JohnnieDarko wrote:Please do get me wrong but you stating some facts that didn't really happened in reality for example I've read declassified documents of Churchill being extremely mad that the Americans would not get into the war and Britain couldn't hold up much longer and Roosevelt said the Americans would not participate but would offer the full support and volunteers. And the public opinion in the USA was that people didn't want go to war. Some even claim that the Britains intercepted messages from the Japanese about pearl harbor and Churchill ommited then from the Americans because he knew that would bring the Americans into the war. And you telling me that this was a plan of the Americans and the poles?
Didn't happen? The documents I cited exist and say exactly what I quoted from them. That you personally find them unpalatable to your view of history and thus seem unwilling to incorporate them into your view of events is not a matter of history but ignorance, I'm sorry to say.
I am aware of Churchill's anger regarding the lack of immediate American intervention, and the constraints by congress on Roosevelts more aggressive war policy, all of that as you say is true. However, this doesn't contradict the documents I cited, as they do not specify how and when the USA was to get involved. That was a matter all on its own. You seem to think that I'm saying the attack on Pearl Harbour was a preconceived plan by the USA and the Poles, which isn't the case. There's no reason why there must be come grand conspiracy connecting all events together. This isn't the case either, Pearl Harbour, or any other casus belli against Japan in the pacific would be good enough to get the USA into the war against Hitler. Pearl Harbour, for whatever reason, was the one which was best suited for this.
Irving writes in an unpublished draft of his memoirs:
Henry L. Stimson had every page of his diary between July 1941 and Pearl Harbor retyped to delete references to the Far East and magic, the American codebreaking results, because he wanted “to keep out anything that might hurt the Pres[ident],” as he disarmingly explained to Henry R. Morgenthau; and so on.
[...]
A pencilled entry in Morgenthau diary, Nov 4, 1944: FDR Library, Henry R Morgenthau papers, page 1458. The Stimson diaries are in Yale University Library. See my Churchill’s War, vol. ii: Triumph in Adversity (Focal Point: London, 2002?), Page 163 for a fuller exposition of this falsification.
Unpublished excerpt from draft chapter of David Irving's memoirs, see page 111: http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/biogr/22_Speer.pdf
From the reference to Irving's published second volume on Churchill:
After the Japanese weighed in with their own pre-emptive strike, officials in the United States spent the next four years purging their files of all evidence that might lead to an impeachment of the president or the disgrace of his military advisers. Telephoned one evening in November 1944 by Roosevelt’s secretary of the treasury, the secretary of war Henry L. Stimson would snap that he was tired out ‘from working the last two weeks on [the] Pearl Harbor report to keep out anything that might hurt the Pres[ident].’
David Irving, Churchill's War: Triumph in Adversity (London: Focal Point Publications, 2001), p. 163.
The controversy around Pearl Harbour is another matter altogether which is not of much interest to me but has been exhaustively dealt with by historians who have shown indisputably that Washington was aware of the Japanese intentions, and used it to their fullest advantage. This didn't require Churchill keeping anything a secret from Roosevelt, which Irving writes "No indisputable proof has been found that Churchill had deduced Tokyo’s precise intentions in enough time and detail to alert Washington, but we shall find that many indications point that way." (pg. 164)
In either case, Pearl Harbour or not, Roosevelt was resolute in his intentions to embroil war in Europe. And again, war might have been avoided had Washington saw fit to fully inform the Poles of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which they didn't. Had they done so, it's questionable whether Poland would've insisted on provoking war with Germany. Polish intentions can only be understood by the fact that she fully expected Germany to be the only power with which she needed to contend:
In this context, which made the war inevitable, Ambassadors Biddle and Bullitt played a key role. Bullitt had assured Lukasiewicz on the morning of 31 August, citing reliable sources, that the Germans and Russians had mentioned neither Poland nor Romania during their negotiations in Moscow, and that the possibly existing secret supplementary agreement to the Hitler-Stalin Pact concerned only the Baltic states, not Poland.
Certainly, one does not dare to claim at first that Bullitt deliberately wanted to lie to his Polish colleague at this critical moment. After all, one can think that the American ambassador himself was not exactly informed about what his colleague Steinhardt had reported from Moscow a week ago. However, since the Hitler-Stalin Pact was the outstanding event in international politics before the outbreak of war, in the content of which every diplomat was burning with interest, and because Bullitt had Roosevelt's personal trust, one must rather assume the opposite. Why did the American ambassador not pass on his information to Lukasiewicz at least at that moment?
It was the same reason that had prevented the Roosevelt administration from telling England, France and Poland the truth in good time. It was precisely on 31 August that Lukasiewicz began to realise that in the event of an Anglo-German rapprochement Poland would find itself "in an extremely difficult and uncomfortable position". If this realisation set in in Warsaw, the whole [diplomatic] quarantine could be shaken. Therefore, even in view of the concrete circumstances, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Bullitt's communication was deliberate disinformation intended to dissuade Beck from revising his exaggerated position. It was given additional weight by the fact that it was confirmed by Foreign Minister Bonnet.
Deliberately deceived or kept in the dark by the Americans about the fate their country would suffer in the event of a war against Germany, the Poles ran to their doom. Since Beck saw Biddle as his political confidant, one must assume that the US ambassador in Warsaw played a decisive role in determining Polish behaviour on the last day of peace. In any case, he kept himself closely informed about Beck's communications with the governments in Berlin and London. To the desperate question of his English colleague Kennard whether Roosevelt could not make one last effort for peace, the American diplomat only waved wearily: Since Hitler had not answered the president's two appeals, further steps were not to be expected.
Dirk Bavendamm, Amerikas Griff nach der Weltmacht: Roosevelt, Hitler und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Gilching: Druffel & Vowinckel-Verlag, 2018), pp. 570-571.
Thus, the Poles were deliberately misinformed by the Americans. To specifically state that the secret protocol contained nothing about Poland, was simply a lie, and one that has no purpose being made unless it was to provoke Polish intransigence and encourage hostilities between Germany and Poland.
In the report of the events between May 1938 and August 1939 the German ambassador to Britain, Herbert von Dirkson writes:
Nourished from the most diverse sources , a flood of lying reports alleging concentration of army corps in Danzig, bringing in of heavy artillery, building of fortifications, etc., poured into the British press . This inflammatory campaign reached its peak in the early days of July, when week - end United Press reports from Warsaw regarding a Danzig - Polish crisis , an ultimatum , etc., provoked a regular feeling of panic and crisis in London , The Embassy soon traced the crisis mongers: they were American circles working through the American Embassy in Warsaw. This was the first, but a very distinct, sign that Roosevelt was interested in an aggravation of the situation, or in war, in order to secure, first the repeal of the neutrality law, and then his re-election thanks to the war.
These intrigues and crises had a direct effect , inasmuch as they compelled Chamberlain to declare in ever more precise terms that any change in the status quo in Danzig would constitute a casus foederis for Britain.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (ed.), Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, Volume 2: Dirkson Papers 1938-1939 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948), Doc. 29, p. 179. See too, Dietrich Aigner, Das Ringen um England: das deutsch-britische Verhältnis, die öffentliche Meinung 1933-1939, Tragödie zweier Völker (Munich: Bechtle-Verlag, 1969), pp. 346-347.
In light of the documents which came to light after the outbreak of war, Dirkson's report is stunningly accurate.
As mentioned in my previous reply to you, Łukasiewicz's report is in full accordance with the secret Polish documents captured and published by the Germans, which also had ancillary counter-parts found in the Polish embassy in Washington. That Łukasiewicz notes that it was Roosevelt's intention "not take part in [the war] at the beginning, but we shall finish it." Concluding that "President Roosevelt’s policy will henceforth take the course of supporting France’s resistance [and] weakening the British tendencies toward compromise." Was thus intentionally geared to provoke a war, since it absolutely couldn't be expected that Hitler would back down. And since you think it "makes no sense" for Hitler to have anticipated this attitude from Washington (in other words stating that you don't believe Hitler knew of this) then it's even less likely that Hitler would've backed down and more likely that he would've made a move against Poland. The surreptitious aspect of Roosevelt's policy which kept Germany in the dark could only embolden Poland and her Allies, while leaving Hitler to believe that he had less enemies to reckon with. On the other hand, if Hitler did know, then your claim that it "makes no sense" must be discarded, for Hitler would in that case have more of a reason to act as he did against Poland. In either case the actions and statements of American foreign policy was geared to make war inevitable and compromise impossible, as this was the stated goal.
No matter what way you look at it, your argument is the one which makes little sense because under no circumstances does this attitude by the USA lead to a positive development. Whether, as you believe, Roosevelt wouldn't participate in a war isn't relevant either. Whether he would or wouldn't doesn't matter, the fact is that in 1939 before the war began and the practical questions of the USA's involvement was relevant, the United States made commitments which were aimed at influencing the policy of the Allies on the continent which led to war. At that time whether she would or wouldn't actually go to war wasn't important. It was enough that Poland and her allies simply believed she would. The effect of declarations in this regard was sufficient to bring to heel any possible compromise in Germany's favour.
This is the first example of the common mistake you make, which is the conflation of what happened or didn't happen later on which leads you to conclusions about what "makes sense", allowing you to dismiss documents and facts you don't like, but not understanding that later developments aren't known by the belligerents of the time under discussion (unless they're omniscient), in which only an account of the records relating to that time are relevant.
JohnnieDarko wrote:That make little sense since Poland was one of the countries that suffered most with the war and no help came really until the end of the war for them and the whole country was a wreck.
You're right, all except for the claim that it doesn't make sense. For one thing the Poles had a severely inflated sense of their own military might, a fact which British documents admit. For example, a memo on Anglo-Polish staff conversations dated July 17, 1939 states quite clearly:
[Paragraph 9] The Polish view of their ability to resist Germany depends to a large extent upon their assessment of the fighting value of the German land forces which they place much lower than we do, and which is set out at some length in paragraph 25 of the Report. The War Office do not agree that the Standard of training in the German forces is low and they consider that the efficiency of the mechanised units has been greatly improved since the time when Austria was occupied.
In general, therefore, we are of the opinion that the Poles tend to underrate the German strength and over-rate their own.
[...]
[Paragraph 14] In paragraph 17 of the report, the possibility is mentioned that a Corps may be transported from Hamburg by sea to East Prussia, to co-operate with a major advance from Pomerania. As we said in paragraph 11 above, we consider this unlikely. Except for this we have no comment on paragraphs 17-27 of the Report, and we endorse the view of our Delegation that the Poles are probably too optimistic regarding their ability to resist the German advance.
The National Archives, Kew; PRO CAB 66/1/2
The Poles made many such statements that they would "fight and die alone" that their army would "march on to Berlin" etc. As is clear, the Poles may had also had a more sensible side, because they did anticipate heavy losses but ultimately reckoned with victory due to the intervention of the British and the French. Neville Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, telegrammed Lord Halifax as late as July 25 to inform him of the reckless Polish attitude:
The Polish attitude is that, though Poland would be overrun in war, her allies would win in the end and a still greater Poland be the result. The immediate sacrifices would therefore be well worth the ultimate gain. Now I cannot conceive of any far-sighted statesmen sitting down at the end of another victorious war and handing over more Germans to Poland. The responsibility for the peace of future generations would be too great a deterrent. In fact I cannot see how Poland could possibly be the ultimate gainer from war, and I cannot but feel, in all honesty, that this point should be made quite clear to the Poles.
The National Archives, Kew; FO 800/316
This document was clearly so inflammatory that it didn't find it's way into the selected British document volumes published at the end of the war. Nonetheless, Henderson's report was supported by the assessment of Anglo-Polish staff conversations which observed just this attitude from the Poles:
III - Polish Strategic Conception
[Paragraph 9] The Poles are convinced that the Germans will, at the beginning of the war, direct their whole available weight against Poland, maintaining a defensive attitude on all other fronts until Poland has been put out of court. All their plans are based on this conception, and they have really very little idea of what action they would take in any other situation, beyond a general statement that it would facilitate the counter-offensive which they always intend to make.
[Paragraph 10] They are thus dealing with their own problem in its most menacing aspect, and the one which presents the greatest difficulties. They are under no delusions that this will cause them tremendous losses, involve the abandonment of large part of their country, the cessation of all trade, except across the Russian and Romanian frontier, the loss of their Silesian industrial resources and perhaps of others further inland, but they face this catastrophe with a certain rather admirable confidence that they will always be able to maintain a front against their enemy somewhere in Poland, and that the eventual defeat of Germany is certain as she will not be able to stand the pressure of a long war against France and England.
The National Archives, Kew; PRO CAB 66/1/2
Essentially, the Poles anticipated that they would have to withdraw their forces from the Western frontier "to a shorter line of rivers and lakes, somewhat east of the old German— Russian frontier." In hope of local counter-offensives with "East Prussia in mind as a possible objective."
All of this fully aligns with the comments made by Beck to Burckhardt:
The Poles wait in apparent silence. Beck, during this night drive, has let me in on his plans a little. He continues to play his double game. It is not a German game as some French and the Polish opposition believe. It is a game in which one hopes for the highest profit for Poland, a profit that is to result from an eventual and inevitable German catastrophe. For this reason the Germans are being driven into their misdeeds, and in Danzig the extremists are being allowed to triumph with pleasure, while at the same time the adherence to the external forms of the treaties is being emphasised again and again. One day they will present the bill and demand interest and compound interest. Already now, by collaborating in a way with the National Socialists, one has succeeded in creating throughout the West, in France, England and America, a solidary aversion to any revision of the treaties.
Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939 (München: Verlag Georg D.W. Callwey, 1960), p. 156.
The compound interest was German territory at the provocation of a war, which Poland fully intended to let come about. Beck went on to illustrate the exact territories Poland hoped to acquire through her intrigue:
"It was quite different in 1932. At that time, the majority of Western opinion in the great democracies was in favour of the German minorities. People were upset about badly drawn borders, about isolated provinces. Thanks to the excessive methods of Nazism, all that has come to an end, and now people in Warsaw are quietly hoping not only for the unconditional integration of Danzig into the Polish sphere of government, but for much more, for all of East Prussia, Silesia, even Pomerania. In 1933, Warsaw still spoke of Polish Pomerania, but now they say "our Pomerania". Beck has been pursuing a purely Polish policy, an ultimately anti-German policy, an only apparently Polish-German policy of détente since the occupation of the Rhineland and the French passivity on the occasion of this event. But an effort is being made to encourage the Germans quite methodically in their mistakes.".... [i.e. to be given no other choice but to attack Poland]
Ibid., p. 156-157.
That the Poles were anticipating great profit from a war against Germany is also attested to by the former German chancellor Heinrich Brüning who relates how the British government had indeed made promises to the Poles for these aforementioned territories:
Even before the outbreak of the war, Heinrich Brüning in exile in London became aware of an Anglo-Polish partition agreement, which he mentioned in several private letters and to which he attributed a major part in the outbreak of the war: "Do you think that after the summer of 1940 any of us could have changed the fact that Poland had risked the war because of the promise made by the British government in the spring of 1939 to obtain not only East Prussia but also Upper Silesia?"
Both objectives had already been demanded by Polish authorities vis-à-vis the Western powers in 1919. It was quite obvious that this had now been repeated and decided upon, while Brüning, as a possible representative of a new, democratic German government, was pointed to this price for a peace treaty by the British side. He declared that he did not want to sign such a thing. That the Polish maximum demands went far beyond this was shown by the declarations of the National Democratic Party Chairman Kowalski, who in a speech in April 1939 demanded the Oder-Neisse line as the border and thought it would be a good idea to have this printed as well.
Stefan Scheil, Polen 1939: Kriegskalkül, Vorbereitung, Vollzug (Schnellroda: Antaois-Verlag, 2013), p. 63. cf. p. 64. cf. Stefan Scheil, Ribbentrop: Oder Die Verlockung des nationalen Aufbruchs. eine politische Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 2013), pp. 218-220.
Brüning also attests to the intention of the Churchill clique to provoke a war with Germany, a fact which on the 'Nazi' side was attested to by memos authored by Herbert von Dirkson:
I saw Sir Joseph Ball and again made it emphatically clear to him that there was still time to make Germany a maximum offer of concessions. In view of what I knew about Beck's resignation and the steps Beck had taken to make Gamelin aware of the dangerousness of the situation, I was sure this could prevent war and lead to the dissolution of the regime. Winston Churchill called at Old Surrey Hall and put forward an invitation to dinner, but I told the Andersons to accept only for themselves. From his speeches and from everything I heard after my return, I realised that I could not prevent the Admiralty and Winston Churchill's group from advocating war at any cost.
Claire Nix (ed.), Heinrich Brüning Briefe und Gespräche 1934-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), p. 233.
Similarly, Dirkson in his report states:
The cross-section of public sentiment at the beginning of July was roughly as follows: the first stratum comprised a numerically small but politically influential group who realized the dangerousness of the course adopted and were anxious for an adjustment with Germany in one way or another—to a certain degree they were victims of their own policy ; then came a broader stratum of determined anti Germans bent on war, composed of the Churchill- Eden Amery -Cooper circle ' and their following of Left Liberal and ultra -pacifist elements, the newspaper group around the “Daily Chronicle,” “Yorkshire Post ” and “Manchester Guardian," influential Jewish groups , émigrés , American influences, etc.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (ed.), Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, Volume 2: Dirkson Papers 1938-1939 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948), Doc. 29, pp. 179-180.
Now of course, I anticipate you dismissing these facts because it isn't what eventually happened. Although, after the collapse of the USSR it did happen. But nonetheless, these were promises and expectations made prior to the Soviet Union coming onto the scene. These facts only serve to show what was thought before the war began and developed, there needn't be any follow-through necessarily.
Continuing with this connection it's not coincidence that Beck had told Lubienski (as quoted already in my previous response to you) that "I have decided not to grant any concessions over Danzig. Let them [the Germans] take it from us by way of a coup. They will have to pay us dearly for that." (H. Roos, Polen und Europa, p. 396) and on September 24th, while exiled in Romania, Marshal Rydz-Smigli and Polish president Moscicki had remarked that:
With deep bitterness, Ryds-Smigli explained that one had relied on the official communications and promises of help from the English. Moscicki's remark that Poland had finally wanted to accept Germany's conditions but had been prevented from doing so by England was particularly bitter. Because his ministers had counted on English help, they had finally allowed the war to come about.
Source: RG 242, NA Microfilm T-120, roll 1496, frame 626334. cf. Annelies von Ribbentrop, Die Kriegsschuld des Widerstandes: Aus Britischen Geheimdokumenten 1938/39 (Leoni: Druffel-Verlag, 1975), p. 383.
The significance of these facts cannot be underrated, they reinforce each other to a spectacularly exact degree. The Beck conversation with Burckhardt on July 23rd for example, was held only two days prior to Henderson's telegram! Both of which show Polish willingness to allow war to break out and to avoid making any concessions. The document I just cited confirms the whole thing from the mouths of the Poles themselves.
Your contention that it makes "little sense" because Poland suffered the most as a result of war is not a reason for why these facts aren't true. The truth doesn't always make sense, it is quite apart from any "sense" that these facts exist to paint a picture. If the Poles were self-destructive, and delusory that is true, it isn't impossible; so if you dismiss facts because you have a preconceived and post hoc belief in what "sense" should mean to the Poles in this case, then you are the one who ends up distorting the evidence and the truth. It isn't for the historian to decide who thought what, only to show what it is that was thought through evaluations of the documents, whether they make sense or not. In this case, the Poles were underestimating their opponents, and still believed that a war provoked by them would result in victory for them in the long term. They staked their independence on this gamble and lost horribly. Their allies didn't and couldn't save them. If you're honestly under the impression that the Poles wanted to avoid a conflict, then it makes little sense for them to have thwarted all proposals put forth by the Germans, and even after the outbreak of war to refuse Mussolini's offer of mediation (which Hitler was considering) by demanding, not even 24 hours after the German attack, that the West should come to their aid and no mention should be made of peace conferences:
French Ambassador tells me he received today' most secret instructions from M. Bonnet to sound M. Beck regarding an ill-defined Italian suggestion for a five-Power conference.
2. M. Beck replied that Poland was the victim of unprovoked aggression and was being pressed hard. It was time to talk not of conferences but of mutual aid in resistance to aggression. He subsequently telephoned to the Ambassador after consulting the Marshal to confirm his reply.
3. French Ambassador told me this was very secret and asked particularly that it should not be revealed that he had told me.
4. M. Beck expressed great satisfaction with the British and French declarations of support this morning. It has given general satisfaction but every Pole is now asking how quickly and effectively we can implement the alliance.
Kennard to Halifax, 02.09.1939, 2:47 a.m. DBFP, 3, Vol. VII, Doc. 693, p. 498f.
The Poles were clearly not as concerned with their own destruction as you imply.
It's well known that Germans were willing to move out of Poland, and retain only Danzig and the plebiscite in the corridor, or at the very least negotiate the settlement of a Polish rump state. This willingness to negotiate even after the start of the war on behalf of Germany wasn't reciprocated (on Hitler's willingness to come to terms even after the outbreak of war, see: Scheil, Fünf plus Zwei, pp. 63-67). Interestingly enough, after the German 16 points had been publicly broadcast at 9 p.m. on the 31st, Henderson telegrammed at 12:30 a.m. on September 1st to Halifax in order to plead for pressure to be brought to bear on Poland to negotiate on the basis of these proposals:
War may be justified on grounds that Nazi regime is an immoral one which one must fight sooner or later. But I submit that on German offer it would be completely unjustifiable. If the former be the case I have nothing more to say and the moment may well be an opportune one. If the latter should be the view held by His Majesty's Government I can only suggest that Polish Government be urged in unmistakable language that they should announce tomorrow, in the light of German proposals which have now been made public, their intention to send a Plenipotentiary to Berlin to discuss in general terms these proposals.
DBFP, 3, Vol. VII, Doc. 631, p. 469.
Henderson however, was delusional as to the Polish temperament at this time, incensed by what he saw as German intransigence which couldn't be further from the truth. That over 24 hours later in response to Mussolini's suggestion of a peace conference, the Poles made their position clear: "It was time to talk not of conferences but of mutual aid in resistance to aggression." (as quoted above) On the one hand this is reasonable considering their country was being invaded, on the other if the Poles could've prevented the destruction of their country by agreeing to peace terms in which the Germans agreed to move out of Poland, would that not have been more ideal? After all, as Henderson noted, the German proposals had been made public and now couldn't be avoided as a possible basis for negotiations. If the Poles had genuinely sought a peaceful resolution one would expect that they'd jump at the chance to stave off the destruction of their country, after all Beck admits that they were being "pressed hard." Evidently this wasn't the case, the Poles weren't interested, and never were, in what would save their country.
It may be inexplicable, but it's true nonetheless.
JohnnieDarko wrote:And also saying the invasion of Poland was a necessity is not even revisionism it trying to re-write history, saying that Hitler foreshadow the plan of the Americans and the poles and there was a necessity to invade to improve his position doesn't make any sense either, because Hitler gambled the invasion, he didn't belive Britain and the French would risk go to war for Poland, there's a lot of Germans reports on that, he was even surprised. So these all seem to be conclusions taken after the facts and not based on what really happened, I cross-reference a lot of documents and books and some of the things you are stating don't really make sense considering the way things played out.
No. I never said Hitler anticipated the scope and detail of the American involvement. Although he certainly expected their involvement at some point on the side of the Allies, which was all the more reason not to wait any longer.
As for the Poles, Hitler repeatedly spoke of how he believed successful negotiations with them were unlikely and doomed to failure, leaving him with no other choice than the use of force against her. This is why it was a necessity, because he had no other choice but the use of force if he was to re-acquire Danzig and the corridor for Germany. Hitler fully anticipated resistance Poland spurned on by the West, and spoke multiple times of the Poles opposing his proposals due to the British guarantee, a fact which the Poles themselves admitted. The best case scenario for the Poles would be if Hitler gave up on his desire to acquire Danzig and the corridor, in this unlikely scenario the Poles would lose nothing and had no reason to act because they would've gained what they desired by default.
None of this is "rewriting history" (which isn't a bad thing, historians do it all the time) it's simply taking account of what the facts show. Hitler emphasised both in letters to Mussolini in August 1939 and March 1940 and in his "secret" conferences in August of the military necessity of moving against Poland by September 1st because, as he told Ciano on August 13 he knew "Poland was playing for time" and for this reason "Poland’s political attitude must be clarified by the end of August at the latest" (DGFP, D, VII, Doc. 47) in order to give Germany enough time to beat the weather and move against her with adequate time to defeat her. This in conjunction with his understanding that Germany only had a limited window of opportunity in which to act before the armaments of his Western opponents caught up to him. This was Hitler's other motivation to act against Poland to which he argued was a necessity unless Poland came to heel, which again, he didn't expect. This didn't mean he anticipated opposition from the West in August, or even September, but he made it quite clear that he didn't want to end up in a position where he was encircled and threatened by the united power of his Western antagonists. To move against Poland in the time frame he specified was the best chance he had of securing Germany's position further before any other possible hostilities could develop, which he nonetheless tried to stifle.
I'm also fully aware of Hitler's repeated resolution that Britain and France wouldn't come to Poland's aid (which they didn't) and that they wouldn't even fully commit to war on her behalf. But this doesn't contradict what I wrote to you previously at all, as it doesn't make the move against Poland any less necessary from Hitler's point of view, which the documents clearly show. It was precisely because Hitler didn't believe the West would get involved that he was resolute in solving the Polish question "one way or another", which actually refutes your contention that Hitler was running a "risk" or "gamble". Clearly he wasn't because you also recognise that Hitler didn't believe in Anglo-French aid to Poland, you cannot have it both ways.
Hitler did try to improve Germany's position by presenting the West with a fait accompli in his speech of October 6th in which he invoked the now relevant question of Soviet participation against Poland. He had tried to invoke this in August by telling Henderson (IIRC) that the Soviet Union now has to be reckoned with as a factor due to the non-aggression pact, a warning which went thoroughly disregarded by the British side.
JohnnieDarko wrote:So the Americans gamble with Poland Europe lol that's absurd since Hitler conquered almost the entire Europe that plan makes 0 sense.
It isn't absurd, saying it is doesn't make it so. This is what the Americans state from their own mouths. Whether you think it's "absurd" is irrelevant.
JohnnieDarko wrote:And Hitler never made more serious plans to invade Britain because Goering failed his mission, RAF humiliated the luftwaffe so their was no way to invade Britain, because if the luftwaffe had succeeded their plan they would have invaded Britain there's german records of this, they were even constructing special boats for the invasion I forgot the name os these boats, but since Raf showed air superiority they never moved forward. Saying it was just a smoke screen for operation barbarossa doesn't make much sense since they lot a great amount of planes and good pilots during that time. Why not charge directly for Russia? They didn't need to make any diversion, Stalin until the invasion didn't belive the Germans would invade even being warned by their generals so why lose a ton o equipment and good pilots on a smoke screen? Again those sound like conclusion taken after the events to justify the facts but don't really make much sense.
Hitler was certainly vacillating between an invasion of Britain and an attack on Russia. He tried again and again to reach an agreement with Britain which would make an invasion unnecessary even as it became less and less viable. This agreement would even theoretically nullify the necessity of an attack on Russia. That is if you ignore that the Russians were preparing their own attack on Germany, which they were. But even if you disagree with this because you're unaware of the extensive literature on the subject, Hitler still had every reason to act against Russia because of her increasingly heavy-handed demands which departed from the original agreements signed between the two countries. These demands and territorial incursions quite apart from any plans of aggression directed against Germany, nonetheless threatened to place her in a position of total reliance on Soviet goodwill, for example:
There is much to be said, however, for the hypothesis that the Soviet government believed that a German success over Great Britain still lay far in the future, that the war would continue for a long time, and that as a result it could step up considerably its demands on Berlin. The issue was to gain a superior starting position for further, even more stringent demands, which, if granted, would have made Stalin the arbiter, even the permanent ruler, of Europe. Given the possibility of an unlimited duration of the war in the west, the Germans therefore faced two alternatives following Molotov’s visit to Berlin: either increased dependence on the Soviet Union and acceptance of the danger of being blackmailed in the foreseeable future, or a turn-about against the Soviet Union by means of a decisive attack. In the ensuing period both Hitler and Stalin became convinced, if only from their political assessment of the situation in terms of strategic security, that a war against each other was inevitable.
Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler's War: German Military Strategy 1940-1945 (London: Arms & Armour, 1998), p. 48.
Hitler had decided not to go ahead with the invasion of Britian, as Kershaw admits, "long before the decisive phase of the ‘Battle of Britain’ was reached" and thus rendered unfeasible:
The order for the indefinite postponement of ‘Operation Sealion’ was not actually given until 17 September. But in reality, Hitler had always had cold feet about the prospect of a landing in Britain, and possibly accepted as early as 29-31 July, long before the decisive phase of the ‘Battle of Britain’ was reached, that it would not be possible to go through with the invasion.
Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World 1940-1941 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 75.
Your statements regarding planes and pilots has little relevance from what I can see. If the Germans could force the British through air-power to concede defeat, which obviously failed, it would've - as stated - nullified the necessity of moving against Russia. The only reason the invasion of Britain was floated in the first place was because she was unwilling to make peace with Germany, which Hitler sincerely desired to end the war, hence why his directive for July 16 1940 states "As England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, still shows no willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare, and if necessary to carry out, a landing operation against her." He had no reason to hastily undertake any military operations while the prospect of peace was still on the table. Hence why the options being weighed - Britain or Russia - were being contemplated in terms of what would be more successful and the least risky, and of course which would end the war as quickly as possible through military means. It was simply decided that attack Russia was the least risky option (As Kershaw writes: "The decision to attack Russia had swiftly taken the place of the decision to attack Britain. It was seen as less risky.").
The smokescreen was strategic because in the German conception the Russians would be none the wiser to their preparations against them in case the Soviets took defensive measures. In preparing to go for Russia, it couldn't be done openly, that you're insinuating this was possible because of Stalin's dismissal of a possible German invasion doesn't account for the fact that the Germans had no way of knowing that. To say this, and then dismiss the fact that Sea Lion was a smokescreen on that basis, is to conflate what you know post hoc of Stalin's belief, and what the Germans at the time had no way of knowing. This is bad judgement on your part. Thus you have not shown that what I said makes no sense, quite the opposite.
Clearly the Germans made the right call in any case, due to the offensive position of the Russians the Germans were able to incur heavy losses against the Russians and wipe out swarths of them, and capture tons of equipment. All the more reason not to give your enemy any more reason to suspect anything.
JohnnieDarko wrote:This discussion was getting interesting but some of the "facts" presented diverge so much from reality, and I'm not saying mainstream history, but real actions taken by the people involved that is nonsensical only thing left to say was that the Germans were forced to go to war lol and it was all a big plot, Im all up for revisionism but re-writing history is another question.
I didn't say it was a big plot. The Germans were however, forced to go to war on a limited scale, and then when their attempts at peaceful resolution were ignored to fight a global war for self-preservation. The option presented to Hitler was 'war or lose face' and give up vital German interests. This was not a possibility, which Hitler made clear again and again in the face of British insistence that they'd make good on their guarantee.
) it was less risky to invade Russia? And why it was less risky? Because luftwaffe couldn't not guarantee a safe landing of the troops. 