to Poland. He reminded the Polish diplomat that Germany had no desire to change the terms of that offer. He discussed the advantages of an agreement, and he repeated that Germany was requesting only the political union of National Socialist Danzig with National Socialist Germany, and the transit connection with East Prussia.
Hoggan, op cit., p. 315.
Germany could've asked for more than Danzig, yet she never did. For example, Germany had a moral claim to all of West Prussia, yet at no point did she demand the reincorporation of West Prussia into the Reich. Only Danzig. Hitler however, did offer a plebiscite in the region of Pomerelia, which the Poles rejected. That the Poles would later complain about the loss of their own autonomy is rather ironic in light of all this:
In 1938 and 1939 the dispute between Germany and Poland over the northern part of Pomerelia-West Prussia comes to a head at the same time as the dispute over Danzig. In 1938 the German Reich initially asks only for safe extraterritorial traffic routes through the northern part of Pomerelia, through the so-called Corridor. When Poland does not grant that, Germany calls for a plebiscite in the disputed region. It is worth noting that Germany, up to the outbreak of war, never once asks Poland to return the whole of West Prussia.
Rhonhof, op cit., p. 445.
Anyway, best not to rattle on. Search the forum for Hitler's 16 points, which was the final, most generous offer Hitler proposed to the Poles which they rejected just before the war broke out.