Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack

[Werd]

When you get to the end, you will see why the post is so long. A letter they were quoting had vanished from it's original internet source. In other words j4g is probably one of the few, if not the only, site still preserving a letter written to Mannerheim from Ribbentrop.

http://justice4germans.com/2015/01/18/a ... ch-7-1940/

A Follow-Up to the Stalin-Churchill Pact – Ribbentrop’s Letter to Mannerheim, March 7, 1940
Posted on 01/18/2015 by justice4germans

The following comes from a friend and supporter in Finland, in response to my previous post regarding the “Stalin-Churchill Pact”. He writes: “This is said to be a letter from Joachim von Ribbentrop dated 7th of March 1940. I will try to translate here a few date’s and important points from it as an overview, though this is not a ‘professional’ translation. Hitler actually sent two ultimatums (two edicts or orders) to Stalin to stop the winter war against Finland.

First, on the 9th/10th of February 1940, Hitler wrote in a diplomatic type of message which was courier delivered to Stalin: “Stop the war and make peace with Finland.” Then, on the evening of 3rd of March, 1940, Hitler gave the following written order to a Soviet diplomat (or courier): “If the Soviet Union immediately, no later than tomorrow, the 4th of March, 1940, does not stop military operations against Finland, then Germany will give armed assistance to Finnish groups and drive the Soviet army out of the territory of Finland.”

That was an “order” style message to Stalin. Not a proposal or diplomatic suggestion. It was actually Field Marshal Herman Goering who gave this ultimatum to the Soviet Union diplomat, who also told him verbally, at the same time: “If the Soviet Union does not agree with this requirement, we will take the German Air Force to assist Finland, even without them asking for any help. Germany has vital interests in Finland which will be monitored and protected.”

Hitler offered (or even ordered) Mannerheim to read all of the material concerning Finland which they had captured from the courier airplane on the 9th of February, 1940, regarding the Stalin-Churchill Pact. Mannerheim knew then, that he could not expect any help from the western nations. (source: Hautamäki’s book).

Details follow…



“German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s letter to Mannerheim March 7, 1940

[via Google translation with some necessary tweaks to make it more readable, but which will likely contain some errors. Nonetheless, it should provide the ‘gist’ of what was said in this letter. J4G]

To: The Marshal of Finland CGE Mannerheim.

The German Government has received your inquiry, Mr. Marshal, dated March 2, 1940, to the German leader Adolf Hitler: “What is meant by the letter sent by Hitler on the 9th of February 1940 to Marshal Mannerheim, regarding the war between Finland and the Soviet Union to end, because the letter was sent after the Soviets had attacked with more than double the force of the Finnish troops?”

As a result of the changed international situation, the policy between Germany and Finland must be seen in another light, the German Government and the German leader Adolf Hitler, has authorized me to tell you, Mr. Marshal Mannerheim, the following:

First, find enclosed a copy of the photo of part of the documents which fell into German hands on the 9th of February, 1940, thanks to our interception of a courier airplane. The document is a detailed report on the implementation of an agreement between Stalin and the Soviet Union, Churchill and the British, and their Western Allies, made on behalf of Moscow on the 15th of October, 1939. The agreement is a document in which the Western powers, together with the Soviet Union, propose to defeat Germany as soon as the spring 1940, with possible military action.

Although Finland is not a German ally, the matter, however, also applies to the Finnish and the Scandinavian peninsula, in the sense that the Anglo-Soviet agreement is aimed towards Germany, the Baltic States and the direction of the Scandinavian Peninsula, in addition to the French side attacking the German military forces in the west, as well as, in the east by the Soviet Union from the direction of the Balkans. Attached to this letter is a photo of a map of the operation.

Mr. Marshal, Finland is hereby given an opportunity to explore all of the documents from the intercepted aircraft received in Germany, and the maps whenever you want. We hope that you take notice of them immediately.

Second, the Soviet Union, with which Germany has a valid ten-year “friendship pact”, and is the third Contracting Party to the Franco-German pact, but is now involved in an English conspiracy. As such, Germany now considers the Soviet Union, a rival and can no longer keep in force the Soviet-German agreements that, until now, held the German-Soviet policy binding.

When the Soviet Union, without the knowledge of the Germans, had changed their international policy, the German-Soviet cooperation is considered cancelled, without possible future sanctions. Germany now considers itself free of the contracts made with the Soviet Union, and will take measures for its own protection.

Thirdly, the above-discussed issues, on the basis of which Germany considers the Finnish difficulties and their future of autonomy, and to safeguard the German north, will take measures to ensure that the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Finnish region remain free from Soviet-British forces.

For this purpose, for the implementation of the German Government

a) in the early morning of the 10th of February 1940, Hitler gave to Stalin, through the German Chargé d’Affaires for the Soviet Union,an edict signed by Hitler on the 9th of February 1940, with the written provisions that the military action against Finland must be stopped and to strive for peace.

This issue had previously been disclosed to you, Mr. Marshal Mannerheim. Since the German Government realized that the Soviets have not complied with the request of German leader Adolf Hitler, and which you, Mr. Marshal Mannerheim, had also asked of Hitler, so

b) On the evening of March 3rd, 1940, Hitler gave the German Chargé d’Affaires the following written provisions to the Vice President of the Soviet Union: “If the Soviet Union will not immediately, and no later than tomorrow, March 4th, 1940, stop military operations against Finland, then Germany will give the Finns armed assistance in driving the Soviet army out the territory of Finland.” This was an ultimatum to the Soviet Union. Marshal Herman Goering also announced verbally at the same time, that if the Soviet Union does not comply with the demand, to deploy the German Air Force on the Finnish side, anytime Finland requests it. Germany has interests in Finland which are being monitored will see that these are taken care of.

Fourth: With the international situation changed, we see that Germany, but also the Nordic nation with them, are getting into an international theatre of war, valiantly fighting in Finland against the Soviet Union, for our countries’ common interest. In order to guarantee these, the German Government has decided to defend the Scandinavian peninsula, and Finland, and will ensure that your country, at least for the time being, is not invaded by the Soviets, or by the Western powers military forces. Chancellor of the German Reich, Adolf Hitler requested, in addition to inform Finland that, if you need quick military material and air support, to help stop the Soviets overwhelming onslaught, then Germany will be prompted to give it right away without any reciprocity.

Berlin, March 7, 1940
Joachim von Ribbentrop
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs”

Source: : http://kriitikot.dy.fi/kritiikki/pohja2.php?v=3

https://translate.google.com/translate? ... hp%3Fv%3D3

***

Conclusions:

So, it seems that the German high command knew from the papers captured on that courier plane on the 9th February, 1940, that Stalin had lied to them. England and the Soviets had secretly made an alliance pact. The officially “friendly neighbour governments” thus, unofficially became “enemies”, without any official “declaration of war”.

The Finnish winter war against Soviet Union stopped on the 13th of March 1940. Ten days after that Hitlers first edict to Stalin. Our groups would have soon been badly defeated if the war had not stopped then. Our ex-president Paasikivi said in his diaries that “Hitler saved us”. My opinion is that our brave soldiers also saved us.

I believe that the German war efforts had always been defensive until this time. The Germans did not want war against anyone; they didn’t want to conquer the world or even Europe. England had provoked a war against Germany by using Poland as a proxy.

This intercepted courier plane changed many things in German defence policies. Finland would fight and die alone. This is not even today officially acknowledged in Finland, only that we had asked help from Hitler, as our country would otherwise be conquered by the Soviets, and then raped and robbed. Fighting alone against a terrible and very powerful enemy, we otherwise would have been forced to capitulate at any price and begin peace conversations with Soviets; even an unfair peace offers, would have to be accepted, or die.

Finland lost much in this war, and afterwards, had to pay huge war reparations. That is unfair because the Soviets attacked us! We only defended our lives. These unfair peace offer conditions still affect our politics today. We are not really an independent and democratic country. Wikipedia and their “official truth” are a pack of lies. All important orders come from outside.
See: http://heninen.net/sopimus/1940_e.htm

Petteri (Finland)

****

NOTE: Just after posting this and linking to the Finnish source article, that site mysteriously removed the page containing the Letter to Mannerheim, so link is now broken and it takes you a different page. But I do have a copy of that page, but it is in Finish. My friend in Finland is trying to obtain a photocopy of the letter from the book. ~ J4G

[Hektor]

Good work. He just needs to know that "reparations" (in context of war) isn't a payment by someone that has harmed you. It's a payment a loosing party has to pay after a war to winning parties.

[Werd]

NOTE: Just after posting this and linking to the Finnish source article, that site mysteriously removed the page containing the Letter to Mannerheim, so link is now broken and it takes you a different page. But I do have a copy of that page, but it is in Finish. My friend in Finland is trying to obtain a photocopy of the letter from the book. ~ J4G

Vesa says:
01/25/2015 at 9:00 pm
http://kriitikot.dy.fi/kritiikki/pohja2.php?v=2

justice4germans says:
01/25/2015 at 10:26 pm
Thank you for the new link

[Mortimer]

This article by Walter Sanning is about Soviet scorched earth policy but at the beginning he mentions details about Lithuania and how the USSR violated the non aggression pact in regards to that country thus revealing their treacherous nature - http://codoh.com/library/document/2112/

[Werd]

Another great article. Here is one from the OP in this thread courtsey of Mortimer. I feel this clip is relevant. It shows the honesty of revisionists who correctly support Suvorov's basic ideas that have only ended up being confirmed by others.

Overrating Stalin

Occasionally Suvorov contradicts himself. For example, he argues that when Hitler turned his troops southward to Kiev before Moscow was taken, he all but lost the war. But elsewhere Suvorov recognizes that in war the best strategy is to defeat the enemy’s armed forces, not to take prestige cities. In fact the German forces turned south not so much to take Kiev as to destroy another Soviet army. The German generals, who after all had some experience in the conduct of war, were of course perfectly aware of the pointlessness of capturing large cities merely for trophy value. When the enemy’s armed forces are destroyed, his cities will fall on their own.

Only in the case of Stalingrad did the German invaders commit all their forces and energies to take a city – with disastrous results. The previous winter, after the failure to take Moscow, reason had prevailed and the Germans retreated to a more defensible line, where they were able to regroup and reinforce their armies. Without the help of the Finns, German forces were inadequate to take Leningrad, so they bypassed the city. But Hitler forbade any retreat from Stalingrad. Its capture had been aimed, among other things, at blocking oil shipments up the Volga north to the Soviets. The Wehrmacht was no less concerned to fuel its own war machine: it had secured the Crimea in order to protect its chief sources of petroleum, in Romania and Hungary, from Soviet air attack from that peninsula.

Suvorov’s excessive regard for Stalin’s leadership and his equally overdone criticism of Hitler’s ignores the fact that Germany nearly did defeat the Red Army. Had the United States, Great Britain, France, and other allies not supported Stalin with arms, trucks, provisions, and other necessities of war, the outcome might have been quite different. It must also be recalled that, throughout much of the long Russian-German conflict, Germany was compelled to divert twenty to thirty percent of its war effort to the Western front.

Suvorov’s main contention, that Stalin groomed Hitler to do his dirty work in Europe, is untenable. It gives far too much credit to the Soviet dictator. Germany never wanted a war in the west, let alone one against Britain. True, the Germans suspected France – especially under the government of Léon Blum’s popular front – of further mischief.

It must be recalled that Germany’s ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union followed several successive attempts at its encirclement by its enemies. In the 1930s British and French diplomacy had succeeded in surrounding her with hostile nations. Then came the attempted Scandinavian and Balkan encirclement, and finally that of the U.S.,UK, and USSR. With both Soviet and Western forces increasing in strength, Germany took a desperate gamble to break the ring, rather than wait until the Red Army seized the most opportune time to pounce. True, the gamble failed. Today’s Germany, however, is a prosperous country, much smaller than it might have wished, but the remnant of Stalin’s USSR, stripped of the Tsar’s empire, is not much more than an overgrown economic basket case.

Suvorov exaggerates Stalin’s “genius.” While it is true that he created a police state and built up the Red Army to superpower status, his armed forces failed miserably at the time they were most needed, June 1941. It is also true that Stalin dominated Churchill and Roosevelt, above all in the several conferences that determined postwar arrangements among the “Big Three,” but the Western leaders had cast themselves in the role of supplicants who needed the Red Army to contain and destroy Germany.

For all that, Suvorov has made a great contribution to correcting the history of the Second World War by dispelling, once and for all, the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union invented by Communist propagandists and circulated in the West by their dupes and sympathizers.

Revising the Twentieth Century’s ‘Perfect Storm’
Russian and German Historians Debate Barbarossa and Its Aftermath
By Daniel W. Michaels

http://codoh.com/library/document/3000/

[Mulegino1]

This is a very good summary. Suvorov does, in my opinion, tend to exaggerate Stalin's prescience and strategic thinking abilities just a bit.

[Hektor]

This is a very good summary. Suvorov does, in my opinion, tend to exaggerate Stalin's prescience and strategic thinking abilities just a bit.

Viktor Suvorov doesn't insist on Stalin's prescience. Actually he says that Stalin didn't believe in a German preemptive strike:



https://archive.org/details/DidStalinStartWorldWarTwoTheSecretPlansToConquerEuropeViktorSuvorov

[Mortimer]

The English translation of a statement by the German foreign minister Von Ribbentrop after the start of hostilities with the USSR. Mentions soviet sabotage and espionage after the signing of the non aggression pact in particular the covert support of Yugoslavia. This statement was published in The New York Times June 23 1941 - http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622b.html

[Hektor]

The English translation of a statement by the German foreign minister Von Ribbentrop after the start of hostilities with the USSR. Mentions soviet sabotage and espionage after the signing of the non aggression pact in particular the covert support of Yugoslavia. This statement was published in The New York Times June 23 1941 - http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622b.html

Interesting later part seems to be identical with the following:
https://archive.org/details/Aussenminis ... andfeldzug

[Werd]

In November 1940 Soviet foreign minister Molotov went to Berlin with a list of demands for the German government -
from Finland, Pechenga the only Finnish port on the Barents sea and Porkkala-Udd the strategically located peninsula on the Baltic Sea controlling the entrance to the Gulf of Finland
naval bases on the Danish side of the straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak controlling access to the North Sea and Baltic Sea
from Yugoslavia a naval base on the Adriatic Sea
from Greece a naval base in the port of Thessaloniki
from Romania the province of Southern Bukovina, a strategic foothold in the Carpathian mountains to control access to the Ploesti oilfields
from Bulgaria a pact of alliance with the Soviet Union including Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere of influence
from Turkey bases in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits
from Iran bases in the Persian Gulf
the transfer of territories south of the Baku-Batumi line (in eastern Turkey north of Iraq and Iran) to the Soviet sphere of influence
from Japan the renunciation of its oil concessions in the province of Northern Sakhalin
Notice how these demands included territory that the German government had no control over. Hitler was perplexed. He asked Molotov to arrange a meeting between himself and Stalin so they could sort out the problem in a diplomatic and friendly atmosphere. The message was relayed but nothing came of it. If someone doesn't want to talk to you face to face while claiming to be your friend then that indicates dishonesty. Stalin wasn't interested in a face to face meeting with Hitler. His mind was already made up. He wanted war with his Operation Thunderstorm (Operatsiya Groza).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Bunich
It was after this list of demands was presented by Molotov and after the failure to secure a meeting with Stalin that Hitler realised he was being played for a fool and drew up plans for Operation Barbarossa.

As you stated to me via PM, this comes right out of a chapter in Suvorov's book THE CHIEF CULPRIT called "Trotsky Murdered, Molotov in Berlin."

[Mortimer]

A review of the book Stalin's War by Ernst Topitsch - http://codoh.com/library/document/2205/ This author is of the opinion Barbarossa was preventive.

[Werd]

I think that Hitler's peace offers are also relevant to the issue of whether the Nazis were really aggressive or rather defensive after being pushed into a corner.



By Dr. Friedrich Stieve. Including: A Final Appeal for Peace and Sanity, July 1940, by Adolf Hitler; Hitler’s Political Testament, April 1945; Hermann Göring’s Last Letter to Winston Churchill, Nuremberg, October 1946, and Neville Chamberlain in The Forrestal Diaries: “The World Jews Have Forced England into the War”

Written by Germany’s foremost diplomatic historian of the early twentieth century, this work maps out all the numerous times that Adolf Hitler made unconditional offers of peace to all the nations of Europe—and how the major anti-German belligerents, France and Britain, turned down these offers each and every time.

The author lists all of Hitler’s offers in detail, complete with quotes, starting with his first offer of May 17, 1933, his second offer of December 18, 1933, his third offer of May 21, 1935, his fourth offer of March 31, 1936, his fifth offer of September 30, 1938, his sixth offer of December 6, 1938, his seventh offer of late 1939 to Poland to settle the Danzig Corridor issue peacefully, and finally, his offer of world peace on October 6, 1939, just over a month after Britain and France had declared war on Germany for invading Poland on September 1 (but not on the Soviet Union, which also invaded Poland on September 17).

This edition benefits from four new sections which did not appear in the original publication. These are:

- The full text of Hitler’s “Appeal for Peace and Sanity” speech, made before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, following the fall of France. In that speech, Hitler once again offered unconditional peace to Britain. This speech was printed in English and dropped by the tens of thousands from German aircraft over Britain. Although nearly half the British cabinet wanted to take up his offer, Churchill’s warmongering put an end to this final offer of peace;

- Hitler’s Political Testament, dictated just hours before his death on April 29, 1945, wherein he spelled out once again how he had tried to avoid the war, and blamed Jewish agitators for the refusal of other nations to accept his peace offers;

- Hermann Göring’s final letter—from this death cell in Nuremberg—to Winston Churchill, in which he blamed the latter’s warmongering on behalf of “Jewish Bolsheviks” for the conflict; and

- An extract from The Forrestal Diaries, in which the US Secretary of State William Forrestal quotes British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as complaining that “the world Jews” have forced England into the war.

Fully reset and illustrated throughout with 22 rare photographs and reproductions of original documents.

Dr. Friedrich Stieve (1884—1966) was Germany’s foremost diplomatic historian of the first half of the twentieth century. He obtained his PhD in history at Heidelberg university, and during the First World War served as press attaché at the German Embassy Stockholm. From 1928 to 1932 he served as the German Ambassador in Riga, Latvia. And then from 1932 to 1939 served as the first head of the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Office. From 1933 to 1936 he was also Head of the Archives of the Political Archive of the Foreign Office.

Softcover

Pages: 93

Binding: Perfect-bound Paperback

Interior Ink: Black & white

Weight: 0.42 lbs.

Dimensions (inches): 6 wide x 9 tall

£4.95 /$6.25 plus shipping

http://ostarapublications.com/world-rej ... 1933-1940/

[Werd]

In February, this topic got noticed on Stormfront.

https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1003081-6/
Re: If the USSR had conquered Germany in 1941

02-25-2015, 05:50 AM

Igor Bunich discovered the code name for the Soviet invasion of Romania and Germany. Igor Bunich - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia It was called Operation Thunderstorm (Operatsia Groza). Look at the chronology - Operation Thunderstorm was drawn up in September 1940 and Operation Barbarossa not till December 1940 - Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack ? The CODOH Revisionist Forum

Here, starting on page 2 of a page 4 topic, the anti German posters really get their knickers in a knot. It's hilarious.

Operation "Groza" Soviet Invasion of Western Europe, July 6, 1941
http://defence.pk/threads/operation-gro ... 859/page-2

[Werd]

Nessie started a topic on rodoh called Hitler's Peace Treaties.
https://www.rodoh.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=2113
Observe how he dodges the information I have brought over to rodoh from this thread.

[Werd]

I just posted this in the rodoh thread. I may as well put it here too.

pages 29-30

The speech made by Stalin of August 19 1939, was obtained by the French Havas agency from Moscow by way of Geneva from an "absolutely reliable source." It was published as early as 1939 in volume 17 of the Revue Du Droit International. [6] Remarkably, the authenticity of the speech is disputed with extraordinary zeal by Stalinist propagandists and their blind adherents right up to the present day. However, in an interview under the hypocritical headline "A Mendacious Report from the Havas Agency" in the official party newspaper Pravda on November 20, 1939, Staln himself denied the speech. The mere fact that Stalin felt personalyl and immediatly compelled to publish an official denial reveals the extent to which he felt he had tipped his hand. [7] Only in extraordinary cases did Stalin ever allow himself to consent to his personal views.

Viktor Suvorov has proved that the authorities of the Soviet Union, such as members of the Central Committee, marshals, generals, professors, academicians, historians, and ideologists, have wracked their brains, and, with truly ardent zeal, have attempted to prove for fifty years that no meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee ever took place on this paticular August 19 at all. The whole tissue of lies finally collapsed on January 16, 1993 in a single day, when Stalin's biographer Professor Volkogonov confirmed in Izvestia "that a metting had indeed taken place on the date in question, and that he himself had held the minutes in his hand." [8]

The historian Ms. T. S. Bushueva, during the course of a scholarly evaluation of Viktor Suvorov's books, which had been distributed in editions of millions of copies, found the text of the speech by Stalin. The speech, which had long been known, was discovered in the secret depths of the former Special Archives of the USSR, apparently prepared by a member of the Comintern. She made it available to the Russian public fo rthe first time in the periodical Novyi Mir in December 1994. [9] This epoch making speech by Stalin is also contained in the published edition of the minutes of the ocnference of the "Memorial" society held on April 16, 1995, in Novosibirsk. It has been analyzed and commented upon in detail by the historians T. S. Bushueva and I. V. Pavlova, as well as by Professor V. L. Doroshenko.

"The question is," as Dr. Pavlova wrote to the author on August 7, 1996, "did Stalin prepare for a war of aggression, and did he accordingly make a speech on August 19, 1939?...A study of the minutes of the Politburo of 1939-1941 provides an additional justification for an affirmative answer to the question." Professor Doroshenko also grasped this point while summarizing his research results and said: "Analysis has shown that the text, regardless of any possible distortion, originates from Stalin, and must be considered one of the most important documents in the history of the Second World War." [10] That Stalin, as will be ascertained, will be transformed into the principal warmonger must be conclusively acknowledged on the basis of all the following circumstances, and the whole chain of subsequent events. [11] According to Viktor Suvorov, August 19, 1939, was the date upon which Stalin started the Second World War (since this was the day Stalin ordered a surprised attack against the Japanse 6th Army at Khalkhin Gol). Professor Lev Kopelev made a similar statement on December 24, 1994; his phraseology is different but no less clear: "In 193, the World War was continued by the Hitlerite and Stalinist realms...on a new and monstrous scale." [12]

Russian historians today have long seen an immeditae connection between August 23, 1939, and June 22, 1941. The August 23, 1939, Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler enabled Stalin to achieve his initial goal. Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union, recalled that Stalin was "convinced that the Pact would enable him to wrap Hitler around his little finger." "We have tricked Hitler for the moment," was Stalin's opinion, according to Nikita Khrushchev. [13] The August 23, 1939, Non-Aggression Pact encouraged Hitler to attack Poland and as a result - just as Stalin expected - a European war broke out. The Soviet Union participated as an aggressor, beginning on September 17, 1939, without, of course, incuring a declaration of war from the Western powers. The leader responsible for Soviet foreign policy, the Chariman of the Council of the People's Commissars, Molotov, spoke before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939. He said: "A single blow against Poland, first by the Germans, and then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this misbegotten child of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence to the repression of non-Polish nationalities." [14] It was the express wish of Stalin that nothing should remain of the national existence of Poland.

And now for the footnotes.

[6]
When on July 16, 1996, in the daily newspaper Die Welt, Carl Gustaf Strohm published a strikingly accurate report on the contents of the speech given by Stalin on August 19, 1939, the international apologists for Stalin immediatly considered themselves provoked. It was the task of one of their spokesmen, Gabriel Gorodetsky, to rescue the endangered Stalinist version in the new era. Gorodetsky is the Director of the Cummings-Institute for Russian history at the University of Tel Aviv, and was also one of the organizers of the conference held between January 31 and February 3, 1995, in Moscow. In the columns of Die Welt on August 31, 1939, Gorodetsky launched a counterattack in which he claimed that the speech by Stalin of August 19, 1939, was a falsification by the French secret service, but in so doing, he became immediatly mired in so many contradictions that his arguments were destroyed. For example, he referred to December 23, 1939, as the exact date of the French falsification, forgetting that Stalin published his official denial in Pravda on November 30, 1939, I.E. twenty three days before the text of the speech by Stalin would therefore have to have been known to the French secret service at a much earlier time. Another momentous blunde that entirely destroys Gorodetsky's credibility is that he claims that the secret additional protocol was only discussed for the first time at the end of September 1939 during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow. Whereas a fascimile of the full text of the "Sekretnyj Dopolnitel'nyj Protokol" (Secret Additional Protocol) on territorial annexation, signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939, had even been printed by Werner Maser in Der Worthbruch, pp. 48f. Gorodetsky confuses the Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, with the Secret Additional Procotol to the Border and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which, for an expert, is rather astounding and his hardly excusable. The desperate situation of the Stalin apologists today and the methods to which they resrot in their confusion were also revealed by H. -E. Volkmann, who appeared in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit on June 3, 1997 as "Research Director of the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswher." In this capacity, he published a full-page article on the "Legend of the Preventive War" with an attack on the former Inspector General of the Bundeswher, General Heinz Trettner. In doing so, he merely demonstrated that he is not familiar with the very numerous German and Soviet source documents, or with the international research situation. His shabby argumentation is an attempt to show that Hitler planned aggression, which, of course, is no longer a problem in contemporary research. Academically, the real question relates to whether the war of conquest prepared by Stalin that Hitler preempted rather by accident. Volkmann's rather incompetant article raises the question of whether the article is an attempt to mislead on ideological grounds, or whether it is quite simply the result of ignorance. Volkmann, who trivializes the Lenin-Stalin system of despotism at every opportunity, is also mentioned by Rudiger Proske, Wider den Missbrauch der Geschichte, pp. 16, 34, 61 as well as Professor Dr. jur. Gerhard Eiselt "Die historisch-politische Auseindersetzung."

[7]
"O Lzhivom soobschenie." The text of Stalin's official denial in Pravda of November 30, 1939, and a few other documents were made available to me by Dr. Michael Guterbock of Berlin, to whom sincere thanks are due at this point.

[8]
Suworow, Der Tag M, pp.76f.

[9]
Busuerca, "...Proklinaja - poprobujte ponjat...", pp. 232f.

[10]
Doroshenko, "Stalinskaja provokacija Vtrov mirovoj vojny," p.17

[11]
To the author, the contents of the verified speech by Stalin (which was, after all, known since 1939, published in the conferences volumes of Novosibirsk, and confirmed by the entire chain of historical events) was so minor a discovery that when the outworn text was sent to him by Dr. I. M. Pavlova in May 1995, he, at first, even hesitated to disseminate it in Germany but later discovered it was really longed for. That the speech by Stalin circulated by the author in Germany after some delay caused an authentic sensation was a surprise insofar as it shows how deficient people's knowledge of Stlain must be in Germany, even among interested groups of persons.

[12]
Kopelew, "Freie Dichter und Denker."

[13]
"Krushchev's Secret Tapes," p.44

[14]
Izvestija, NOv 1, 1939.