I see what you mean Lamprecht, and I agree with you but in any case the Hitler quotes you gave are all post Barbarossa. This means that anyone wishing to continue Thompson's point would simply say that Hitler manifested that reason ex post facto to move the blame from himself. Whenever the facts or even Hitler says something they do not like they simply declare it as duplicitous on his part. The point is that they need Hitler not only to have acted against the Soviets unprovoked but they need him doing it willingly and knowingly, so if we have a situation in which Hitler acts but is sure that it's preventative they cannot fully blame him. Or at least, they cannot turn him into an actor knowingly committing an evil act.
What struck me was how the deterioration between Germany and Russia occurred. Usually with Stalin invading countries and Hitler secretly being concerned. I took a screenshot from a wiki page which goes a little bit into detail on this regarding Finland and Romania.
I'm sure there's heaps of info if you follow the citations or look elsewhere. The point I want to make taking this into consideration is that Hitler even though he signed (or Ribbentrop did) the 'secret protocols' which as Werner Maser notes in
Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin, Olzog, Munich 2004
that the
definition of “spheres of interest” was not considered to be equal to the right to invade and annex other countries, as a German protest note declared on Nov. 3, 1940. (p. 197)
https://codoh.com/library/document/1748/ Hitler was clearly not satisfied with the pact and this comes into play when you realise Hitler would not have acted this way if he agreed to the secret protocols in the beginning, which he didn't. The protocols were forced onto Ribbentrop last minute in Moscow surrounded by Stalin and his henchmen, the Soviets knew the Germans needed the pact to be concluded ASAP before taking on Poland and potentially war from the west. So Ribbentrop calls Hitler and asks him about it, Hitler says yes
(I'm sure he'd have agreed to anything if it meant being able to defend his rear from the West if they tried to also conclude a pact with Stalin which we know they were) Schultze Rhonhof goes into detail on pages 545-551 in his book
1939 - the War that Had Many Fathers Here are two pages from the book which should be of use.
I see Hitler dissatisfaction with the protocols to be very important evidence in regards to his concern over Russia and their potential aims.
Hitler echos his dissatisfaction in the secret recording we have of him to Marshal Manheim about Molotov.
Furthur more, from an Inconvenient History article,
https://web.archive.org/web/20171107210344/https://revblog.codoh.com/2011/02/the-latest-effort-to-combat-denial-i-e-holocaust-revisionism/Just briefly to the war with the Soviet Union: At the meeting with Molotov in Berlin in November 1940, Hitler told him that because of the war with England, Germany had been forced to advance into territories in which it had no interest in.[13] Hitler than stated that Germany's Lebensraum had been greatly expanded, and even though both, Germany and the Soviet Union, might not have achieved what they set out to do, they could be satisfied nevertheless.[14] But Molotov demanded more concessions from Germany[15] and following this meeting Hitler realized that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Barbarossa, the strike against the Soviet Union, was a preventive strike, though establishment historians are still loath to admit this in spite of the growing evidence.
On October 29th 1942 Hitler writes a letter to Sven Hedin about Poland in 1939 and also how '"Europe would simply have been steam-rollered by the weight of the Bolshevik war machine," From Werner Masers, Hitler's Letters and notes, pp. 192 here's the pictures
Granted this is also post Barbarossa, but it's in a letter that Hitler would presumably not expect to ever see the light of day. There's no reason to think in my mind that this isn't Hitler's true feelings.
I do however, have a rare fact which proves Hitler considered Barbarossa a preventative war. From David Irving's original 1977 Hitler's War papermac editions. I'm not surprised these pages/quotes haven't made the rounds because I doubt many people have bothered to read this edition of Hitler's War which has these passages. This is even more impressive when one understands that this was before Irving became the historian he is today, he was much less "redpilled" if you will. Particularly on the Jews considering he hadn't yet dealt with all the trouble they were to put him through.
Hitler's own mind was made up on the Russian campaign, but he still wanted to convince Ribbentrop. He knew he would not win over the foreign ministry as such. He considered its ways conservative, its procedures ponderous, and its attitude to the Party reactionary. Since its failure to give him advance warning of the Belgrade putsch, the ministry's stock had sunk even lower in his estimation. Hitler's tendency to direct foreign policy himself, using Ribbentrop only as a secretary, was strongly exposed again in "Barbarossa." He had decided to appoint Rosenberg, to manage the new eastern domain--impressed, apparently, by Rosenberg's early writings on the Bolshevik menace. Small wonder that Hewel's diary shows Ribbentrop "off sick" for most of April 1941--malingering, furious at this fresh erosion of his powers. On about April 25, Hitler telephoned Ribbentrop in Vienna, summoned him to his special-train headquarters, and told him he had decided finally to attack Russia. Ribbentrop later recalled: He said that all the military Intelligence reaching him confirmed that the Soviet Union was preparing in a big way along the entire front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. He was not willing top be taken by surprise once he had recognised a danger. Moscow's pact with the Serbian putschist government was a downright provocation to Germany and a clear departure from the German-Russian treaty of friendship. In this conversation I recommended that he listen first to out [Moscow] ambassador, Count [Werner von der] Schulenburg. . .I wanted to try a diplomatic settlement with Moscow first. But Hitler refused any such attempt and forbade me to discuss the matter with anybody; no amount of diplomacy could change the Russian attitude, as he now recognised it, but it might cheat him of the important tactical element of surprise when he attacked. He requested me to put on a show of complete support for his view, and explained that one day the West would understand why he had rejected the Soviet demands and attacked the East.
Thus Hitler regarded "Barbarossa" as that most controversial of campaigns--a preventative war.
"What can a war historian tell us about the problems of fighting preventive wars?" he asked Wilhelm Scheidt at this time. Scheidt, a young, well-groomed cavalry captain, had just been introduced as adjutant to Colonel Walter Scherff, Hitler's personal historian. Scheidt knew about "Barbarossa," and replied, "Only somebody with the deepest sense of responsibility can take such a decision, and then only after looking at it from every possible angle. Because he will be risking immense dangers in starting such a war." He would have to accept the odium of being the aggressor, in return for tactical advantages of surprise. But Hitler mused out loud, "Britain will just have to climb down, once we have defeated her last ally on the continent. If she does not, we shall destroy her, with all the means that we shall have when all of Europe as far as the Urals is at our feet." - David Irving, Hitler's War Volume 1, (Papermac, 1983), pp. 230-231
What is clear to me, as it should be to others, is Hitler kept his true intentions so secret that the Soviets would have no idea that he knew. You even have Hitler seeking guidance from historians to reaffirm what he must do. This shows us Hitler is a careful man, one who will take the actions he must to secure victory and in truth take the most important military gambles necessary. This also shows us Hitler was a great tactician as he most certainly made the correct choice even if the overall campaign failed in the end due to American intervention and Italy's Greece blunder.
Perhaps you or anyone else here knows of what the Generals thought about Barbarossa and Hitler's intentions? Whether their diaries or memoirs could illuminate us on this fact.
I know that Leon Degrelle in his book
"Hitler for a Thousand Years" provides some insight into why Hitler invaded the Soviet Union when he did, I do not have an English copy of this book so I cannot post a quote, but I'm sure he there has some insight that would back us up.
