Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack

[Hektor]

Joachim von Ribbentrop explains that and why the invasion of the Soviet Union was a necessary preventive war:
https://archive.org/details/Aussenminis ... andfeldzug

[Werd]

ICEBREAKER was written over 20 years ago. Suvorov's most recent work in English is THE CHIEF CULPRIT - STALIN'S GRAND DESIGN TO START WORLD WAR II. Having read it myself I can say it is more polished and contains more info on the subject than ICEBREAKER. Why doesn't Muehlenkamp critique THE CHIEF CULPRIT?

Given the above if Hoffman is shortcoming with direct quotes from documents as opposed to his summaries we are supposed to take his word for, and if Suvorov is taking liberties and ripping quotes from their context as well as having figures that disagree as to Soviet strength or lackthereof, it does not bode well for the "icebreakers" as Roberto put it. Asking why he does not critique the chief culprit is like Roberto asking us why don't we critique any new books on the holocaust? Why bother if faults in Suvorov are already pointed out? Arguably, one could say that dealing with THE CHIEF CULPRIT, as least if Roberto was to, would be like beating a dead horse. If Hoffman is short on sources, and Suvorov may not only have numbers wrong about Soviet capabilities but also the context of certain quotes wrong, what reason is there to think he has changed his short cuts? I guess one can only know when reading the book and comparing quotes as he renders them to their actual meaning in the primary source he quotes.

In one of the chapters Suvorov talks about Russian-German phrase books. Published in Moscow in May 1941 5 million copies were printed. A question in Russian followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters then in German in Latin letters. The answers were also printed in Russian and German with Latin and Cyrillic letters. Some of the phrases included "Where is the water? Is it drinkable? Drink it first yourself! Where are the German soldiers hiding? Where is the burghermeister? ( I would point out that burghermeister is a German term and they do not exist in Russia) and most tellingly You do not need to be afraid! The red army will come soon!" If the Soviet Union was fighting a purely defensive war on Russian speaking territory then can Muehlenkamp explain why they had millions of Russian-German phrase books? The red army also had Russian-Romanian phrase books as well.

Did he provide photos of these books and their location in any particular archives? Couldn't one argue that these phrase books were printed as a backup plan just incase they knew they would have to march into Germany eventually, self defense or not?

THE CHIEF CULPRIT page 258 - "Soviet soldiers and officers were preparing for a victorious march on Berlin but the war against Germany in 1941 didn't run according to plan. As a result when Soviet commanders were captured the Germans found quite interesting maps and curious orders in their bags. Thousands of soldiers had Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books. Many simply did not think of the necessity to get rid of this compromising evidence. The commander of the 5th battery of the 14th howitzer regiment of the 14th tank division of the 7th mechanized corps, Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili, son of Stalin, was no exception. He was taken prisoner but at first he was not recognised. The senior lieutenant was betrayed by his subordinates. Stalin's son was searched and questioned. A letter was found in his pockets from a certain junior lieutenant in the reserves named Victor:I am at the training camps, I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin might hinder this. The letter is dated June 11 1941. The contents of the letter were reported to Hitler personally;he mentioned it on May 18 1942. German intelligence officers showed the letter to Yakov Dzugashvili and asked him to clarify the statement about the "planned walk to Berlin". The questioning protocol recorded Stalin's son's reaction. He read the letter and quietly muttered: Damn it!
During questioning Stalin's son was asked why the soviet artillery which had the best cannon and howitzers in the world and in incredible numbers fired so poorly. Stalin's son answered: The maps let the red army down because the war contrary to expectations unfolded to the east of the state border. Stalin's son told the truth. In 1941 the red army fought without maps. There simply weren't any. But the artillery couldn't fire without maps. Direct aiming and firing was just a small fraction of the work done by artillery in war. Most of the time artillery fired beyond the horizon.
"It turned out that in soviet Russia a map making industry was created that surpassed everything that had ever been done before in its size, organization, volume and quality of work" concluded the Germans about the soviet topographic services. How do we reconcile the best map making industry in the world with the complete absence of maps? Lieutenant General A I Lossev explained: "Storages of topographic maps located unreasonably close to the border were either seized by the enemy or destroyed by the enemy during the first bomb raids. As a result the troops lost 100 million maps".

As much as I like to play devil's advocate, I would love to check the sources in THE CHIEF CULPRIT to ensure Suvorov isn't playing games this time around. Although, I would hope that he furnishes other pieces of evidence, and he seems to. You know, I really am curious if anyone on axisforum or holocaustcontroversies has mentioned these maps and this interrogation.

Edit: Yes, they have.
The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=157349

[Werd]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=795

Re: Operation Barbarossa and Icebreaker
Post Number:#808 Postby Panzermahn on 24 Mar 2010, 06:40

May I suggest the works of Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov, (his works has not been translated to English yet but I believed the translation of his two titles that dealt with Soviet offensive plans for a prem-emptive strike against Germany are "We Will Destroy The Enemy Even at His Territory" and "Stalin's Missed Chance"). I believed Meltyukhov is the leading Russian scholar on Soviet offensive plans against Germany. Meltyukhov criticised Rezun's work on circumstantial evidence (a fact mitigated that Soviet archives was restricted to researchers in the 80s). Surprisingly, not many Western historians had review Meltyukhov's work apart from Richard Raack.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin%27s_Missed_Chance

Dr. Heinz Magenheimer as well as Bianka Pietrow-Ennker from Austria also concluded that the Soviets were planning to pre-emptively strike Germany, however the Germans spoilt the Soviet plans by launching Operation Barbarossa

This sounds like a reasonable middle ground to me. It also apparently is based on better, supporting evidence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin%27s_Missed_Chance

Stalin's Missed Chance is a study by Russian military historian Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov, author of several books and articles on Soviet military history.

Stalin's Missed Chance covers a theory of planned Soviet invasion raised by Viktor Suvorov, author of highly controversial books such as Icebreaker. Unlike Suvorov's works, Meltyukhov's book is based on archive materials, some of which were until recently classified. Contrary to many Western scholars (David Glantz, John D. Erickson, Richard Overy and others), Mikhail Meltyukhov concurs with Suvorov's claim that Stalin and the Soviet military leadership had planned an offensive against Germany in 1941.

Meltyukhov rejects, however, Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a preemptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of the other side's strike.

Stalin's Missed Chance is an extensive study of archive sources, often quoting and summarizing wartime records of the Red Army and the Soviet Union. The book also draws on a legion of published primary sources from the years 1939 to 1941.

Hopefully he quotes them directly and doesn't just summarize them and expect the reader to take his word for it like Hoffman has been rightfully accused of doing in his book at times.

On the eve of World War II

According to Meltyukhov, Russia had lost its position as a Great Power during the Great War, the revolution and the breakup of its empire. The Soviet leadership had the option either to accept the regional status of the USSR or to become a Great Power once again. Having decided for the latter, the Soviet leadership used Communist ideology (the Comintern, the idea of world revolution etc.) to strengthen its position.[1] The key objective was to exclude a possible alliance of Capitalist countries. Although diplomatic relationships had been established with the capitalist countries, the USSR was not accepted as an equal partner.

That changed, however, in the course of the political crisis of 1939, when two military and political blocs were formed: Anglo-French and German-Italian, both of which were interested in an agreement with the USSR. Moscow then had the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions to negotiate.

The basic aim was to retain neutrality, and after the weakening of both belligerent sides, to emerge as the decisive factor in ensuring victory for one side. Thus, "the USSR succeeded in staying out of the European war, after obtaining in this case a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, wider space to maneuver in its own interests between the belligerent sides."[2]

During the years 1939 and 1940, the USSR annexed several Eastern European countries and territories. The Kremlin viewed Germany as a force capable of weakening the positions of the United Kingdom and shaking the capitalist order. And "then at the suitable moment the Red Army could have destroyed Germany and would have freed Europe both from fascism and from 'rotten capitalism.'"[3]

As for Soviet-German relationship during 1940, Meltyukhov points out that although both sides had the common goal of weakening Britain and negotiations were held in November 1940, an actual military alliance was never realised, for Soviets would have had to leave the whole continent to the German-Italian sphere of influence, i.e., relegating the Soviets to a second-rate role in the world matters.[4]

I would purchase this book faster than anything by Suvorov or Hoffman. He seems to be closer to the truth.

Had the Soviet assault taken place

Meltyukhov asks the hypothetical question: what would have happened if the Soviets had carried out their initial plan and begun the invasion on June 12, 1941? By that time, German troops had completed preparations for Operation Barbarossa and concentrated themselves on the Soviet boundaries, where in the strip from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea it had already gathered 81.6% out of the divisions which the Wehrmacht would have on June 21.[21] The remaining troops were in motion and the Luftwaffe had completed re-dislocation after the Balkan campaign, but the "Wehrmacht had neither defensive nor offensive groups [yet], and a Soviet attack at this moment would have placed it in a very complicated position and made it possible [for the Red Army] to tear its forces apart."[22] For Soviet troops concentration, see http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s07.gif

The situation at the border strip from Ostrołęka to the Carpathians is shown in the table [23]



It is important to point out, however, that this table ignores powerful German forces positioned north of Ostroleka, who could have interfered with the Soviet plan. These included the whole of Army Group North with the Sixteenth Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Fourth Panzer Army, as well as Army Group Centre's Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Army to the North of Lomzha.

According to estimations by B. Sokolov, on the basis of Georgy Zhukov's proposal from May 15, 1941, 152 Soviet divisions had to break 100 German divisions as the main attack was provided for the South-Western Front in the direction of Kraków, Katowice.[24]

Meltyukhov believes that the Western leaders would have approved the Soviet strike, for it was difficult for the United Kingdom to win the war alone and the British had already done everything within their means to convince the Soviets to take a less benevolent attitude towards Germany.

In a telegram to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from June 15, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested providing the Soviets with every possible assistance in case a war between Germany and the USSR broke out. Roosevelt accepted this proposal without reserve on June 21. (Meltyukhov 2000:507-8)

Taking everything into account, Meltyukhov claims that though an "offensive by the Red Army would not have led to the immediate solution on the outcome of war, […] the Red Army could have been in Berlin no later than in 1942, which would have made it possible to gain much greater territory in Europe under the control of Moscow, than it really did in 1945." (Meltyukhov 2000:506)

I'm bet this is not covered by Hoffman or Suvorov.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Meltyukhov

Meltyukhov also contributed to a recently published collection of articles on Viktor Suvorov's ideas.[6] Meltyukhov supported some ideas of Suvorov in general but criticized him for inaccuracies. In his latest work, Stalin's Liberation Campaign,[7] he deals with Joseph Stalin's attempts to re-gain 'lost territories' of the Russian empire, for example, Bessarabia. He presents a hypothesis that precisely at the time of Soviet occupation of Bessarabia did Adolf Hitler make the decision to invade the Soviet Union, because he realized that Red Army can quickly cut Germany off its oil reserves in Romania by a strike from Bessarabia. This thesis was put forward earlier by Viktor Suvorov who described Soviet preparations for the strike.

An English version of some of his work has been published as "Disputes over 1941" by M I Mel'tiukhov in the series Russian studies in history.[8]

And

Support

Meltyukhov's study Stalin's Missed Chance has also been valued positively for covering Soviet military plans before the outbreak of German-Soviet war in 1941, relying on documents that were previously inaccessible.[12] While the theory that the Soviet leadership was indeed planning to strike Germany in 1941 remains disputed, Meltyukhov's data has been used[13] by authors who do not support the Soviet assault plans thesis mentioned above. However, some reviewers who agree that the USSR intended to attack Germany, have also criticised Meltyukhov for including pro-Soviet views (justifying aggressions on the basis of Soviet 'national interests' etc).[14]

Footnote 13 is David Glantz Stumbling Colossus, 1998. p. 292 and that book is heavily referenced by Roberto and others on axishistory.

How are books by David Glantz
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=148122

[Werd]

ICEBREAKER was written over 20 years ago. Suvorov's most recent work in English is THE CHIEF CULPRIT - STALIN'S GRAND DESIGN TO START WORLD WAR II. Having read it myself I can say it is more polished and contains more info on the subject than ICEBREAKER. Why doesn't Muehlenkamp critique THE CHIEF CULPRIT? In one of the chapters Suvorov talks about Russian-German phrase books. Published in Moscow in May 1941 5 million copies were printed. A question in Russian followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters then in German in Latin letters. The answers were also printed in Russian and German with Latin and Cyrillic letters. Some of the phrases included "Where is the water? Is it drinkable? Drink it first yourself! Where are the German soldiers hiding? Where is the burghermeister? ( I would point out that burghermeister is a German term and they do not exist in Russia) and most tellingly You do not need to be afraid! The red army will come soon!" If the Soviet Union was fighting a purely defensive war on Russian speaking territory then can Muehlenkamp explain why they had millions of Russian-German phrase books? The red army also had Russian-Romanian phrase books as well.
THE CHIEF CULPRIT page 258 - "Soviet soldiers and officers were preparing for a victorious march on Berlin but the war against Germany in 1941 didn't run according to plan. As a result when Soviet commanders were captured the Germans found quite interesting maps and curious orders in their bags. Thousands of soldiers had Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books. Many simply did not think of the necessity to get rid of this compromising evidence. The commander of the 5th battery of the 14th howitzer regiment of the 14th tank division of the 7th mechanized corps, Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili, son of Stalin, was no exception. He was taken prisoner but at first he was not recognised. The senior lieutenant was betrayed by his subordinates. Stalin's son was searched and questioned. A letter was found in his pockets from a certain junior lieutenant in the reserves named Victor:I am at the training camps, I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin might hinder this. The letter is dated June 11 1941. The contents of the letter were reported to Hitler personally;he mentioned it on May 18 1942. German intelligence officers showed the letter to Yakov Dzugashvili and asked him to clarify the statement about the "planned walk to Berlin". The questioning protocol recorded Stalin's son's reaction. He read the letter and quietly muttered: Damn it!
During questioning Stalin's son was asked why the soviet artillery which had the best cannon and howitzers in the world and in incredible numbers fired so poorly. Stalin's son answered: The maps let the red army down because the war contrary to expectations unfolded to the east of the state border. Stalin's son told the truth. In 1941 the red army fought without maps. There simply weren't any. But the artillery couldn't fire without maps. Direct aiming and firing was just a small fraction of the work done by artillery in war. Most of the time artillery fired beyond the horizon.
"It turned out that in soviet Russia a map making industry was created that surpassed everything that had ever been done before in its size, organization, volume and quality of work" concluded the Germans about the soviet topographic services. How do we reconcile the best map making industry in the world with the complete absence of maps? Lieutenant General A I Lossev explained: "Storages of topographic maps located unreasonably close to the border were either seized by the enemy or destroyed by the enemy during the first bomb raids. As a result the troops lost 100 million maps".

I also found that quote (albiet, unsourced) here by cheshire cat at axishistory.
Post Number:#52 Postby Cheshire Cat on 31 Aug 2009, 13:44
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&start=45
And someone had a reply to it.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1370510

by bf109 emil on 31 Aug 2009, 14:27

How do we reconcile the best map-making industry in the world with the complete absence of maps?
General A.I. Lossev explained: “Storages of topographic maps, located unreasonably close to the border, were either seized by the enemy, or destroyed by the enemy during the first bomb raids. As a result, the troops lost 100 million maps.”

The fact these maps where stored and not given to artillery commanders, armor units, generals and thus every single one of them was destroyed also points to the fact that even though the SU had maps of the other nations, they also had no plan for attacking other then being pre-pared, hence all the maps where indeed in storage...

but lets not forget Germany also had maps of the east and where quite frequently flying over Soviet territory in a pre-invasion flights to maps, chart, and located Soviet military positions which indeed, unlike the Soviet Union acted upon and used in an intentional, un prevoked act of violence...the fact Russia had detailed maps of borders to the west of theirs is not a justification nor a legal stance for the intentional and undeclared attack upon the Soviet Union and a violation as the declaration came post.

Viktor Suvorov a Soviet writters has written theories and published work that Suvorov's most controversial assertion was that Stalin originally planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. For this reason Stalin provided significant material and political support to Adolf Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to “liberate” the whole of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that Hitler lost World War II the moment he attacked Poland: not only was he going to war with the Allies, but it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would seize the opportune moment to attack him from the rear. This left Hitler with no choice but to launch a preemptive strike on the Soviet Union, while Stalin's forces were redeploying from a defensive to an offensive posture, providing Hitler with an important initial tactical advantage.

but his work and maybe a Ukarainain heritage which many saw Germany as a savior in order to be granted Independant Statehood and a removal from Soviet Rule has had his work and theories termed by many historians as inaccurate or false...[i]"Suvorov's assertions remain a matter of debate among historians. While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an upcoming war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage, the assertions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, and that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler, is widely disputed."[i]
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/980531.shtml

As a result, when Soviet commanders were captured, the Germans found quite interesting maps and curious orders in their bags. Thousands of soldiers had Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books. Many simply did not think of the necessity to get rid of this compromising evidence.

why should they as having maps and phrase books are hardly comprising, and evidence towards what?...and can you source what curious orders where found in their bag if indeed there where any?

Millions of Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books were burned along with the maps.

considering most Slavs at the time where illiterate and couldn't read nor write, seems like a waste printing more books then their where troops and I suppose they made a good fire to cook upon as their intended usage would have not been justified or put to heart.

And what does cheshire cat do? he continues to flood the topic with quotes from articles he does not give the link or source to.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1370579
Not impressive.

[Mortimer]

Werd,
Why don't you buy or borrow a copy of THE CHIEF CULPRIT yourself and critique it? That would be the easiest way to look at and check Suvorov's references. But it is not just Suvorov and Hoffmann who support this point of view. As previously stated there is also Igor Bunich as well as Ernst Topitsch, Mark Solonin, John Mosier and Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof amongst others.
The standard scenario of Operation Barbarossa is based on the false notion that Stalin trusted Hitler. The Soviet leader didn't trust his own citizens and had millions of them murdered - http://www.holodomor.org.uk Stalin didn't trust prisoners of war and had many executed - http://www.katyn.org.au Stalin didn't trust his own officer corps and had them decimated in purges. Yet he was supposed to trust the leader of Germany whose political career was based on fighting communism? I don't think so! Stalin's concept of the non aggression pact was to lull Hitler into a false sense of security while he was fighting in the West and then strike when he was least expecting it.
Five million of the Russian-German phrase books were printed in May-June 1941 and were to be used in the war of offense. The same with the Russian-Romanian phrase books. The Ploesti oilfields in Romania were a major source of oil for the German war machine.
THE CHIEF CULPRIT page 155 -
"A seizure of Ploesti by Soviet troops, or just a fire in the oil producing areas, would have meant paralysis for Germany. In the event of Ploesti falling to the Soviets, all German tanks, automobiles, cruisers, battleships, submarines and airplanes would have been stopped in their tracks. Who cares that you have talented generals, officers, soldiers, pilots and artillerists? Without fuel all their talents would be completely useless? A freeze on oil supply to the German war machine opened the way for thousands of other Soviet tanks. From Brest and Lvov, from Belostok and Grodno, the road to Berlin was now very short. If the German army and aviation were paralysed, and no one offered resistance, then on good roads the tank units could reach not only Berlin and Munich, but Paris and Marseille as well."
In 1940 the Soviet Union had already taken over the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Ploesti was 180km away. To allow the USSR to strike first and take the Ploesti oil fields would have been suicidal for the German war effort.
Just as it is important to keep alive the lie that there was a genocide of Jews it is also important for the powers that be to keep alive the lie that Hitler initiated Operation Barbarossa out of sheer love of conquest and warmongering. Never mind that Stalin killed 20 million of his own citizens the establishment propaganda campaign against Hitler must be kept up.

[Hektor]

It is important to point out, however, that this table ignores powerful German forces positioned north of Ostroleka, who could have interfered with the Soviet plan. These included the whole of Army Group North with the Sixteenth Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Fourth Panzer Army, as well as Army Group Centre's Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Army to the North of Lomzha.

... mmmmmh. And the equivalent Soviet forces (ignored by that argument) to the North wouldn't have interfered in that all? Btw. what was the ratio there?

[Mortimer]

In November 1940 Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov visited Berlin to discuss the USSR joining the Axis. He presented the German government with a list of demands which included territory that Germany had no control over (eg Turkey). Hitler proposed to Molotov a meeting with Stalin so that they could sort out their differences face to face. The message was passed on but nothing happened. Hitler was trying to solve the problem in a diplomatic fashion. Stalin wasn't interested. He had already decided on war with his Operatsiya Groza (Operation Thunderstorm) - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Bunich
A Youtube clip of Viktor Suvorov speaking on the origins of the Soviet-Nazi war - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7zVLfjWzmE

[Werd]

It is important to point out, however, that this table ignores powerful German forces positioned north of Ostroleka, who could have interfered with the Soviet plan. These included the whole of Army Group North with the Sixteenth Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Fourth Panzer Army, as well as Army Group Centre's Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Army to the North of Lomzha.

... mmmmmh. And the equivalent Soviet forces (ignored by that argument) to the North wouldn't have interfered in that all? Btw. what was the ratio there?

Let's refer to where I quoted an old Michael Mills post on page 2 of this topic.

Werd @ Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack

2. Germany would launch an attack on the southern Soviet Union with the aim of occupying Ukraine and the oilfields of the Caucasus and thereby bringing under its absolute control the resources which it needed for prosecuting the war against Britain (and potentially the United States) and for which at the time it was dependent on a less-then-reliable Soviet goodwill. In order to meet that possibility, Stalin concentrated the Red Army in the South, particularly its most modern weapons; that concentration also served the purpose of moving into Rumania if Option 1 eventuated.

However, the concentration of Soviet forces in the South enabled the Wehrmacht to make its breakthough in the North and centre. The Wehrmacht did not move in the South until some weeks after the start of barbarossa, until the reakthrough in the North had achieved overwhelming success. Wehrmacht plans show that it was well aware that Soviet forces in the south, facing Rumania and Hungary, were locally stronger than the forces of Germany and its allies, while those in the North were weaker.

Here,
Werd @ Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack
I demonstrated Suvorv's liberties taken with ripping small quotes about alleged Soviet prepardness on the eve of Barbarossa out of context, among other problems.

Already, I have shown the shortcomings of Suvorov as outlined by Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov who seems to have the more reasonable middle ground. Stalin did wish to make an offensive but not as soon as he would have liked.

Meltyukhov rejects, however, Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a preemptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of the other side's strike.

It seems the issue was control over resources. At least according to Mortimer's quote from page 155 of THE CHIEF CULPRIT. And I think it is THIS issue that Roberto Muehlenkamp and other leftist historians prefer to ignore. Ignoring this prevents them from seeing that Stalin had his own war aims and his own goal of conquest, albiet the prevention of an invasion by Germany. Both Hitler and stalin knew they would have to turn on each other eventually and they would need supplies like oil to do it. I think Michael Mills had it right. They both planned to invade in an attempt to cut each other off from coming into their own country. But Suvorov probably ruins his work with his liberties taken with ripping quotes from context as shown earlier, as well as going on and on about maps of Germany that Russians had which mean nothing in terms of 'proving' the Russians wanted to invade. I will say that useful as some of Suvorv's information may be, it ought to be tempered by reading some of Meltyukhov's work alongside it. As shown before, Hoffman, although pushing an interesting thesis, makes too many mistakes in his book. Although I bet he has some useful quotes in there in the vein of that genocidal Soviet Jew Ehrenburg who encouraged the Soviets to rape and pillage.

[Mortimer]

Viktor Suvorov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov contends that the whole idea of the non aggression pact was a set up from the start by Stalin. It is borne out by the following. The war officially began when Germany invaded Poland. Hitler earned the "bad guy" image by being the first to attack. Just observe the media each September on the anniversary of the attack - they either ignore or downplay the fact that Poland was invaded by 2 nations. Stalin is also responsible for ordering an invasion - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Poland
Germany and the Soviet Union were supposed to invade on the same date but then Stalin indicated he was not ready even though he previously said he was. This was done deliberately as part of the set up. So Hitler invades Poland and not only does he have to fight Poles but is also hit with a declaration of war from Britain and France. So he is now fighting not just Poles, British and French but also the countries of the British Empire such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa etc. When Stalin invaded Poland all he had to fight were Poles. Hitler had fallen into a trap from the very beginning. Stalin was much more Machiavellian and cunning than Hitler.

[Mulegino1]

Viktor Suvorov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov contends that the whole idea of the non aggression pact was a set up from the start by Stalin. It is borne out by the following. The war officially began when Germany invaded Poland. Hitler earned the "bad guy" image by being the first to attack. Just observe the media each September on the anniversary of the attack - they either ignore or downplay the fact that Poland was invaded by 2 nations. Stalin is also responsible for ordering an invasion - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Poland
Germany and the Soviet Union were supposed to invade on the same date but then Stalin indicated he was not ready even though he previously said he was. This was done deliberately as part of the set up. So Hitler invades Poland and not only does he have to fight Poles but is also hit with a declaration of war from Britain and France. So he is now fighting not just Poles, British and French but also the countries of the British Empire such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa etc. When Stalin invaded Poland all he had to fight were Poles. Hitler had fallen into a trap from the very beginning. Stalin was much more Machiavellian and cunning than Hitler.

The Sorelian myth of the Second World War is that the evil demon Hitler was bent upon world conquest, and that his "stab in the back" of his peaceful ally, Stalin, was the act of a bloodthirsty madman.

We now know that this scenario is false. The brilliant Suvorov, along with other lesser known historians, has provided an overwhelming circumstantial case that the Stavka was preparing a massive blow against Europe, almost certainly before mid-September (they could not tie up the Soviet railways with the massive troop and materiel deployments into Fall, as they were needed for grain shipments from the Autumn harvest.)

There is simply no strategic rationale, in a defensive sense, to deploy the bulk of the Soviet forces in the Bialystok and Lvov Salients, or a Light Infantry Force in the Carpathians.

Of particular interest is the huge glider force: Suvorov points out that it had to be either used during the particular time frame of summer/fall 1941, as the planes would be destroyed by the harsh winter weather. The same can be said for the huge paratroop force , as well as keeping the Soviet Navy in port. None of this makes any sense in a defensive context.

I believe you made the point earlier about Hitler deciding that war with the USSR was inevitable at the end of his and Ribbentrop's last meeting with Molotov in November of 1940. It was clear that the Soviets were going to move on the Romanian oilfields, on the Dardanelles and attempt to crush Finland.

Of particular interest is this portion of the surreptitiously recorded conversation between Hitler and Mannerheim:

Hitler: “May I tell you…(couple of unintelligible words)…president of state, I have not suspected this, had I suspected this, my heart would have felt even heavier…but I had made the decision all the more…because there was no other possibility. It was obvious to me, already in winter 39/40 that the (Invasion of the Soviet Union?) had to come. But I had the nightmarish pressure of the West on me, because a war on two fronts, that would have been the downfall…we, too, would have been crushed. We see that better today as we could realize it back then…we would have been crushed…our complete…originally I wanted in autumn 1939 to…I wanted to carry out the West Campaign, only that continuously bad weather we had, that has hindered us. Our whole armament was…it is a ‘Good Weather’ Armament, it is very capable, it is good, but it is unfortunately a Good Weather Armament. Indeed, we have seen it recently here in this war, naturally all of our weapons are styledfor the west. And we all had the conviction…that was until now (mumbling)…it was just our opinion, since the oldest times…one cannot wage war in wintertime. And we have…the German tanks…the German tanks have not been put to the test to perhaps prepare them for winter-war, but test-runs were made to prove that one cannot wage war in winter. It has been a different starting point. In autumn 1939 we have been facing the question…and I wanted yet to attack under all circumstances…I had the conviction that we would finish France within six weeks…but there was the question whether one would be able to move…and it was this continuously rainy weather…and since I know this French region very well…and I, too, could not discount the opinion of many of my generals, that we, probably, would not achieve this verve , that we would not be able to make full use of the tank force, that we would not be able to make full use of the Air Force, too, with the front air fields, because of the rain…I knew northern France myself, I have been soldier for four years during the Great War…and that was the reason for this delay. Had I finished France in the year 39, the world history would have went a different way, but this way I had to wait until the year 1940…and that was not possible until May…the 10th of May was the first fair day, and I have attacked on the 10th of May at once. I have given order on 8th of May to attack on the 10th and…then there had to be…had this giant transposition of our divisions from the west to the east to be made…(unintelligible: the first occupations in…?) then we had this task in Norway…during the same time came…came actually, I can say that today, this very great misfortune upon us, namely the weaknesses that had arisen for Italy, firstly the North-African situation, secondly with the situation in Albania and Greece, a very grave misfortune. We had to help now. That, at a blow, meant for us first of all again a rending of our Air Force, a rending of our tank units…while we were preparing our tank units for the east, we had, at a blow, to commit two divisions…two complete divisions, it turned out to be three at the end…and had to replenish very great losses there…it were bloody fights that have been fought out in the desert…naturally all of this has been missing here in the east…and…it was not imaginable any other way that the decision, which has been inevitable. I had a talk back then with Molotov, and it was absolutely obvious…Molotov left with the decision to begin the war, and I dismissed him with the decision to beat him to it, if possible…because, the demands this man was making were obviously aiming at ultimately ruling Europe…(the next sentence is whispered and largely unintelligible, something like ‘I have […] to dispute this, is downright ridiculous […]’)…Already in…in…in autumn 1940 there was constantly this question for us: shall one …err…risk a sundering?…I have advised the Finnish government back then…err…to negotiate and…err…to gain time to…err…err…to handle diversionary (?) things because I always had one fear: that Russia would suddenly assault Romania in late autumn, and would annex the petroleum sources…and we would have been not finished yet in late autumn 1940. If Russia had occupied the Romanian petroleum sources, Germany would have been lost…with…with, with 60 Russian divisions this thing could have been arranged; back then we had in Romania no task force yet, the Romanian government has turned to us very lately…and what we had would have been ridiculous indeed. They only would have needed to occupy the petroleum sources, I could not have started a war in September or October any more with our arms, that was indeed impossible…we also had the deployment of our troops in the east not prepared in any way, the units had to be consolidated in the west first, the armament had to be brought in order…because, naturally, we had also have made our sacrifices during the West Campaign. It would have been impossible to line up before the Spring of 1941, and if now the Russian, back then in the autumn of 1940, had occupied Rumania, and had annexed the petroleum sources, then we would have been…err…helpless in the year 1941…We had…have the large German production, but the amount the Air Force alone is consuming, the amount our tank-divisions are consuming that is something quite monstrous. It is a…a…a consumption surpassing all imagination. And without the afflux of four to five million tons of Rumanian petroleum, we would not be able to wage the war…And this worried me greatly, hence my attempt to overcome this time through negotiations, until we were strong enough to oppose this extortionate demands…the demands were sheer extortion, it were extortions, the Russians knew that we were helpless, that we were tied in the west, they could extort everything from us…and only on the visit of Molotov…then I have offhandedly declared them, that we could not accept the demands…these many demands…Basically with this the negotiations were…abruptly ended……there were four points, the one point concerning Finland…was the freedom to protect themselves from the Finnish threat…I said: ‘You do not want to tell me that Finland is threatening you?…He said, well, in Finland one would act against the friends of the Soviet Union…this would be a society…they would be continuously persecuted, and a Great Power could not accept being threatened from a small state regarding its existence.’ I said: ‘ you…your existence is not threatened by Finland, is it? You are not trying to tell me that your existence is threatened by Finland?’ (In the background someone says: ‘ridiculous.’) Well, there also would be a moral threat to the existence of a Great State, and what Finland was doing would be the more…a threat to the moral existence…And I said to him, that we would not be able to accept another war on the Baltic Sea as passive spectators. Then he asked me how our positions would be regarding Romania, we had made a guarantee after all…whether this guarantee would be directed against Russia as well…I said: ‘I do not think that it is directed against you, because you do not have the intention to assault Romania, don’t you? Tell me…we never have heard that you have the intention to assault Romania, you have always stated that Bessarabia belonged to you, but you have never stated that you wanted to assault Romania.’ He said that he wanted to know precisely..."

[Mortimer]

In November 1940 Soviet foreign minister Molotov went to Berlin with a list of demands for the German government -
from Finland, Pechenga the only Finnish port on the Barents sea and Porkkala-Udd the strategically located peninsula on the Baltic Sea controlling the entrance to the Gulf of Finland
naval bases on the Danish side of the straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak controlling access to the North Sea and Baltic Sea
from Yugoslavia a naval base on the Adriatic Sea
from Greece a naval base in the port of Thessaloniki
from Romania the province of Southern Bukovina, a strategic foothold in the Carpathian mountains to control access to the Ploesti oilfields
from Bulgaria a pact of alliance with the Soviet Union including Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere of influence
from Turkey bases in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits
from Iran bases in the Persian Gulf
the transfer of territories south of the Baku-Batumi line (in eastern Turkey north of Iraq and Iran) to the Soviet sphere of influence
from Japan the renunciation of its oil concessions in the province of Northern Sakhalin
Notice how these demands included territory that the German government had no control over. Hitler was perplexed. He asked Molotov to arrange a meeting between himself and Stalin so they could sort out the problem in a diplomatic and friendly atmosphere. The message was relayed but nothing came of it. If someone doesn't want to talk to you face to face while claiming to be your friend then that indicates dishonesty. Stalin wasn't interested in a face to face meeting with Hitler. His mind was already made up. He wanted war with his Operation Thunderstorm (Operatsiya Groza).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Bunich
It was after this list of demands was presented by Molotov and after the failure to secure a meeting with Stalin that Hitler realised he was being played for a fool and drew up plans for Operation Barbarossa.

[Werd]

John Mosier is the author of DEATH RIDE : HITLER VS STALIN - THE EASTERN FRONT 1941-1945 He has also come to the conclusion that Operation Barbarossa was preventive in nature. http://inconvenienthistory.com/archive/ ... thride.php

I saw that book in a store the other day and flipped to this part, quoted in that inconvenienthistory article.

"A summary of the key interrogations and the deductions of the interrogators, taken from the Wehrmacht records, is contained in Joachim Hoffmanm, Stalin's War of Extermination, 1941-1945: Planning, Realization, Documentation, translated by William Diest (Capshaw, Alabama, Theses and Dissertations Press, 2005), 80-88... In 1990, Victor Rezhun, a defector who had been an officer in Soviet military intelligence, writing under the pseudonym Suvarov, published Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War, translated by Thomas Beattie (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1990). He summarized Stalin's plans and offered as proof the dispositions of the Red Army in forward positions (those dispositions are corroborated by the Wehrmacht interrogations also summarized by Hoffmann, Stalin's War of Extermination, 65-70). After the collapse of the USSR the intentions enumerated in Hoffmann and Suvarov were confirmed, most notably by Pleshakov (Stalin's Folly), but by other Russian scholars as well (see the extensive citation in Stalin's Folly, 285)." (note 49/p.397)

As shown already in this topic, Hoffman doesn't have a strong case. He as well as Suvorov are prone to shift comments from ex soviet generals out of context and Hoffman also claims he finds damning things in documents that he merely summarizes but never quotes directly. The people on axishistory forum are correct in that the book does not do enough for its own case. As well, Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov is probably more accurate than Suvorov. The only shame is that his works have not been put into English. At least not his most important ones.

As for Igor Bunich at wikipedia, I found this quote.

After Georgy Zhukov became chief of the general staff in February 1941, the plan was called MP 41 (Mobilisatsyonni Plan 41). Bunich points to the Russian military archives, where it can be found (ZAMO, f. 15A, op.2154, d.4,l. 199-287). This document contains information about the Soviet military power in June 1941: 300 divisions, 8 million soldiers, 27,500 tanks, 32,628 airplanes. The total number of the German warplanes at that time was only about 6,000 although the majority of the Soviet aircraft was obsolete.

This is an oversimplification as one can see from what I posted here.
And another quote from wikipedia.

In Bunich's view Stalin is not the main responsible for these human losses, but Zhukov. Stalin was a statesman but not a soldier, in strategic questions he had to rely on the advice of his generals, and Zhukov was not a very talented one. For example he gave order to pile up heaps of ammunition under the bare sky in Soviet occupied Poland to a kind of Egyptian pyramids, which could be easily detected by the scout planes of the "Fliegerabteilung" of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris' "Abwehr" patrolling over this region as early as a month before the German attack. The Germans got a good picture of this monstrous mass of men and material and later easily destroyed it.

And what do we find from earlier back in this post of mine?

If the data in the table transcribed above are accurate, the Red Army was still equal in numbers at best and outnumbered at worst, thus far from achieving the numerical superiority of at least two to one that Stalin considered mandatory to launch a successful offensive. Which may have been the reason why Stalin rejected the proposal forwarded by Zhukov and Timoshenko in May 1941.

I still find it hard to believe Stalin was ready for war in 1941 or that he even wanted to launch war by 1941. However as an earlier quote from Michael Mills explains:

The truth about the lead-up to the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 probably lies between the two extremes of the views expressed by Left and Right.

Mine own view is that the Soviet Union did pursue the expansionist aims of Tsarist Russia, reinforced by the ideological aims of Communism, but after the War it reverted to a policy of maintaining its east European gains rather than pursuing further expansion. I consider the view propagated by the United States in the 1980s of the Soviet Union as the "Empire of Evil" to be totally force. The Soviet Union had been "evil", under Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, but then became simply corrupt and mediocre, not really a threat.

Leftist historians, whose views have obviously been accepted by Andy W, continually state that the concept of a German "preventive war" against the Soviet Union has been decisively refuted. In fact, what has been refuted is the claim that the Soviet Union was on the point of launching an invasion of Germany and German-occupied Europe in the summer of 1942. Examination of the actual moves made by the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1941 show that it could not have been preparing an advance into German-occupied POland and East Prussia at that time.

The mistake made by the Leftist historians is their claim that the refutation of the more extreme claims of defectors like "Suvorov" (real name Rezun) constitutes a refutation of any notion that the Soviet Union was pursuing an expansionist policy in the 1940s, and that it posed a very real threat to Germany in the near future, against which preventive measures had to be taken. In fact, the Leftist historians have not demonstrated conclusively that the Soviet Union had no expansionist plans, and that it was not discussing with Britain the possibility of its joining the war against Germany, with domination of Eastern Europe as its prize.

Again, Meltyukhov rejects Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a preemptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of the other side's strike.

It seems the issue was control over resources. At least according to Mortimer's quote from page 155 of THE CHIEF CULPRIT. And I think it is THIS issue that Roberto Muehlenkamp and other leftist historians prefer to ignore. Ignoring this prevents them from seeing that Stalin had his own war aims and his own goal of conquest, albiet the prevention of an invasion by Germany. Both Hitler and stalin knew they would have to turn on each other eventually and they would need supplies like oil to do it. I think Michael Mills had it right. They both planned to invade in an attempt to cut each other off from coming into their own country. But Suvorov probably ruins his work with his liberties taken with ripping quotes from context as shown earlier, as well as going on and on about maps of Germany that Russians had which mean nothing in terms of 'proving' the Russians wanted to invade. I will say that useful as some of Suvorv's information may be, it ought to be tempered by reading some of Meltyukhov's work alongside it.

[Hannover]

Admittedly I haven't read all of this thread, but a few of questions & points:

1. Wasn't the positioning of Soviet troops & materials indicative of an impending offensive action? It's rather obvious to me that it was.
2. Wasn't there a speech by Stalin which spelled out his plan to attack Germany? I believe there are verifiable documents about it.
3. Didn't Soviet POWs openly admit that they were about to attack Germany? Yes they did.
4. No, I do not believe one can just blow off the fact that maps of Germany were found on captured Soviet personnel. Dead give away.
5. And no, I do not believe Hitler was outsmarted by Stalin's delay in invading Poland. Germany had it's time table which it felt compelled to stay with; to avoid potential weather problems, the need to 'get it over with' ASAP not knowing what Britain and France would do, and a certain urgency to protect Germans residing within stolen German territory. People either do not know or conveniently forget about the hardships those Germans were under. And there's always a desire by 'historians' of a certain type to make Hitler out as dimwitted or deranged, he was certainly neither. It fits the contrived 'holocaust' lies.

Generally I accept the conclusions of Suvarov and those here: http://inconvenienthistory.com/archive/ ... thride.php

It all falls into place with what the Germans actually saw in their pre-war intelligence collection and what they found when Barbarossa commenced.
I think there is tendency for many to wish away the fact the Germans were right in their urgency. Heretofore I have seen no convincing evidence otherwise.

Thanks, Hannover

[Mulegino1]

Admittedly I haven't read all of this thread, but a few of questions & points:

1. Wasn't the positioning of Soviet troops & materials indicative of an impending offensive action? It's rather obvious to me that it was.
2. Wasn't there a speech by Stalin which spelled out his plan to attack Germany? I believe there are verifiable documents about it.
3. Didn't Soviet POWs openly admit that they were about to attack Germany? Yes they did.
4. No, I do not believe one can just blow off the fact that maps of Germany were found on captured Soviet personnel. Dead give away.
5. And no, I do not believe Hitler was outsmarted by Stalin's delay in invading Poland. Germany had it's time table which it felt compelled to stay with; to avoid potential weather problems, the need to 'get it over with' ASAP not knowing what Britain and France would do, and a certain urgency to protect Germans residing within stolen German territory. People either do not know or conveniently forget about the hardships those Germans were under. And there's always a desire by 'historians' of a certain type to make Hitler out as dimwitted or deranged, he was certainly neither. It fits the contrived 'holocaust' lies.

Generally I accept the conclusions of Suvarov and those here: http://inconvenienthistory.com/archive/ ... thride.php

It all falls into place with what the Germans actually saw in their pre-war intelligence collection and what they found when Barbarossa commenced.
I think there is tendency for many to wish away the fact the Germans were right in their urgency. Heretofore I have seen no convincing evidence otherwise.

Thanks, Hannover

http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/script ... plans.html

In general, the Soviet media denied rumors of troop concentrations along the frontier. The defense committee had been secretly transferring combat divisions there since the summer of 1940. In April 1941, the Ural and Siberian military districts were ordered to release more formations. On May 13, an additional 28 divisions, nine corps headquarters and four army headquarters were relocated from the Russian interior. By June, according to recent Russian archival estimates, the Soviet armed forces had deployed 2.7 million men near the western frontier; the equivalent of 177 divisions...

This enormous fighting force was allocated 10,394 tanks, over 1,300 of which were the formidable types KV and T-34. The army was supported by nearly 44,000 field guns and mortars. Over 8,000 combat aircraft occupied forward airdromes. The western military districts established command posts close to the frontier. Army staffs and front administrative personnel were ordered transferred there in mid-June.

One hundred Soviet divisions were positioned in eastern Poland alone. A high proportion of armored and mechanized formations deployed near Bialystok and Lvov, behind geographic bulges protruding westward along the German-Soviet demarcation line. In a 1972 book, Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, in 1941 a colonel in the Red Army, commented on the troop disposition around Lvov:

"More than half the troops of the Western Special Military District were stationed around Bialystok and to the west, therefore in territory extending like a wedge deeply into that of the probable enemy. A troop arrangement of this kind would only have been justifiable... if these troops had been earmarked to launch a surprise attack. Otherwise, half of them would have been surrounded in a moment..."


As for the Bialystok area, the Soviet Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko later offered this perspective:


The philosophy of the Red Army was attack oriented. The chief of staff, Georgi Zhukov, described the training at the Soviet general staff academy:

Participants in the course were instructed that wars are no longer declared; the aggressor strives far more to insure all the advantages of a surprise attack... The strategy of warfare is above all anchored in the correct thesis that the aggressor can only be beaten through offensive operations. Other variables of battle, such as counterthrusts, fighting to cover retreats and operations in case of encirclement, were, with few individual exceptions, only touched upon.21
During May 1941, Zhukov and the defense commissar, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, prepared an operational study for Red Army deployment in case of war with Germany. It was based on an initial plan submitted to Stalin the previous September. The May document included the following recommendation:

"In total, Germany and its allies can deploy 240 divisions against the Soviet Union. Considering that Germany, through the arrangement of its rearward services, can keep its army readily mobilized, it could deploy ahead of us and carry out a surprise attack. To prevent this and defeat the German army, I regard it as necessary to under no circumstances relinquish the initiative to the German high command; but to deploy ahead of the enemy and then attack the Germany army right when it is forming up, has not established a front and cannot organize the combat operations of its allied forces."


What one is faced with on June 21, 1941: The Soviets' largest Army, the 9th, is sitting on the Romanian border less than 100 miles away from the Ploesti oil fields.

The bulk of the rest of the Soviet forces are deployed in vulnerable salients- perfectly appropriate and effective for the near future conduct of offensive operations, but potentially catastrophic in the event that these operations are preempted.

The offensive strategy of Zhukov has received Stalin's public blessing.

The bulk of the Soviets' front line air force is sitting on airstrips in close proximity to the western frontiers. (Nearly 2,000 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the first day of Barbarossa).

My money is on a large Soviet offensive sometime in the middle or late summer of 1941.

[Hannover]

Thanks, Mulegino.
Court historians just can't bring themselves around to admitting that Hitler was right. In reality Hitler had no choice but to fight a two front war. In fact he had no choice but to go to war in the first place. The Allies were not about to let the German economy stand as an example of how to avoid a system that was so profitable to certain Allied interests. Not to mention the huge communist influence within Allied governments and of course the communist USSR. Neither the Allied financial interests nor the communists were going to allow competition.

- H.