Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

[Otium]

In his Second Book, Hitler made clear that the mere restoration of the borders of 1914 couldn't be a satisfying solution for two reasons: a) It would only restore the situation that had led to WWI and b) it wouldn't solve the Lebensraum problem, i.e. that Germany didn't have enough land for her people and that this would have to be gained in the east. Granted, he wrote that in 1928, but these arguments were still valid in 1939. What had fundamentally changed by then was that he was now a statesman that had to pragmatically deal with political realities and to make concessions.

What Hitler said in Mein Kampf and his Zweites Buch two decades prior to the second world war is irrelevant.

As I've shown here, here and here - but didn't say explicitly - the ideas expounded in Hitler's alleged 'programmatic writings' in the 1920s were abrogated by the opportunity provided by the war against Poland to secure lebensraum within former German territories. Although, it must be stressed, there is no evidence that this was the reason the war was fought. It merely provided a good opportunity, one which Hitler accounted for in April 1939 if a negotiated settlement was not possible.

When Germany won the war against Poland, it allowed her to create a settlement zone in the former 1914 German territory of West Prussia, which had since been stolen from Germany, given to Poland, and ethnically cleansed of its original German inhabitants (Richard Blanke in his Orphans of Versailles gives a fine account of this, as does, funnily enough, Hermann Rauschning in his 1930 book Die Entdeutschung Westpreußens und Posens: Zehn Jahre polnische Politik). That Hitler considered the aim of German lebensraum completed by this is evident from his numerous comments to his confidants and generals on September 29 1939 in which he stated that West Prussia would serve as Germany's granary.

The first plan for Generalplan OST in April/May 1939, was drafted explicitly to put Hitler's thoughts of late September into practise in the long term. No mention was made of Russia, or expansion beyond the territories to be re-germanised. In-fact, as Goebbels noted definitively in his diary on September 30th (1939), a new fortification line was to be built in order to "separate Germany from Russia once and for all" (An seiner Grenze bauen wir eine neue Befestigungslinie. Die trennt Deutschland endgültig von Rußland). He also remarked on the permanence of this plan to delineate the new German settlement zone in Western Poland (formerly Prussian), west of the new Polish territory of the Generalgouvernement; he stated: "Our settlement is proceeding according to plan and is calculated for the long term" (Unsere Siedlung geht planmäßig vor sich und ist auf lange Sicht berechnet). The fact that he could remark that this was "calculated for the long term" is important information, because it shows that this was not just a short-term plan before a "war for lebensraum," but that this was the end of the lebensraum concept at this point.

Thus, the concrete statements by Hitler (reiterated by him on numerous occasions) and the subsequent concrete plan which supported his statements ruled out any programmatic intention on Hitler's part to seek 'lebensraum im Osten' further eastward, let alone at the expense of the Soviet Union (not that this is a bad thing anyway). This nullifies via abrogation the primary two sources that conspiracy theorist historians use, Mein Kampf and the Zweites Buch.

[Prussian blue]

@ Otium

Thank you for your answer. I basically agree with you, especially that securing lebensraum wasn't the reason the war was fought. And "Our settlement is proceeding according to plan and is calculated for the long term" shows quite convincingly, that this wasn't merely a short-term plan.

"at the expense of the Soviet Union (not that this is a bad thing anyway)"

Agreed. Nowadays, people often forget to see expansionism in the historic context. At that time, England ruled 1/4 of the world, and the USA and USSR owed their almost continental sizes their expansionism of the past.

However, in his Second Book Hitler elaborates quite at length why regaining the former German territories would not provide sufficient lebensraum (see quotes below). And the reasons given there were still valid in 1939. Do we know what had changed his mind by then? Realpolitikal considerations seem most likely to me. (And his Second Book wasn't written "two decades prior to the second world war" but in 1928. However, I'm aware that there is a difference between ideological outlines and a real policy.)

Some quotes (search results for "1914" and "lebensraum") from Hitler's Second Book:

The Germany of today must under no circumstances see its foreign policy task in a formal border policy. As soon as restoration of the 1914 borders is established as the foreign policy objective, Germany will confront a cohesive phalanx of its former enemies.

p. 94

The German borders of 1914 were borders that represented something just as unfinished as peoples’ borders always are. The division of territory on the earth is always the momentary result of a struggle and an evolution that is in no way finished, but that naturally continues to progress.” It is dumb to simply take the border from any given year in the history of a people and establish it as a political goal. Instead of establishing the border of 1914, one could just as well take the one from 1648 or 1312, and so on, and so on. Especially because the 1914 border was not at all satisfactory from a national, military, or territorial policy perspective. It was just the momentary situation at that point in our people’s struggle for survival, which has been rolling on for millennia and whic would not have had its ending in 1914 even if the Great War had not come.

p. 95

If the German people actually did achieve the restoration of the 1914 borders, the sacrifices of the Great War would nevertheless have been for nothing. But the future of our people would not gain anything either through such a restoration. This purely formal border policy of our national bourgeoisie is just as unsatisfactory in its potential end result as it is intolerably dangerous. It also may not apply to itself the [demand] dictum about the art of the possible, because that is simply a theoretical phrase that seems suitable for destroying every practical possibility.

p. 96

The prospects for the German people are bleak. Neither the current Lebensraum nor that achieved through a restoration of the borders of 1914 permits us to lead a life comparable to that of the American people. If we wanted this, either our people’s territory would have to be very significantly expanded or the German economy would again have to follow paths that are already familiar to us from the prewar period. In both cases, power is then necessary—first in the sense of the restoration of the inner strength of our people, but then in a military version of this strength as well.
Today’s national Germany, which sees the fulfillment of the national duty in its limited border policy, cannot deceive itself into thinking that that will solve the nation’s food-supply problem in any way. Because even the greatest success of this policy of restoring the 1914 borders would only bring back the economic conditions of 1914. In other words, the problem of feeding our people—completely unresolved then as now—would inevitably drive us back onto the path of the global economy and international exports.

p. 105

Thus increasing the productivity of the land can bring relief in the life of a people for a certain time, but in the long term this will never eliminate the requirement to again adjust the people’s insufficient Lebensraum to fit the growing population. Internal colonization itself can, at best, provide improvements only in the sense of social rationality and justice. It is irrelevant to the overall sustenance of a people. For the foreign-policy orientation of a nation, however, it is not infrequently damaging, as it raises hopes that can distance a people from thinking realistically. Ordinary decent citizens will then really believe that they can obtain their daily bread at home through industriousness, diligence, and fair land distribution, rather than recognizing that a people’s strength must be gathered to win new Lebensraum.

p. 22

Destiny will teach them that a people can ultimately only be preserved when population and Lebensraum are in a certain natural and healthy relation to each other. Also, this relation must be reviewed from time to time, and to the degree that it shifts into imbalance to the detriment of space, it must be restored to the advantage of the population.

p. 26

Peoples with impossible territory will always—at least as long as they are well led—make the effort to expand their territory and therefore their Lebensraum.

p. 48

Germany decides [its future goal] to adopt a clear, farsighted policy of space. It thus turns away from all international industrial and international trade policy attempts and instead concentrates all of its strength on marking out a way of life for our people through the allocation of adequate Lebensraum for the next one hundred years. Because this space can lie only in the East, the obligation of a naval power takes a back seat. Germany again attempts to fight for its interests by forming a decisive power on land.

p. 159
(A bit out of context, because it is only one of four possible goals. However, he dismisses the others.)

Page numbers refer to
https://archive.org/details/hitlers-sec ... 6/mode/1up

[Otium]

Thank you for your answer. I basically agree with you, especially that securing lebensraum wasn't the reason the war was fought. And "Our settlement is proceeding according to plan and is calculated for the long term" shows quite convincingly, that this wasn't merely a short-term plan.

Indeed it does.

There are other pieces of evidence as well.

I have already posted here that 'eastern expansion' was a reference, not to Russia, but to the Baltic states if anything. But this was ruled out, again, in late September 1939 when Goebbels wrote regarding the Baltic that: "We could also expand in the Baltic, but the Führer does not want to attack another state, and for the rest we have enough to digest for the time being." (Wir könnten auch im Baltikum uns ausdehnen, aber der Führer will nicht noch einen Staat angreifen, und im Übrigen haben wir nun vorläufig genug zu verdauen.) Evidently this was not apart of some predetermined plan, as it was in the context of the territorial divisions between Germany and Russia, in which Germany could expand further if she so desired, but Hitler didn't want to. Nor did this change in January 1940 when Goebbels remarked that the 'great eternal goal' of Germany foreign policy at the time was to defeat England and push her out of Europe, while also deposing France as a great power:

"The Führer is determined to wage a great war against England. As soon as the weather is good. England must be swept out of Europe and France must be deposed as a great power. Then Germany will have hegemony and Europe will have peace. That is also our great, eternal goal. After that, the Führer wants to stay in office for a few more years, carry out social reforms and his buildings, and then retire. Then let the others do it. He then only wants to hover over politics as a good spirit. And write down everything that still occupies him today. The gospel of Nationalsocialism, so to speak."

22.1.1940; Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Pt. I: Vol. 7 (Munich: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1998), p. 280.

No mention of further expansion to the east, no mention of some grandiose plan. Nothing. It's very concrete and limited in scope, and the result of the circumstances thrust on Germany by the belligerence of the West's reckless declaration of war. By this time Hitler knew he had to confront them.

Really the fact that the first plan for 'Generalplan OST' is explicit about Germany's aims to restore the borders of 1914 is one of the big nails in the coffin of the 'lebensraum' myth. No further plans existed until the outbreak of Barbarossa. If we want to talk in terms of 'plans' then look no further than this one. That Hitler talked about turning the limited territory he had obtained from the old German territories into a granary meant there was no need to expand further, this accounts for what Hitler said in the second book regarding the problem of food production and, as I said, effectively closes the book on Hitler's goal for lebensraum.

However, in his Second Book Hitler elaborates quite at length why regaining the former German territories would not provide sufficient lebensraum (see quotes below). And the reasons given there were still valid in 1939. Do we know what had changed his mind by then? Realpolitikal considerations seem most likely to me.

I have already showed that the evidence is conclusive for this time, and the only conclusion to draw from it is that Hitler was satisfied with West Prussia and Posen being re-germanized and turned into a granary for German food production (and in October would authorise some tactical extensions of German territory beyond 1914, but there's no evidence this was concieved prior to September 1939). That Germany would also oversee - albeit lightly according to Hitler - the Generalgouvernement which would keep the Polish element away from Germany, is itself a change in what the Germany's territory had been in 1914, in the sense that the German 'sphere of influence' was much larger, and further east, than it had been previously. There's little reason to think that this wasn't sufficient to allay the concerns Hitler had in 1928, without actually turning that territory into an ethnic transformation zone which would become apart of Germany proper.

Germany had fine relations with Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Lithuania. She also had good relations with Russia for a time, but a combination of realkpolitik and the true Soviet aims put an end to that.

You also have to consider the other factors geopolitically which were different from 1914. Germany and Austria were unambiguously united under one banner when the war broke out in 1939, as was Czechoslovakia. The political arrangements in terms of state structure were monumentally different, in that when fighting a coalition of enemies there were not two governments in Berlin and Vienna which required arbitration. Similarly. Germany had friendly governments in Scandinavia and in Iberia. The whole European constellation was, more or less, aligning with German hegemony. The stragglers of course, were countries like Poland, which became essential to British foreign policy in their attempt to create a 'coalition' against 'German aggression', which was really just encirclement no matter what spin you put on it.

Also, it's a fact that Germany would not have been facing the same 'phalanx of its former enemies' (geschlossenen Phalanx seiner ehemaligen Feinde gegenüberstehen) after the military confrontation of the West. If the West's defeat had been achieved without a war with Russia - which became essential from a strategic/military point of view no matter how you slice it - then the potential threat to the east would be greatly diminished, and the threat emanating from the West completely destroyed. Thus, it would not have been necessary to acquire 'lebensraum' further east in 1939, had the West either accepted that it was reckless to fight any longer, or had Germany been capable of ending the war in the West by military means.

There's little, or even no reason to think Germany couldn't succeed in peace with the much better geopolitical position she had obtained after the war with Poland (those who think differently must inadvertently defend German 'aggression', so it's a 'lose lose' for those people), although this wasn't something which solely depended on her. This is most evident from the fact that the West did not wish to make peace, and thus propelled German expansion in order to defend herself from real and potential attacks.

The problem Germany was confronted with was that there were still potential enemies in the West and in the East. That she would have to contend with one of these is just the unfortunate thing about the German geographic position. This didn't necessarily mean war, but it was always on the table. It's all well and good for countries like Britain, France, Russia and the United States to talk of 'peace', they were not surrounded by potential enemies. Applying the same 'logic' to Germany is itself illogical.

Hitler was content with the outcome of the Polish war, his goal of lebensraum had been achieved, and his books from the 1920s were abrogated thereby. As Hitler told the French philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel in February 1936 regarding his relations with France:

"You want me to make corrections in my book, like a writer preparing a new edition of his works? But I am not a writer, I am a politician. My correction? I make it every day in my foreign policy [...] I will write my rectification in the great book of history!"

De Jouvenel, Bertrand, "Le chancelier Hitler nous dit", Paris-Midi, 28 Feb. 1936, p. 3. Cf. Philipp W. Fabry, Mutmaßungen über Hitler: Urteile von Zeitgenossen (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969), pp. 190-191.

Certainly this is a principle which can be applied here too.

[Hektor]

In his Second Book, Hitler made clear that the mere restoration of the borders of 1914 couldn't be a satisfying solution for two reasons: a) It would only restore the situation that had led to WWI and b) it wouldn't solve the Lebensraum problem, i.e. that Germany didn't have enough land for her people and that this would have to be gained in the east. Granted, he wrote that in 1928, but these arguments were still valid in 1939. What had fundamentally changed by then was that he was now a statesman that had to pragmatically deal with political realities and to make concessions.

What Hitler said in Mein Kampf and his Zweites Buch two decades prior to the second world war is irrelevant.

As I've shown here, here and here - but didn't say explicitly - the ideas expounded in Hitler's alleged 'programmatic writings' in the 1920s were abrogated by the opportunity provided by the war against Poland to secure lebensraum within former German territories. Although, it must be stressed, there is no evidence that this was the reason the war was fought. It merely provided a good opportunity, one which Hitler accounted for in April 1939 if a negotiated settlement was not possible.

When Germany won the war against Poland, it allowed her to create a settlement zone in the former 1914 German territory of West Prussia, which had since been stolen from Germany, given to Poland, and ethnically cleansed of its original German inhabitants (Richard Blanke in his Orphans of Versailles gives a fine account of this, as does, funnily enough, Hermann Rauschning in his 1930 book Die Entdeutschung Westpreußens und Posens: Zehn Jahre polnische Politik). That Hitler considered the aim of German lebensraum completed by this is evident from his numerous comments to his confidants and generals on September 29 1939 in which he stated that West Prussia would serve as Germany's granary.
....

The zone was a bit larger than Wilhelminian Germany, though. But it still was within reasonable limits. It appears that the intention was to resettle Germans from the East in that area. And basically consolidate German territory a bit. It's far more modest then the claims the Allies made on territory, they neither needed nor intended to settle with their own people, but held exclusively for economic/financial reasons.

There is also a twist in getting Germans from Soviet occupied areas to gather there. It indicates that there was no initial plan to invade the USSR at all. But that's forgotten and ignored by those whining about "Lebensraum" or "Generalplan Ost".

[Otium]

The zone was a bit larger than Wilhelminian Germany, though. But it still was within reasonable limits. It appears that the intention was to resettle Germans from the East in that area. And basically consolidate German territory a bit. It's far more modest then the claims the Allies made on territory, they neither needed nor intended to settle with their own people, but held exclusively for economic/financial reasons.

The zone was a bit larger in a few places, namely the Suwalki triange and the District of Zichenau (Ciechanow). The latter was only incorporated by Hitler's order in late October; and in that case in 1914 Ciechanow was formerly Imperial Russian territory, not Polish, thus if Stalin as the head of Russia ascented to it, then technically Hitler had every right to incorporate it. Anyway. What needs to be understood is that these territorial changes were only decided upon in October 1939 after the defeat of Poland, not before. Prior to the war there is not a shred proof of any intention to go beyond, at most, former Prussian territory if a war with Poland offered such a possibility. Nonetheless, the borders of 1914 were still in all the documents the guiding principle, the template, of the German settlement zone. This is explicitly the case in the documents I cited, and ones I have yet to cite here on this forum and will perhaps do so later on.

There is also a twist in getting Germans from Soviet occupied areas to gather there. It indicates that there was no initial plan to invade the USSR at all. But that's forgotten and ignored by those whining about "Lebensraum" or "Generalplan Ost".

Yes, you're exactly right. The fact of the matter is that all the Germans east of the Polish settlement zone were to be brought back into the Reich for permanent settlement (e.g. the Volhynia and Galicia Germans were to be resettled. Goebbels made reference to this in his diary on January 23, 1940), which was admitted to take years. This completely refutes any claim that Hitler saw "Lebensraum im Osten" as being in reference to Russia. Hitler really only felt that he could expand into the Baltic if possible (clearly to stave off blockade), but we know from Goebbels' diary that he wasn't intent on doing this.

Hitler's order for the "Consolidation of German Nationality" dated October 7, 1939 explicitly stated that "the consequences of the Versailles Treaty have been removed in Europe" and this meant German lebensraum was essentially settled, this is what the document practically states; for example the first paragraph:

The consequences of the Versailles Treaty have been removed in Europe. Now the Greater German Reich has the opportunity of admitting into its territory and resettling those Germans who had to live abroad, and to arrange the settlement of the racial groups, within its sphere of interest, so as to improve the dividing lines between them. I entrust the Reichsführer SS with the execution of this task according to the following regulations. . .

BA-BL, NS 2/60, Sheets 136-138. English in: Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), pp. 608 ff. here p. 609.

This order was the impetus to resettle Germans from outside back into the Reich and intended to be quite permanent indeed, hence Goebbels' remark in his diary on Septmber 30th:

[Polish] Protectorate with autonomy. On its border we build a new fortification line. This separates Germany from Russia once and for all. [...] Our settlement is proceeding according to plan and is calculated for the long term. [...] German history has taken a new turn and the German nation is heading for two generations.

30.09.1939; Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part I: Vol. 7 (München: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1998), p. 130.

This was emphasised more heavily in Rosenberg's diary on September 29:

Along the Vistula, an impregnable eastern line of fortifications [Ostwall] - even stronger than in the West.

29.09.1939: Frank Bajohr & Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), Alfred Rosenberg: Die Tagebücher von 1934 bis 1944 (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2015), p. 292.

Rosenberg states that the intention was to "resettle good Germans from all over the world." It's really unambigious. This was the end of German lebensraum. One historian, Martin Broszat (former director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte), in no doubt one of his rare moments of clarity was able to understand this:

The facts alone, for example, that Hitler arranged for the resettlement of ethnic Germans from the Soviet-controlled area in 1939/40 and that he planned a gigantic eastern wall along the German-Soviet demarcation line in the autumn of 1939, show that Hitler was obviously counting for some time on the territorial limitation of his own eastern expansion resulting from the pact with Moscow.

Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), p. 13, n. 3.

[Hektor]

The references to Lebensraum in Mein Kampf are geopolitical speculations and by no means programmatic.

What that deals with is that a sovereign nation needs to assert itself and that this can have elements of conflict with the interest of other nations. A malicious reading can turn this into 'aggressive Nationalism", which can of course be a problem, too. But this would be an extreme reading into Mein Kampf AND NOT a literalist best understanding of the test. If your mind is already set on 'finding proof of Hate and intentional extermination", you'd read this of course a little different.... And that's what establishment historians have done for 50 or more years now. It's an example of 'bold lying' and repeating bold lies until the people will believe them.

Now I'm sure the opinions within the NSDAP and German administration were quite over a spectrum, as well. So if you really want to, you'd be able to find statements of official that suit a more extreme agenda as well. That is however not different with the administration of other countries, yet the Exterminationists would not apply that approach their as it wouldn't suit their agenda. Double standards are part and parcel for Holocaust Historiography and demonizing them Germans/Axis.