Hacha in Berlin, March 1939

[castlewarden]

Who pushed for Czech Republic becoming the Reichsprotectorat Böhmen und Mähren (Protectorat of the Reich Bohemia and Moravia)? Was it Hacha or Hitler? I read somewhere that then Czech president Hacha had a heart attack after his meeting with Hitler. So my guess is rather that Hitler put pressure on Hacha. Hitler was more concerned that Czech Republic becomes a "Soviet aircraft carrier" than Hacha being concerned about a civil war and communist takeover in Czech Republic. I find it rather implausible that the Czech wanted to lose their independence, even when the price would have been the risk of civil war/communist takeover.

Are there any historic documents going into those details?

[Hannover]

I do believe it is rather clear that Hacha truly wanted assistance from Germany.
Good question about documents. I have only seen blame-everything-on-the-Germans propaganda, but no proof. Surely there were real signed documents, but where are they?

- Hannover

[Mkk]

I read about this in defendants' testimony at Nurumburg. Hacha agreed to it, under pressure, because Czechia was collapsing after Germany annexed the Sudetenland.

[Hannover]

Mkk:
Goering's testimony on Hacha and Czechoslovakia at Nuremberg here:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-14-46.asp
start with 300, 14 March 46

So much for Allied propaganda.

- Hannover

[castlewarden]

Mkk:
Goering's testimony on Hacha and Czechoslovakia at Nuremberg here:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-14-46.asp

Excellent Hannover, that is what I was looking for. Here is the relevant excerpt:

DR. STAHMER: On the 15 March 1939 a conversation took place between Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation? And what was your part in it?

Goering: That was the beginning of the establishment of the Protectorate in Czechoslovakia. After Munich -- that is, after the Munich Agreement and the solution of the Sudeten German problem -- a military decision had been reached by the Fuehrer and some of his collaborators to the effect that, if there should be new difficulties after the Munich agreement, or arising from the occupation of the zones, certain measures of precaution would have to be taken by the military authorities, for, after the occupation of the zones, the troops which had been in readiness for "Case Green" (Schmundt File) had been demobilized. But a development might easily take place which at any moment could become extremely dangerous for Germany. One needs only to remember what an interpretation was given at that time by the Russian press and the Russian radio to the Munich agreement and to the occupation of the Sudetenland. One could hardly use stronger language. There had been a liaison between Prague and Moscow for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the Munich agreement, could now strengthen its ties with Moscow. Signs of that were seen particularly in the Czech officers' corps and we were informed. And in the event of this proving dangerous to Germany, instructions had been issued to the various military offices to take preventive measures, as was their

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duty. But that order has nothing to do with any intention of occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia after a short time.

I myself went to the Riviera at the end of January for my first long vacation and during that time I dropped all business affairs. At the beginning of March, much to my surprise, a courier came from the Fuehrer with a letter in which the Fuehrer informed me that developments in Czechoslovakia were such that he could not let things go on as they were with impunity. They were becoming an increasing menace to Germany, and he was determined to solve the question now by eliminating Czechoslovakia as a source of danger right in the center of Germany, and he therefore was thinking of an occupation.

During that time I had met many Englishmen in San Remo. I had realized that they had made the best of Munich and even found it satisfactory, but that any other incidents, or demands on Czechoslovakia would cause considerable excitement.

I sent a letter back by courier. Maybe it is among the many tons of documents in the possession of the Prosecution. I could also understand if they do not submit it, for it would be a document of an extenuating character as far as I am concerned. In this letter I communicated these views to the Fuehrer and wrote to him somewhat as follows: That if this were to take place now, it would be a very serious loss of prestige for the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and I hardly believed that he would survive it. Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the Fuehrer knew Churchill's attitude toward Germany. Secondly, it would not be understood, since just a short time previously we had settled these things to general satisfaction. Thirdly, I thought I could calm him by telling him the following: I believed that what he wanted to eliminate at the moment in the way of danger, by the occupation of Czechoslovakia, could be achieved in a somewhat lengthier manner, at the same time avoiding anything which might excite Czechoslovakia as well as other countries. I was convinced that since the Sudetenland had been separated and Austria was a part of Germany an economic penetration of Czechoslovakia would be only a matter of time. That is to say, I hoped by strong economic ties to reach a communications, customs, and currency union, which would serve the economic interests of both countries. If this took place, then a sovereign Czechoslovakia would be politically so closely bound to Germany and German interests that I did not believe that any danger could arise again. However, if Slovakia expressed her desire for independence very definitely we should not have to counteract that in any way. On the contrary, we could support it, as then economic co-operation would naturally become even much closer than otherwise; for, if Slovakia were to secede, both countries would

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have to look to Germany in economic matters, and in such matters both countries could be made interested in Germany and could be most closely bound to Germany.

This letter -- I have just given the gist of it -- the courier took back. Then I heard nothing for some days.

THE PRESEDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off?

[A recess was taken.]

DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please?

Goering: I was then called to Berlin on very short notice. I arrived in Berlin in the morning and President Hacha arrived in the evening of the same day. I presented orally to the Fuehrer the views which I had already expressed in my letter. The Fuehrer pointed out to me certain evidence in his possession to the effect that the situation in Czechoslovakia had developed more seriously. This state had, for one thing, disintegrated because of the detachment of Slovakia, but that was not the decisive question. He showed me documents from the Intelligence Service which indicated that Russian aviation commissions were present at the airfields of Czechoslovakia, or certain of them, undertaking training, and that such things were not in keeping with the Munich agreement. He said that he feared that Czechoslovakia, especially if Slovakia were detached, would be used as a Russian air base against Germany.

He said he was determined to eliminate this danger. President Hacha had requested an interview, so he told me at the time, and would arrive in the evening; and he wished that I too should be present at the Reich Chancellery.

President Hacha arrived and talked first with the Reich Foreign Minister. At night he came to see the Fuehrer; we greeted him coldly. First he conversed with the Fuehrer alone; then we were called in. Then I talked to him in the presence of his ambassador and urged him to meet as quickly as possible the Fuehrer's demand that trdops be kept back when the Germans marched in, in order that there might be no bloodshed. I told him that nothing could be done about it; the Fuehrer had made his decision and considered it necessary, and there would be only unnecessary bloodshed as resistance for any length of time was quite impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I should be sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point

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like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the whole matter.

I succeeded then in getting a telephone connection between him and his Government in Prague, he gave the order, and the occupation and the march into Prague took place the next day.

DR. STAHMER: Did you accompany the Fuehrer to Prague?

Goering: No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was rather annoyqd. I did not enter Czechoslovakia or Sudeten Germany at any time after that incident, with the exception of 21 April 1945 when I passed through a part of Czechoslovakia.

DR. STAHAIER: Why were you annoyed?

Goering: Because the whole matter had been carried out more or less over my head.

DR. STAIMIER: Did other powers take a part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia?

Goering: Yes. Poland took the Olsa territory at that time.

So, Hitler told Goering that Hacha requested the interview.
At that time Soviet aviation commissions were present at at least some airfields of Czechoslovakia, undertaking training.

Hacha wanted apparently advice and some help, but he certainly did not want Czechoslovakia or Czech Republic to become a protectorate of Germany. That is how I understand Goering's statement:

President Hacha arrived and talked first with the Reich Foreign Minister. At night he came to see the Fuehrer; we greeted him coldly. First he conversed with the Fuehrer alone; then we were called in. Then I talked to him in the presence of his ambassador and urged him to meet as quickly as possible the Fuehrer's demand that troops be kept back when the Germans marched in, in order that there might be no bloodshed.

I told him that nothing could be done about it; the Fuehrer had made his decision and considered it necessary, and there would be only unnecessary bloodshed as resistance for any length of time was quite impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I should be sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague.

The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the whole matter.

I succeeded then in getting a telephone connection between him and his Government in Prague, he gave the order, and the occupation and the march into Prague took place the next day.

So, Hacha did not really want that. Goering had to threaten that he would not want to bomb Prague. Hitler made the decision out of concern of Russian influence in Czechoslovakia:

He (Hitler) showed me (Goering) documents from the Intelligence Service which indicated that Russian aviation commissions were present at the airfields of Czechoslovakia, or certain of them, undertaking training, and that such things were not in keeping with the Munich agreement. He said that he feared that Czechoslovakia, especially if Slovakia were detached, would be used as a Russian air base against Germany.

Goering disagreed with the creation of the Protectorate (because he feared such a step would damage Chamberlain and bring Churchill to the post of Prime Minister of UK) but could not prevent it:

In this letter I (Goering) communicated these views to the Fuehrer and wrote to him somewhat as follows: That if this were to take place now, it would be a very serious loss of prestige for the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and I hardly believed that he would survive it. Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the Fuehrer knew Churchill's attitude toward Germany.

[hermod]

Hacha wanted apparently advice and some help, but he certainly did not want Czechoslovakia or Czech Republic to become a protectorate of Germany. That is how I understand Goering's statement:

President Hacha arrived and talked first with the Reich Foreign Minister. At night he came to see the Fuehrer; we greeted him coldly. First he conversed with the Fuehrer alone; then we were called in. Then I talked to him in the presence of his ambassador and urged him to meet as quickly as possible the Fuehrer's demand that troops be kept back when the Germans marched in, in order that there might be no bloodshed.

I told him that nothing could be done about it; the Fuehrer had made his decision and considered it necessary, and there would be only unnecessary bloodshed as resistance for any length of time was quite impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I should be sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague.

The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the whole matter.

I succeeded then in getting a telephone connection between him and his Government in Prague, he gave the order, and the occupation and the march into Prague took place the next day.

So, Hacha did not really want that. Goering had to threaten that he would not want to bomb Prague.

What makes you think Hacha didn't want the remaining Czech lands to become a German protectorate? I can see that nowhere in Goering's words.

Goering talked about a possible bombing on Prague on his own initiative and to "accelerate the whole matter". Had Hitler had plans to pressure Hacha against his will, I don't think Goering would have needed to use his "threat of bombs on Prague" tactic. I think the conversation which Hacha had just had "with the Fuehrer alone" would have been amply sufficient to convince Hacha. Hitler was a direct man and his persuasiveness was well-known.

Hacha's daughter was part of the trip to Berlin and she testified her father freely put his country under German protection when interviewed by Allied interrogators after WW2. As David Hoggan wrote in his definitive work, The Forced War, Hacha’s daughter confirmed after the war that her father was treated courteously and kindly by the Germans, and with all the attention and consideration normally given to a statesman.

Goering disagreed with the creation of the Protectorate (because he feared such a step would damage Chamberlain and bring Churchill to the post of Prime Minister of UK) but could not prevent it

Goering was right to fear such a thing, but more because of American pressure than because of any damage to Chamberlain's reputation.

When Hacha signed the agreement with Hitler, the British government initially accepted the new situation, but then Roosevelt intervened. In their nationally syndicated column of 14 April 1939, the usually very well informed Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported that on 16 March 1939 Roosevelt had "sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain" demanding that henceforth the British government strongly oppose Germany and "the president warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued." Chamberlain gave in and the next day, 17 March, ended Britain's policy of cooperation with Germany in a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Two weeks later, on March 31, 1939, the British government formally pledged itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities.

William C. Bullitt, the leading American diplomat in Europe, was pleased by the reversal of British policy in March 1939. He knew that President Roosevelt would welcome any British pretext for a war in Europe. Ambassador Bullitt sent a jubilant report from Paris on March 17, 1939, in which he triumphantly concluded that there was no longer any possibility for a peaceful diplomatic settlement of European differences. Polish Foreign Minister Beck received an assurance from Juliusz Lukasiewicz and William Bullitt on March 19, 1939, that President Roosevelt was prepared to do everything possible to promote a war between the Anglo-French front and Germany. American Minister Joseph E. Davies reported to Washington, D.C., from Brussels on March 30, 1939, that in Belgium the Chamberlain speech at Birmingham was regarded as a disaster which had reversed the favorable prospects for peace in Europe. On 25 April 1939, four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt called American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, chief European correspondent of the International News Service, to the U.S. embassy in Paris and told him: "War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it." Bullitt informed the Poles that he knew Germany hoped to acquire Danzig, and that he was counting on Polish willingness to go to war over the Danzig question. He urged Lukasiewicz to present demands to the West for supplies and other military assistance.

Chamberlain didn't say "America and World Jewry forced England into the war" (diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, entry for 27 December 1945) for nothing. He knew what was going on behind the scenes.

[castlewarden]

What makes you think Hacha didn't want the remaining Czech lands to become a German protectorate? I can see that nowhere in Goering's words.

The threat of bombing Prague.

Goering talked about a possible bombing on Prague on his own initiative and to "accelerate the whole matter". Had Hitler had plans to pressure Hacha against his will, I don't think Goering would have needed to use his "threat of bombs on Prague" tactic. I think the conversation which Hacha had just had "with the Fuehrer alone" would have been amply sufficient to convince Hacha. Hitler was a direct man and his persuasiveness was well-known.

Maybe Goering himself did not believe that Hacha wanted to put his country under German protection and therefore made this remark.

Hacha's daughter was part of the trip to Berlin and she testified her father freely put his country under German protection when interviewed by Allied interrogators after WW2. As David Hoggan wrote in his definitive work, The Forced War, Hacha’s daughter confirmed after the war that her father was treated courteously and kindly by the Germans, and with all the attention and consideration normally given to a statesman.

More or less freely. There was the threat that Czechia will anyway be occupied, with or without resistance.

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books/ ... %20War.pdf
From David Hoggan's The Forced War
bottom of Page 141

Hacha made a plea for the continuation of full Czech independence, and he offered to reduce the Czech army. Hitler rejected this plea, and he announced that German troops would enter Bohemia-Moravia the same day.

[Hannover]

castlewarden said:

The threat of bombing Prague.

What threat of bombing Prague?
Goering said:

I made the statement that I should be sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing.

Is anyone listening? Can anyone actually read?

- Hannover

[hermod]

What makes you think Hacha didn't want the remaining Czech lands to become a German protectorate? I can see that nowhere in Goering's words.

The threat of bombing Prague.

Threat made on Goering's own initiative "to accelerate (not to force) the whole matter" and after Hacha's private conversation with Hitler. All that doesn't sound like a well-planned coordinated action in order to force Hacha to surrender his country. To me, that sounds more like a diplomatic clumsiness and impatience, or even an attempt to impress his boss, on Goering's part.

Goering talked about a possible bombing on Prague on his own initiative and to "accelerate the whole matter". Had Hitler had plans to pressure Hacha against his will, I don't think Goering would have needed to use his "threat of bombs on Prague" tactic. I think the conversation which Hacha had just had "with the Fuehrer alone" would have been amply sufficient to convince Hacha. Hitler was a direct man and his persuasiveness was well-known.

Maybe Goering himself did not believe that Hacha wanted to put his country under German protection and therefore made this remark.

Maybe. But Goering was not in the room when Hitler and Hacha talked together and he naturally ignored what had just been said when he formulated his threat. So that was a personal feeling at best. Unless Goering used Hilberg's Holocaust mind-reading technique and Hitler telepatically ordered him to threat Hacha with bombs on Prague. As Hilberg is now dead, we'll probably never know.

Hacha's daughter was part of the trip to Berlin and she testified her father freely put his country under German protection when interviewed by Allied interrogators after WW2. As David Hoggan wrote in his definitive work, The Forced War, Hacha’s daughter confirmed after the war that her father was treated courteously and kindly by the Germans, and with all the attention and consideration normally given to a statesman.

More or less freely. There was the threat that Czechia will anyway be occupied, with or without resistance.

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books/ ... %20War.pdf
From David Hoggan's The Forced War
bottom of Page 141

Hacha made a plea for the continuation of full Czech independence, and he offered to reduce the Czech army. Hitler rejected this plea, and he announced that German troops would enter Bohemia-Moravia the same day.

A rejected plea as in all normal negotiations. Between a wish on one part and an intensive coercion from the other part, there's a whole range of diplomatic cases. Maybe there would have been a possible in-between solution conciliating Hacha's wish of full independence and Hitler's legitimate concerns about Czechia becoming "a Soviet aircraft carrier" (as German intelligence reports indicated). Why not an agreement on German inspectors checking the Czech airports and also a few German military bases on the Czech territory?

For info, Hacha traveled by train, not by plane, because his heart was weak. He didn't have a heart failure because of intensive pressure put on him when he was at Berlin as claimed on and on by court historians today.

So, Hitler told Goering that Hacha requested the interview.
At that time Soviet aviation commissions were present at at least some airfields of Czechoslovakia, undertaking training.

Hacha wanted apparently advice and some help, but he certainly did not want Czechoslovakia or Czech Republic to become a protectorate of Germany.

Seems pretty improbable an old experimented politician like Hacha only wanted advice from a young politician like Hitler. Some help? What kind of help? Maybe the kind of help I've suggested above in my in-between solution with German inspectors and military bases on the Czech soil? Maybe not? Whatever it failed and Czechia became a German protectorate, but clearly not after intensive coercion as we're now told by academic historians. The negotiations seemed pretty balanced and fair.

[castlewarden]

castlewarden said:

The threat of bombing Prague.

What threat of bombing Prague?
Goering said:

I made the statement that I should be sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing.

Is anyone listening? Can anyone actually read?

Hacha was not a mind reader like Hilberg.
Therefore he did not know that this threat did not exist.
However, it existed a threat of bloodshed if he would not give in.

I agree, though, that the case presented by court historians is unbalanced. There was a legitimate concern about Soviet Airbases and influence in Czechia, even though it could have been solved in another way (like Goering wanted).

In any case, the relationship between Czechia / Germany is - no, was, because they have their independence now - similar to that of Kosovo / Serbia or Tibet / China:
- one nation's territory belonging for several hundred years to the territory of the other nation
- that smaller nation wishes to be independent
- it only gets autonomy status

[neugierig]

Its been a while since this was discussed, I’m therefore not really up on it anymore and old age is not helping.

To really do this justice, one would have to go back, but here is the abbreviated version. Hitler is accused of breaking his word after the Sudetenland was returned to Germany. Hitler had promised Chamberlain that when this problem is solved, Germany has no further territorial claims in Europe. In his speech of September 26, 1938 he stated that he also told Chamberlain that as soon as the Czechs settle their differences with the rest of their minorities, peacefully, that he is no longer interested in this state. He concluded: “We do not even want any Czechs”. (Heinrich Härtle, Die Kriegsschuld der Sieger, p.275)

The Czech government was not able to come to terms with their minorities, the Slovaks wanted out. We are told that Hitler encouraged them, not so. On March 13,1939, the British foreign office official Roberts submitted an ‘Assessment on the Slovakian crisis and the implications for the British government’ (I translated this from German text). He wrote about the unsatisfactory situation in Slovakia (The Czechs were terrorizing them) but stated that he has found no evidence that Germany was involved, quite to the contrary (Annelies von Ribbentrop, Die Kriegsschuld des Widerstandes, p.243) Ribbentrop gives as a source: DBFP IV, No.230 (Documents on British Foreign Policy, London1949, Vol.I, Series D).

On March 14, Slovakia declared its independence, Hitler had a meeting with Dr. Tiso, the Slovak President, prior to this (as mentioned, a long story). Following this – and by now it had become obvious that the Czechs would not be able to come to terms with their minorities, therefore Hitler did not break his word – President Hacha asked for a ‘personal meeting’ with Hitler, via his foreign minister Chwalkowsky who had been in repeated contact with Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister (Ibid, p.243, DdP 7, S.498 [Dokumente der deutschen Politik]). The meeting took place on March 14. At the same time Chamberlin told Henderson to let the German government know that the British government would not interfere in matters other governments were directly involved in (Ibid, DBFP IV, No.247). Henderson immediately visited the German foreign office (Wilhelmstraße) to tell them about the English governments disinterest re. the negotiations between Hitler and Hacha (Ibid, DBFP IV, No.232).

On March 17 Chamberlain, in his Birmingham speech, made no mention of this, of course, true to form for Das perfide Albion.

I Hope this helps a little.

Regards
Wilf

[TheBlackRabbitofInlé]

Wilf,

Please check your personal messages, I sent you a few things that might interest you.

Best.
BRoI

[Otium]

What makes you think Hacha didn't want the remaining Czech lands to become a German protectorate? I can see that nowhere in Goering's words.

The threat of bombing Prague.

Goering talked about a possible bombing on Prague on his own initiative and to "accelerate the whole matter". Had Hitler had plans to pressure Hacha against his will, I don't think Goering would have needed to use his "threat of bombs on Prague" tactic. I think the conversation which Hacha had just had "with the Fuehrer alone" would have been amply sufficient to convince Hacha. Hitler was a direct man and his persuasiveness was well-known.

Maybe Goering himself did not believe that Hacha wanted to put his country under German protection and therefore made this remark.

Hacha's daughter was part of the trip to Berlin and she testified her father freely put his country under German protection when interviewed by Allied interrogators after WW2. As David Hoggan wrote in his definitive work, The Forced War, Hacha’s daughter confirmed after the war that her father was treated courteously and kindly by the Germans, and with all the attention and consideration normally given to a statesman.

More or less freely. There was the threat that Czechia will anyway be occupied, with or without resistance.

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books/ ... %20War.pdf
From David Hoggan's The Forced War
bottom of Page 141

Hacha made a plea for the continuation of full Czech independence, and he offered to reduce the Czech army. Hitler rejected this plea, and he announced that German troops would enter Bohemia-Moravia the same day.

I've also seen this quote in Hogan's book. But it has no source. The only source I've seen from Hacha's daughter has been from a 1947 new york times article which mentions the complete opposite of what Hoggan claimed. Although I cannot find the actual Nuremberg interview that documents what was REALLY said. If someone could find or verify what Hacha's daughter really said it'd be a great help.

[Lamprecht]

From: https://archive.is/5UsDF or https://archive.is/PFHMk

I do not speak Czech, but here is the google translate (so there may be grammatical errors). It is supposed to be President Hácha's account on what happened that night. He does claim that Goering said he would feel sorry if he had to bomb Prague. Apparently, it was relased in 1966, long after Hacha had died in a Soviet prison, charged as a Nazi collaborator.

Emil Hácha: a record of the meeting in Berlin on the night of March 14-15, 1939

A record of the negotiations with Hitler on the night of 14 to 15 March 1939, which Dr. Emil Hacha dictated March 20, 1939.

On March 14, 1939, at the Anhalt railway station, the Minister of State expected me. Meissner and Envoy Dr. Fatty with his wife. After a military tribute in front of the station, in which I was not accompanied by State Secretary Dra Meissner, whose name I did not remember, Dr. Meissner to the Adlon Hotel, where very splendid rooms were reserved for me and my retinue and where a bouquet from the Reich Chancellor and a large box of candy from Minister Meissner were handed over to my daughter. The bouquet was to be handed over to the station, but stored in the hotel for bad weather.

At 24 pm, the Minister of Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop visited the parade of Minister Dra Chvalkovsky, with whom I exchanged a number of quite general phrases, mentioning the difficult situation of a small nation wedged into the realm of a great nation. I also touched the difficult ratio of Czechs to Slovaks. After leaving Ribbentrop between 1-2 h night, I was told that the Reich Chancellor was expecting me in the imperial office.

At the Adlon Hotel, beside the Imperial Flags, a banner was displayed in our state colors.

In the imperial office, where he accompanied me, except for Minister of State Meissner, Minister Dr. Chvalkovsky, I was admitted in the courtyard with military honors and immediately afterwards the Reich Chancellor, who came to meet me and whom I said I appreciate a personal meeting with the most powerful statesman of our time. The Reich Chancellor then invited me to sit on his right in the great circle of prominent personalities of the empire, including: General Field Marshal Goering, Minister von Ribbentrop, General von Keitel and, among others, Minister of State Meissner.

I started my speech with the words that I apologized to my vocal indisposition on the way and said that I, the person in political life still unknown, find it appropriate to introduce myself as a former administrative judge who has accepted the function of head of state when its national and civic duty. In doing so, I pointed out that I have hitherto stood apart from the political life of our state, and that I did not have any contacts other than purely official with the former regime, and that I was not particularly intimate with them.

After that I switched to the Slovak question, which until then I considered the status of my Berlin journey; I said that it was difficult for Czechs and Slovaks to negotiate closer mutual understanding, because the Czechs 'orientation was rather Western, while the Slovaks' orientation was more Eastern. Closer thought was merely evangelical with the Slovaks, while deeper rapprochement was not found with the Catholic Slovaks. Then I rejected the Slovak criticism that by dismissing the Slovak government and appointing a new government in Slovakia, I committed an unconstitutional act. I said I was too a lawyer and too old a judge to be unconstitutional. My progression that he was in full agreement with the constitution, which essentially Slovaks themselves formulated. I have noted that I am convinced that even the Reich Chancellor will make his own experience with the Slovaks.

In another speech I said that we are aware that the fate of the Czech nation is put in the hands of the Reich Chancellor, but I look at it with full confidence because I know the profound understanding of the Reich Chancellor for Nationality ("Ihr tiefes Verständnis für das Volkstum"), in which I see a guarantee that it corresponds to the mind of the Reich Chancellor to the Czech nation to live and fully enjoy.

The Reich Chancellor replied that his intention was indeed for the Czech nation to live undisturbed and not for his nationalization ("keine Entnationalisierung"). I know, he said further, that it will also cost me great sacrifices, but the result cannot be doubtful, and in the course of his speech, the Chancellor said, "Meine Entschlüsse sind unabänderlich". are irreversible.]

I replied that, in a short period of several hours, I doubt that I am in a position to prevent the defensive works as supreme commander of the armed forces, whereupon the Reich Chancellor declared that he provided me with a telephone facility for the imperial office.

After that the interview was interrupted and I went with Minister Chvalkovsky to the next room, where we reached a telephone connection with the Minister of National Defense and later with the whole government. During my stay in this room, a personal General Poln physician came to me. marshal Goeringa prof. Dr. Morel, who asked me to allow him to investigate my heartbeat and find it irregular, offered me an injection. At first I refused, because I felt no need for medical intervention, but I finally submitted to Morel's insistence, whereupon Morel injected me with grape sugar. We were offered refreshments.

I told Army General Raw on the phone what the situation was and gave him an order to order the crew not to resist the German army. After that I informed the Prime Minister by phone and after a while I got his answer to the point that the government that had gathered so far was taking note of my progress and that it agreed with it.

Then we were invited to the office of the Reich Chancellor, where I was presented with a declaration, one of which was signed by the Reich Chancellor and went. Ribbentropem the German side and me with the minister Chvalkovsky our side, min. Chvalkovsky brought to Prague. The concept of this statement was presented to me by Minister Rbbentrop during our stay in the neighboring lounge.

It was stated in the concept that I am making my statement on behalf of myself and on behalf of the government, to which I have noted that I am not constitutionally entitled to make a statement on behalf of the government, with which Minister Ribbentrop - requesting the approval of the Reich Chancellor - was satisfied. Even before we were invited to sign this statement to the Reich Chancellor, Goering told me almost literally: "Ich habe ein schweres Amt. Es würde mir ungemein leid t; wenn ich diese schöne Stadt vernichten müsste. Aber ich müsste es tun, damit die Engländer und Franzosen wissen, dass meine Luftwaffe eine hundertprozentige Arbeit zu leisten vermag. Denn sie wollen es noch immer nicht glauben und möchte den Beweis hierüber liefern ". [I have a difficult task. I would be extremely sorry if I had to destroy this beautiful city. But I would have to do it for the English and the French to know that my Luftwaffe is always 100% ready. They still do not want to believe it and I would like to convince them.]

I said that I cannot guarantee that all crews will be in the short term; what we have left to be informed of the order I gave to the Minister of National Defense. Goering replied that he meant the organized resistance of our armed forces, not the sporadic combat acts.

When we signed the declaration in the Chancellor's office, the Reich Chancellor and his entourage said goodbye to us, after which we left the morning imperial office.

From the speech of the Chancellor, I have recalled to me the statement by which he declared that if he encountered resistance, he would end - "dann mach 'ich Schluss".

After returning to the hotel, where the Minister of State Meissner accompanied us, we tried to rest without success and around 11 am we embarked on a special return train trip. After a delay of more than three hours and said to have been caused by snow drifts, I immediately went to a meeting of the Ministerial Council, which was held in a former large library at the Castle. Here we presented with Chvalkovsky a report on our journey.

During the meeting we learned that the Reich Chancellor had arrived in Prague and had taken rooms in front of the Castle. Minister Chvalkovsky was then invited to the Reich Minister Ribbentrop.

The following day I was invited to the Reich Chancellor around noon, who told me in an interview about half an hour that he had full confidence in me and reiterated his Berlin speech that he wanted the Czech nation to live to live and express that in loyal breeding reaches an unexpected prosperity ("einen ungeahnten Aufschwung"). At the same time, he promised me that in the sense of the decree of March 16, which had already been issued to me and delivered to me by Ribbentrop in the morning, he would appoint the Reich Protector a senior administrative officer of the rank of Reich Minister who is not a political personality and known for his utter objectivity. His name has not yet been marked.

When the Reich Chancellor told me that I could turn to him at any time, if I considered it necessary, I left the less important imperial chancellor after the interview, after which an arm was immediately received. General Syrový.

Dr. Hácha 20. 3. 1939

Source: Documents from the History of Czechoslovak Politics 1939-1943. II., Praha 1966, pp. 420-422 (Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939-1943. II., Praha 1966, s. 420-422)

Goering (cited above) said:

The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the whole matter.

So, was it just an empty threat?

[Otium]

From: https://archive.is/5UsDF or https://archive.is/PFHMk

I do not speak Czech, but here is the google translate (so there may be grammatical errors). It is supposed to be President Hácha's account on what happened that night. He does claim that Goering said he would feel sorry if he had to bomb Prague. Apparently, it was relased in 1966, long after Hacha had died in a Soviet prison, charged as a Nazi collaborator.

Emil Hácha: a record of the meeting in Berlin on the night of March 14-15, 1939

A record of the negotiations with Hitler on the night of 14 to 15 March 1939, which Dr. Emil Hacha dictated March 20, 1939.

On March 14, 1939, at the Anhalt railway station, the Minister of State expected me. Meissner and Envoy Dr. Fatty with his wife. After a military tribute in front of the station, in which I was not accompanied by State Secretary Dra Meissner, whose name I did not remember, Dr. Meissner to the Adlon Hotel, where very splendid rooms were reserved for me and my retinue and where a bouquet from the Reich Chancellor and a large box of candy from Minister Meissner were handed over to my daughter. The bouquet was to be handed over to the station, but stored in the hotel for bad weather.

At 24 pm, the Minister of Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop visited the parade of Minister Dra Chvalkovsky, with whom I exchanged a number of quite general phrases, mentioning the difficult situation of a small nation wedged into the realm of a great nation. I also touched the difficult ratio of Czechs to Slovaks. After leaving Ribbentrop between 1-2 h night, I was told that the Reich Chancellor was expecting me in the imperial office.

At the Adlon Hotel, beside the Imperial Flags, a banner was displayed in our state colors.

In the imperial office, where he accompanied me, except for Minister of State Meissner, Minister Dr. Chvalkovsky, I was admitted in the courtyard with military honors and immediately afterwards the Reich Chancellor, who came to meet me and whom I said I appreciate a personal meeting with the most powerful statesman of our time. The Reich Chancellor then invited me to sit on his right in the great circle of prominent personalities of the empire, including: General Field Marshal Goering, Minister von Ribbentrop, General von Keitel and, among others, Minister of State Meissner.

I started my speech with the words that I apologized to my vocal indisposition on the way and said that I, the person in political life still unknown, find it appropriate to introduce myself as a former administrative judge who has accepted the function of head of state when its national and civic duty. In doing so, I pointed out that I have hitherto stood apart from the political life of our state, and that I did not have any contacts other than purely official with the former regime, and that I was not particularly intimate with them.

After that I switched to the Slovak question, which until then I considered the status of my Berlin journey; I said that it was difficult for Czechs and Slovaks to negotiate closer mutual understanding, because the Czechs 'orientation was rather Western, while the Slovaks' orientation was more Eastern. Closer thought was merely evangelical with the Slovaks, while deeper rapprochement was not found with the Catholic Slovaks. Then I rejected the Slovak criticism that by dismissing the Slovak government and appointing a new government in Slovakia, I committed an unconstitutional act. I said I was too a lawyer and too old a judge to be unconstitutional. My progression that he was in full agreement with the constitution, which essentially Slovaks themselves formulated. I have noted that I am convinced that even the Reich Chancellor will make his own experience with the Slovaks.

In another speech I said that we are aware that the fate of the Czech nation is put in the hands of the Reich Chancellor, but I look at it with full confidence because I know the profound understanding of the Reich Chancellor for Nationality ("Ihr tiefes Verständnis für das Volkstum"), in which I see a guarantee that it corresponds to the mind of the Reich Chancellor to the Czech nation to live and fully enjoy.

The Reich Chancellor replied that his intention was indeed for the Czech nation to live undisturbed and not for his nationalization ("keine Entnationalisierung"). I know, he said further, that it will also cost me great sacrifices, but the result cannot be doubtful, and in the course of his speech, the Chancellor said, "Meine Entschlüsse sind unabänderlich". are irreversible.]

I replied that, in a short period of several hours, I doubt that I am in a position to prevent the defensive works as supreme commander of the armed forces, whereupon the Reich Chancellor declared that he provided me with a telephone facility for the imperial office.

After that the interview was interrupted and I went with Minister Chvalkovsky to the next room, where we reached a telephone connection with the Minister of National Defense and later with the whole government. During my stay in this room, a personal General Poln physician came to me. marshal Goeringa prof. Dr. Morel, who asked me to allow him to investigate my heartbeat and find it irregular, offered me an injection. At first I refused, because I felt no need for medical intervention, but I finally submitted to Morel's insistence, whereupon Morel injected me with grape sugar. We were offered refreshments.

I told Army General Raw on the phone what the situation was and gave him an order to order the crew not to resist the German army. After that I informed the Prime Minister by phone and after a while I got his answer to the point that the government that had gathered so far was taking note of my progress and that it agreed with it.

Then we were invited to the office of the Reich Chancellor, where I was presented with a declaration, one of which was signed by the Reich Chancellor and went. Ribbentropem the German side and me with the minister Chvalkovsky our side, min. Chvalkovsky brought to Prague. The concept of this statement was presented to me by Minister Rbbentrop during our stay in the neighboring lounge.

It was stated in the concept that I am making my statement on behalf of myself and on behalf of the government, to which I have noted that I am not constitutionally entitled to make a statement on behalf of the government, with which Minister Ribbentrop - requesting the approval of the Reich Chancellor - was satisfied. Even before we were invited to sign this statement to the Reich Chancellor, Goering told me almost literally: "Ich habe ein schweres Amt. Es würde mir ungemein leid t; wenn ich diese schöne Stadt vernichten müsste. Aber ich müsste es tun, damit die Engländer und Franzosen wissen, dass meine Luftwaffe eine hundertprozentige Arbeit zu leisten vermag. Denn sie wollen es noch immer nicht glauben und möchte den Beweis hierüber liefern ". [I have a difficult task. I would be extremely sorry if I had to destroy this beautiful city. But I would have to do it for the English and the French to know that my Luftwaffe is always 100% ready. They still do not want to believe it and I would like to convince them.]

I said that I cannot guarantee that all crews will be in the short term; what we have left to be informed of the order I gave to the Minister of National Defense. Goering replied that he meant the organized resistance of our armed forces, not the sporadic combat acts.

When we signed the declaration in the Chancellor's office, the Reich Chancellor and his entourage said goodbye to us, after which we left the morning imperial office.

From the speech of the Chancellor, I have recalled to me the statement by which he declared that if he encountered resistance, he would end - "dann mach 'ich Schluss".

After returning to the hotel, where the Minister of State Meissner accompanied us, we tried to rest without success and around 11 am we embarked on a special return train trip. After a delay of more than three hours and said to have been caused by snow drifts, I immediately went to a meeting of the Ministerial Council, which was held in a former large library at the Castle. Here we presented with Chvalkovsky a report on our journey.

During the meeting we learned that the Reich Chancellor had arrived in Prague and had taken rooms in front of the Castle. Minister Chvalkovsky was then invited to the Reich Minister Ribbentrop.

The following day I was invited to the Reich Chancellor around noon, who told me in an interview about half an hour that he had full confidence in me and reiterated his Berlin speech that he wanted the Czech nation to live to live and express that in loyal breeding reaches an unexpected prosperity ("einen ungeahnten Aufschwung"). At the same time, he promised me that in the sense of the decree of March 16, which had already been issued to me and delivered to me by Ribbentrop in the morning, he would appoint the Reich Protector a senior administrative officer of the rank of Reich Minister who is not a political personality and known for his utter objectivity. His name has not yet been marked.

When the Reich Chancellor told me that I could turn to him at any time, if I considered it necessary, I left the less important imperial chancellor after the interview, after which an arm was immediately received. General Syrový.

Dr. Hácha 20. 3. 1939

Source: Documents from the History of Czechoslovak Politics 1939-1943. II., Praha 1966, pp. 420-422 (Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939-1943. II., Praha 1966, s. 420-422)

Goering (cited above) said:

The intention of bombing Prague did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in the case of resistance that would not have been necessary -- resistance could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the whole matter.

So, was it just an empty threat?

It was certainly an empty threat. I've read before this expression by Goring, although my memory fails me as to where I read it. it's indeed regarded as another bluff. Although I cannot be sure it's a bluff or even a threat. Hacha in his account doesn't seem to make out that he was pressured, that seems to be a creation of the historian. It sounds more like an off handed comment on Gorings part, even though it can be seen through the lenses of a threat, after all what could Hacha have expected? That if he refused other powers would come to aid? That he'd somehow avoid the inevitable? There was no alternative, either Czechia would sign over then or fall into Hitler's hand later as Goring himself stated to Hitler. A threat to bomb prague is simply unnecessary and would only be followed through upon hypothetically if the Germans were attacked on their entry, which of course they weren't.