[Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

[Otium]

Certain historical figures are lauded for their speeches, on the Allied side of WW2 Churchill is particularly praised for no doubt numerous reasons, mostly for his "inspirational" defiance of Hitler that those who support the Allies find genuinely motivational, and no less truthful. Yet, when it comes to Hitler, those same people denounce every word he utters as a lie. They claim that Hitler was speaking to crowds of people and so it was unlikely that he could possibly have been telling the truth. Of course, anyone who has a public image is likely to think long and hard about what they say once the spotlight is on them, and we generally give the benefit of the doubt to those we trust.

The assertion Hitler was simply spreading lies, misinformation and worse, propaganda, is a tired boring old canard that comes from a place of deep-seated hatred and a desperation to dismiss whatever it is Hitler said that could contradict the conventional narrative. The people who say such things about Hitler have most likely never read a single speech of his. He didn't simply rattle off accusations or make statements he didn't back up. He made arguments, he used sarcasm, and bound it all within a convincing logical framework. He had real talent for decimating his opponents in his speeches. For example the speech he gave in reply to Roosevelt on April 28th, 1939 (Domarus, p. 1562ff.). Or his speech made on March 23rd, 1933 (Domarus, p. 275ff.) that he wrote on the fly in the Reichstag, directly responding to points made by his Social Democratic opponents in real time. Another speech worth mentioning, is that given on January 30th, 1940, where Hitler spoke about the hypocrisy of British Imperialism being opposed to Germany fighting for her own land, which was robbed of her:


(For the full text of this speech, see: Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler: His Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945 (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers), Pp. 1922ff. See p. 1925 for exact page from the video. Also see Hitler's speech on November 8th, 1939. Domarus, p. 1865ff.)

Hitler's 'A Last Appeal to Reason' is his most famous. Those who criticize Hitler's attempts for peace often do so on the grounds that he was "evil" and so the British should've fought on. This is coupled with the lie that the British had a noble cause to liberate countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia, which at wars end, the British and their Allies just didn't do. Rendering their initial moral claim against Hitler to be worthless - even though it had no foundation to begin with.

Few people know that the aforementioned speech was not the first time Hitler had uttered his desire for peace. He hate spoken the same words numerous times in private, no doubt more than we can ever know of for sure. This fact, as I will show, confirms the sincere nature of Hitler's famous peace offer.

It was not my ambition to wage wars, but to build up a new social state of the highest culture.

And every year of war takes me away from my work.

[...]

A great world empire will be destroyed. A world empire which I never had the ambition to destroy or as much as harm. Alas, I am fully aware that the continuation of this war will end only in the complete shattering of one of the two warring parties. Mr. Churchill may believe this to be Germany.

I know it to be England. In this hour I feel compelled, standing before my conscience, to direct yet another appeal to reason in England. I believe I can do this as I am not asking for something as the vanquished, but rather, as the victor, I am speaking in the name of reason. I see no compelling reason which could force the continuation of this war.

Hitler sig.png (2.3 KiB) Viewed 907 times

Adolf Hitler,
July 19, 1940

Source: Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler: His Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945 (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers), Pp. 2062

Hitler did seriously desire peace, and this is admitted by many historians. One such example is Frederic Spotts, who wrote the definitive book on Hitler the Artist. Although he doesn't go the whole way, he admits Hitler's offer to Churchill in 1940 was genuine and that Hitler later lamented on the fact that Churchill ignored it. Hitler also reiterated that he would much rather be spending his time on artistic creations, not war:

Having failed to induce Churchill to drop out of the war in 1940, he complained to his field commanders, 'It is a pity that I have to wage war on account of that drunk instead of serving the works of peace.' A little later he commented, 'Military battles are eventually forgotten. Our buildings, however, will stand.' And, speaking of the cultural marvels he intended to create after his final victory, he assured his staff, 'The funds which I shall devote to these will vastly exceed the expenditures which we found necessary for the conduct of this war.'

Did he mean what he said? Are his words credible in light of the indescribable death and destruction he caused? Shortly after he launched his war in 1939, Albert Speer's secretary overheard him say, 'We must end this war quickly. We don't want war; we want to build.' Years later she asked herself, 'Are we to think that that was a lie too?' It was not a lie, as the following pages show, but it was a half-truth. He wanted both war and art. Once he had won his war and established an Aryan state that was a dominant world power, he intended to devote himself to the creation of cultural monuments that would change the face of Germany and immortalize himself. Destruction was to be the way to construction.

Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (The Overlook Press, 2009), Pp. xi-xii

Of course, the claim Hitler "wanted" war is dubious, as is the opposite claim that Hitler was the most peaceful man to ever live. Neither is true. Hitler was willing to wage war for the sake of the German people, to liberate them from the encirclement of the Allies, and the balance of power policies. He wanted to take back what belonged to his people, even if it meant resorting to war. The mistake is believing that war is always bad, when in truth, every power at this time was willing to go to war if it mean't getting what they wanted. Hitler was no different, and Spotts, albeit in fewer words, still expresses this fact. Although he puts the typical anti-Hitler sentiment behind it. When in truth Hitler did nothing wrong.

Also in 1940, although I cannot be sure of the exact date, Lothrop Stoddard's book 'Into the Darkness' was published, and he confirmed a key element of the speech made in July 1940, that of Hitler's regret over the war, and his lingering thoughts on the work he's been unable to accomplish because of it:

I expressed in my best German my appreciation of the honor that was being shown me, calling him Excellency, as foreigners are supposed to do. Hitler smiled again at my little speech, motioned to the sofa, and said: “Won’t you sit down?’’, himself taking the nearest chair about a yard away from me. My German evidently made a good impression, for he complimented me upon my accent, from which he inferred that I had been to Germany before. I assured him that he was correct, but went on to say that this was my first view 6f the Third Reich. To which he replied, with a slight shake of the head: “A pity you couldn’t have seen it in peacetime.”

The conversation of about twenty minutes which followed these preliminaries naturally cannot be repeated, because I had given my word to that effect. Hitler, however, told me no deep, dark secrets—heads of States don’t do that sort of thing with foreign visitors. I think it is no breach of my agreement to say that much of his talk dealt neither with the war nor politics but with great rebuilding plans which the war had constrained him temporarily to lay aside. His regretful interest in those matters seemed to show that he still had them very much in mind.

Lothrop Stoddard, Into the Darkness: Nazi Germany Today (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1940), Pp. 205-206.

Hitler's other favourite architect, Hermann Giesler, recorded a moment after the fall of France, when Hitler spoke again about his desire for peace:

Silently we walked up and down the narrow path through the forest. Then Adolf Hitler stopped and said with great emphasis:

I want peace—and I will do anything to make peace! It is not too late yet. I will go to the limit of the possible as long as the sacrifice and dignity of the German nation allows it. I know of better things than waging war! If I merely think about the loss of German blood—the best always fall, the bravest and the ones willing to be sacrificed; their task should be to exemplify the nation.

I do not need to make a name by warmongering like Churchill. I would like to make my name as a steward of the German people. I want to secure its unity and Lebensraum, add to achieve to it the National new rebuilding Socialism of and the shape German the cities environment according— to modern knowledge. I would like that the people will be happy there and be proud of their town, their lebensraum, and nation.

Carolyn Yeager & Wilhelm Kriessmann, Ph.D., The Artist Within the Warlord: An Adolf Hitler You've Never Known (The Barnes Review, Second Edition, 2018), Pp. 21

August Kubizek, Hitler's friend from his formative teenage years relayed in his memoirs an episode from July 23rd, 1940, when he had met Hitler again for the second or third time as an adult, and was invited to view Wagner's operas during the Bayreuth festival that year. Unfortunately the war was taking its toll on the production, which upset Hitler:

During the second act on 23 July 1940, Wolfgang Wagner, her second son, hurried up and asked me to follow him. We went to the lounge where about twenty people were gathered, speaking in excited tones. Hitler’s personal adjutant had reported my arrival, and Hitler appeared wearing uniform – a field-grey jacket as opposed to the civilian clothes he wore in 1939 – and greeted me as usual by extending both hands. He was tanned and looked healthy. He seemed even more pleased to see me than before. Guiding me to the long wall of the room, we stood alone, the guests continuing their private conversations. ‘This performance is nowadays the only one I can attend,’ he said. ‘There is nothing else for it; it is the war.’ With a growling undertone he added, ‘This war will set us back many years in our building programme. It is a tragedy. I did not become Chancellor of the Greater German Reich to fight wars.’ I was surprised that he spoke in that vein after his great military successes in Poland and France. Perhaps he saw in my countenance the unmistakable signs of age and realised that time was not leaving him untouched.

This war is robbing me of my best years,’ he went on, ‘You know, Kubizek, how many things I have planned, what I still want to build. But I would like to be around to see it, understand me? You know better than anyone how many plans I have carried with me from my youth. So far I have only been able to realise a few. I still have an enormous amount to do, but who will do it? Time will not stand still. We are getting older, Kubizek. A few more years and it is too late to do what remains to be done.’

That strangely excited voice which I knew from my youth, trembling with impatience, now began to describe the great projects for the future: the spread of the autobahns, the modernisation of the commercial waterways and railway network, and much else. I was scarcely able to keep up with it all. Again I received the impression that he wanted to justify his intentions to the witness of his youthful ideas. I might be only an insignificant civil servant, but for him I was the only person who remained from his teenage days. Possibly it was more satisfying for him to lay bare his ideas to a simple compatriot who was not even a Party member than to the military and political decision-makers who surrounded him.

August Kubizek, The Young Hitler I Knew (Frontline Books, 2011), Pp. 257

It should be noted that Kubizek was loyal to Hitler as a friend, not as a political associate, for Kubizek hadn't joined the NSDAP until 1942 as a gesture to his friend. He wasn't involved in anything political. In fact, Kubizek himself was always apolitical. The general veracity, save a few criticisms, of the memoirs are confirmed in Ian Kershaw's introduction.

Finally, General Otto Ernst Remer, when interviewed in the late 1980s relayed his own story of Hitler lamenting to him the same dissatisfaction with the war, and his desire to undertake his work that was deprived of him:

Q: Was Hitler too soft on England?

A: ...That was a mistake of Hitler's. Hitler always pursued policies based on ideology. One result was the alliance with Fascist Italy, which ended in the betrayal by Italy. And Hitler always believed in the Nordic Germanic race and in the Nordic people, which included the English. That's why he made repeated offers of peace to Britain, which were always brusquely rejected. That's an important reason why we never occupied Britain, which would have eliminated Britain from the war. But for ideological reasons, Hitler did not do that, which was certainly a mistake. But, after all, who does not make mistakes?

Hitler once said to me: "Every day that this war continues keeps me from doing the work that I am still destined to accomplish for the welfare of the German people."

He was referring to his domestic policies and programs. Hitler was terribly unhappy that he couldn't accomplish these things, but instead had to devote himself to the war. The period of peace lasted only six years, but what a great transformation was achieved during that short time!

General Otto Ernst Remer, quoted in an interview published by The Journal of Historical Review, Spring 1990 (Vol. 10, No. 1), pages 108-117. See: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v10/v10p108_Schoeman.html Archive: https://archive.vn/Z5hiB

What we see is that Hitler wanted peace, and he reiterated why he wanted it in the same way, multiple times publicly and privately. The fact to take away from all this, is that even if Hitler started the war (which he didn't) it doesn't matter, because he, more than anyone, wanted and tried to end it as quickly as possible.

[Otium]

I found a full version of that document, or rather that specific page. There is more to it for sure, is this the only page we have? It starts on #2, #5 is not finished. The first paragraph before "2." sounds like something that would be at the top of every document, not a continuation of what would be #1 (or "section 1" referred to in point 3). There's a good chance they had a summary or table of peace offers and dates in the full report somewhere.


mirror: http://archive.fo/hbaJO

I found the entirety of the document, including a second document entitled 'Summary of Principle Peace Feelers, April 1941 to June 1942'. There's also a section among these documents from the German resistance and their peace feelers. I will not quote the whole thing, but I will provide the full references and where you can read the document in full for yourself, and also quote an interesting section or two.

The document 'Summary of Principle Peace Feelers, September 1939 - March 1941' comes from the Public Record Office/London (PRO): F.O. 371/26542/C4216. The second document 'Summary of Principle Peace Feelers, April 1941 to June 1942' comes from PRO, PREM 4/100/8. Which have been reproduced here: https://archive.org/details/dasanderedeutsch0000angl/page/164/mode/2up

The British in these documents confirm that Hitler's peace offers were genuine, but nevertheless it was British policy to unequivocally reject them:

It will be recalled that during the period from September 1939 to the spring of 1941 Hitler made two direct offers of a compromise peace, one after the lightning campaign in Poland, the other after the collapse of France. These offers were seriously meant, and there is little doubt that Hitler was disappointed at the decisive manner in which they were rejected.

Since the spring of 1941 the technique has altered and has been adapted to the changes in the international situation. When Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R. on the 22nd June, 1941, it is clear that he hoped he would be able to achieve a lightning victory in six or eight weeks and that the Allies would be brought to admit that their position was hopeless and that a compromise peace, probably on an anti-Bolshevist basis, was inevitable. During July and August the way for such a peace offensive was sedulously prepared by diplomatic activity, contacts between German businessmen and neutrals, and other methods. As far as this country was concerned, it was, however, answered in advance by the Prime Minister's broadcast on the 22nd June, in which he pledged assistance to the U.S.S.R., and by Mr. Eden in a speech on the 5th July at Leeds, in which he made it clear that His Majesty's Government were not in any circumstances prepared to negotiate with Hitler at any time on any subject. The subsequent course of the Eastern Campaign in any case frustrated Hitler's intentions for the time being.

'Summary of Principle Peace Feelers, April 1941 to June 1942', PRO, PREM 4/100/8. Quoted in: Lothar Kettenacker, Das "andere Deutschland" im Zweiten Weltkrieg : Emigration u. Widerstand in internat. Perspektive = The "other Germany" in the Second World War : emigration and resistance in international perspective (Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, 1977), Pp. 187-188.

One then has to wonder what Hitler was left to do? The British herein admit that they would not discuss anything with Hitler at all. That he would be forced to invade the Soviet Union, even if they weren't planning to attack him, is only reasonable, seeing as the Allies were obviously betting on support from Russia and attempting to illicit it from them. Hitler could not possibly have pretended that such a situation would've been good for Germany - it would mean encirclement. So, we can say that the British obstinacy also led to the invasion of the Soviet Union - thus they are also responsible.

The British, perhaps like the Germans, were willing to do whatever it took to win. The difference is that the Germans had the moral high ground, while the British did not. The Germans were also deeply dedicated to peace, while the British obviously were not.

To prove this point further, I would like to quote from the stenographic records of Hitler's conversations with his generals, and others, which was faithfully recorded and preserved by the Reich government itself, until being found by the Allies. Unlike the dubious nature of the Table Talks, these transcripts are complete and reliable. I haven't heard anyone claim otherwise. These documents were for the first time published in English, in full in 2002. Only in fragments have these documents been seen before. It's obvious that Hitler when discussing with various people didn't intend for these discussions to be made public, nor were they made public. It conveys his true thoughts.

On Wednesday April 25th, 1945, Hitler had a conversation with Joseph Goebbels:

I now how it was in the winter of 1940. I didn't go to war against Moscow out of carelessness, but because on the basis of certain information, I knew that an alliance between England and Russia was being prepared. The question was whether we should begin to strike ourselves or whether we should wait and be crushed to death sometime. [—] Now, I became acquainted with Molotov at that time. The Russians hadn't achieved any overwhelming international successes at that time. They were defeated in Finland. Then they occupied a few areas. In the Polish campaign they waited too long—until we were well past the agreed demarcation line. Then came our campaign in the West, in which we achieved a huge victory. The Russians hadn't expected that at all. It was the biggest victory in the history of the world. Then came the various demonstrations by our Luftwaffe against England. And in this whole situation, Molotov demanded things from us in Berlin that were outrageous. [—] He demanded from us that we withdraw from bases on Danish territory at the exist to the North Sea. He had already announced a claim to that back then. He demanded Constantinople, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland—and we were the winners at that time! How will this Molotov act now toward the British and the Americans with such victories and after these catastrophic failures of the Allies.

David Glantz, Helmut Heiber ed., Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945: The First Complete Stenographic Record of the Military Situation Conferences, from Stalingrad to Berlin (Enigma Books, 2002), Pp. 724

Hitler confirms a few interesting things here that are of note. For one thing the pressing demands made by Moscow that also contributed to Germany invading the Soviet Union, which indicated the Russians were preparing to attack. He also alludes to what Suvorov later wrote about concerning the purposefully delayed attack on Poland from the Russians. The reason they didn't attack at the same time on September 1st, was because they wanted to ensure the West would declare war on Hitler, to make it look like only Germany invaded Poland. The British, presumably, had no clue at this time about the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that divided Poland in half, which would've forced the British to also declare war on the Soviets. Of course, the British had signed their own secret protocol with the Poles that they would only declare war on Germany. Which further shows us how intent the British were on destroying Hitler, more so than they were about 'protecting' Poland - which was nothing but a pretext to go to war against Germany.

This is further proven by the fact that Britain was happy to appease the Soviet Union and even give her the Baltic states that belonged to other small countries (Walendy, p. 383). And Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow received word from the British government that Stalin could also invade the Balkans and Dardanelles (Ibid., p 384). The fact that the British were trying to buy the friendship of the Russians to fight Hitler, by giving away the sovereignty of smaller states is unequivocally hypocritical, considering they were doing this in light of the British guarantee to Poland that sought to prevent Germany from making a move on Danzig, territory that rightfully belonged to Germany and was under League of Nations protection. All on the moral pretext that Hitler was aggressive towards smaller states and taking away their sovereignty! It should also be noted how the territorial concessions Britain was willing to give the Soviet Union (and did give to them after the war) far out weighted the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which only spoke of spheres of interest, that was not tantamount to permissions to invade (Ribbentrop, p. 112. Also see, Maser, Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin, p. 197).

Hitler, prior to this in the same conversation made a very good point concerning the Russian conquest, also noting the Allied hypocrisy in this area, while also confirming that he didn't start the war in 1939:

I received news that the talks between Eden and Molotov apparently didn't reach a compromise. The Russians demand the whole area. That would mean the whole war would be lost for the British. England started this war because I demanded a corridor to East Prussia and Danzig, with approval under Allied control. And now they're supposed to allow a power that now dominates practically the whole of Europe already and extends into East Asia to advance even further?

Hitler and his Generals, p. 721

This conversation with Ribbentrop was five days prior to Hitler's suicide, he had nothing to gain by lying - nor did he lie. He believed honestly that the British started the war and that he himself was innocent. Historians, instead of facing up to the fact that Hitler was no more evil, or wrong to fight a war than the Allies were to seek it (as they claim Hitler did), instead seek to demonize Hitler further by claiming that he 'just couldn't accept that he was wrong!' or some such rubbish - completely ignoring the fact that Evil Hitler didn't once state his intentions to start an aggressive war, nor did he revel in it, which is not what you'd expect when every historian in the world is telling you how eager Hitler was for a war. Instead you find Hitler talking about making peace and other such overtures to his enemies - who funnily enough, are the people who have been talking about war the most! Hitler's enemies had been pontificating about war ever since Hitler came to power, to the point where it became a self-fulfilling prophecy because of how much they expected it to happen.

Simply looking at the historical record shows you that those who truly wanted war, were those who couldn't shut up about it, and who wouldn't entertain any kind of peaceful offer.

David Glantz in the preface confirms that nobody from the German side tampered with the stenographic record, nor was Hitler lying or otherwise being untruthful. Since no doubt there are people who would seek to make the claim that Hitler cannot be cited in his own defence, of the thoughts that he truly believed:

From the military perspective, claims have been made that these transcripts were no doubt falsified in Hitler's favor. Apart from the fact that this statement would not apply to the great majority of the existing documents anyway—at least not those where a second transcription of the original shorthand notes is available—such an allegation is, after a careful examination of the facts, clearly not the case in other situations either. Falsifying history—and ensuring that the falsification holds—is a laborious task requiring a great deal of diligence and care. It is unthinkable that Hitler himself would have taken the time to edit the documents. Witnesses have also attested that he never once reviewed the transcripts. In fact, he was so sure of himself and his own infallibility (including militarily) that he would never have reviewed or corrected anything. Any of the other persons in question either had no access to the transcripts or lacked the specialised knowledge to evaluate military events.

Ibid., p. xix

Back to the documents. I want to quote again from them. The British in this section I'm going to quote, pretty much confirm the same thing as last time, albeit in a slightly different way that I think should still be quoted because it's interesting.

German peace approaches, direct and indirect, have been a feature of this war. During the period from September 1939 to the Spring of 1941, Hitler made two direct offers of a compromise peace, one after the lightning campaign in Poland, the other after the collapse of France. These offers were seriously meant and there is little doubt that Hitler was disappointed at the decisive manner in which they were rejected.

In the Spring of 1941 the situation changed. Hitler had made up his mind to turn east, having failed to knock or bribe us out of the war. There were no further direct offers. Instead there were a number of indirect invitations to us to join in the crusade against Bolshevism. The offer is still open.

Apart from these more general approaches, there has been a regular flow of indirect overtures through neutral governments and through individuals.

German "Dissident" Groups, PRO: F.O. 371/39087/C 8865. Quoted in: Lothar Kettenacker, Das "andere Deutschland" im Zweiten Weltkrieg : Emigration u. Widerstand in internat. Perspektive = The "other Germany" in the Second World War : emigration and resistance in international perspective (Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, 1977), Pp. 200.

The speeches the British mention are those of 6th October, 1939 and the speech I quoted from in my last post, made on July 19th, 1939. Here is the quote from Hitler's October speech after the defeat of Poland:

Never, and in no instance, have I ever really stood in the way of British interests. Only too often, regrettably, I was forced to ward off British intervention in German interests, even in instances where England’s interests were not concerned in the least.

[...]

Why should there be war in the West? To restore Poland? The Poland of the Treaty of Versailles shall never rise again! This two of the world’s greatest states guarantee.

[...]

What is the reason then? Has Germany placed demands on England which might threaten the British world empire or might have placed into question its existence? No. To the contrary, Germany has not addressed any such demands to either England or France.

Should this war really be waged only to institute a new regime in Germany, then this would mean the destruction of the present Reich; the creation of a new Versailles; the senseless sacrifice of millions of human beings. Neither will the German Reich fall apart nor will a new Versailles rise up.

Two problems are up for discussion today: 1. The settlement of the questions arising from the disintegration of Poland, and 2. the problem of the removal of those international concerns which burden the political and economic lives of all peoples.

What are the goals entertained by the Reich Government with regard to a settlement of the situation in the lands west of the German and Soviet-Russian line of demarcation, recognized as the German sphere of influence?

1. The establishment of a Reich border which, as stressed already, renders justice to the historic, ethnographic, and economic conditions;
2. the ordering of this entire Lebensraum by the criteria of nationalities, i.e. the resolution of the minorities questions which not only concern this area, but all southern and southeastern European states;
3. in this context: the attempt at putting into order and regulating the Jewish problem;
4. the rebuilding of the infrastructure and the economy to the benefit of all peoples living in this area;
5. the guarantee of the security of this entire area, and
6. the establishment of a Polish state, the structure and leadership of which affords us a guarantee that it shall not become yet another source of fire against the German Reich, nor a central office for intrigues spun against Germany and Russia.

Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler: His Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945 (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers), Pp. 1841, 1844-1845.

As we can see Hitler even offers to restore a Polish state. Hitler at this time only desired to keep what belonged to Germany. Domarus however totally ignores this, as do the British in their document on the peace offers when they complain that Hitler 'didn't offer to do anything about Poland' (paraphrasing) which would've amounted to Hitler appeasing the British by abandoning Danzig and the corridor. Which is obviously an outrageous expectation, but nevertheless Domarus also seems to think this idea would've been perfectly reasonable.

He even calls Hitler's attempt at making peace a "demand"! For the first time ever, the demand for peace can be turned into something evil - only when Hitler does it of course! Domarus wouldn't ever call the British, or laughably Polish desire for a "peace" a "demand". Yet he does with Hitler because of his own sanctimonious and disingenuous approach to historical truth.

Yet Domarus, in his spiteful commentary doesn't even deny that Hitler's offers were genuine:

Hitler might well have been less confident in his speech of October 6 had he taken seriously the reaction his proposals, relayed to London by Dahlerus, had elicited in Great Britain.

Ibid., p. 1829.

Prior to this he said:

Hitler intended to take advantage of the occasion to announce his new “generous offer of peace” publicly before the Reichstag. After all, he reasoned, why had England declared war on Germany? Solely because of Poland, was it not so? Well, Poland no longer existed. Germany and Russia had shared in the spoils. There was no longer a reason for this ludicrous state of war to exist between the Reich and England. He was willing and ready to forget.

These and similar thoughts apparently compelled Hitler forward at this time, as the further course of events clearly demonstrated. His ideas of the English and his knowledge of their sense of honor and determination to fight were so restricted that he actually believed they would contemplate such dishonorable conduct. The war between Germany and Britain had barely started, the English had not yet been beaten in even one encounter, and already Hitler thought they were so desperate as to abandon their obligations to Poland and to grasp eagerly his hand extended in friendship. Hitler did not stand alone in self-deception.

Ibid., p. 1828.

He claimed the war had "barely started", well of course! Hitler wanted to end it for just that reason, so no more blood would be spilt.

Yet again we see the iniquity of the historian who revels in war, while attempting to demonize Hitler for just that.

Domarus also ignores the fact that the British were totally incapable of defending Poland, they left them in lurch and required support from Moscow that they didn't receive in 1939 but tried to attain in order to encircle Germany and enforce their guarantee:

Chamberlain saw Beck after lunch and the latter reiterated that he could not accept any guarantee which linked Poland with Russia for fear of provoking Germany. Chamberlain was stymied, having given a rash guarantee, he found his new ally refused any co-operation with Russia - the only power which could make the British guarantee effective.

Richard Lamb, The Drift to War 1922-1939 (W. H. Allen & Co., 1989), Pp. 298, 300.

It's wrong to think that Hitler thought they were "desperate" to abandon their "obligations" that they couldn't even fulfil, nor did they fulfil them in 1945 when they had the chance. Domarus acts as if the British were truly motivated by "honour" and "determination" when, as we've already seen, they were willing to give away the entirety of Eastern Europe, more or less to the Soviets in 1939 in order to smash Germany, not because they were noble. So yes, the British were certainly capable of "such dishonourable conduct", as is Domarus in his, probably, wilful and intentional omittance of this fact. Then again, isn't it dishonourable to make a pact with a nation you cannot defend, thereby securing their invasion and deaths of their civilians because you instilled in them a false sense of hope? Is it not worse to then continue to "pledge" your guarantee in order to make yourself look better, but in deed allow that nation you claimed to defend, to be swallowed up against its will by the Russians whom you then go on to pledge support to! How much MORE dishonourable is that, than simply accepting peace terms with Hitler, that would've stopped the war entirely and still given the Poles their own state, irrespective of the German territory.

The answer is simple. The British, in their bid to remain "loyal" to their guarantee, had to break every single one of their supposed moral principles. Not unwillingly.

Some historians claim that the British guarantee was intended to induce the Poles to make a deal with Germany (how?), yet in practise this obviously didn't work. Nor did it work to put pressure on Germany, in practise it only determined both the Poles and Germans to fight all the more harder for what they each wanted. The British involvement made the situation worse than it ever needed to be, and thereby ensured the Second World War occurred.