How Did Hitler Die?

[Otium]

The capture of stalingrad were a pure egomanical decision, they could have went straight to the caucasus and simply maintaining the front and secure the oil fields, instead they split and opened up a larger front that they could not maintain, that's why they ended up losing up the Russian front.

I'm sorry, and I appreciate that you're arguing in good faith, but I think this is a ridiculous assessment. The attack on Stalingrad was nothing to do with ego, Hitler didn't even intend to enter the city if it could be helped.

The strategic and operational planning, which decisively influenced the course of the campaign during summer and autumn, was based on a discussion held at Fuhrer headquarters on 28 March and finally on Directive No. 41 of 5 April 1942. The overall objective, namely ‘to finally destroy the remaining Soviet armed forces and as far as possible to deprive them of their most important sources of economic power’, clearly and logically required the destruction of the opposing enemy forces in the south as the sine qua non for the success of the campaign. The advance of the German armies by sectors in three phases, the intermediate objective of which was to gain the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers and Stalingrad, also demonstrates that the German command was well aware of the precarious conditions upon which the success of the summer offensive depended. Furthermore, there was no intention expressed to take Stalingrad, but only to paralyze the vital arms production and supply centre. The advance towards the Caucasus was only to be undertaken after the intermediate objectives had been attained and a secure position along the River Don built up to protect the flank. The Caucasus was clearly defined as the primary objective of the campaign.

Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler's War: German Military Strategy 1940-1945 (London: Arms & Armour, 1998), p. 140. cf. Stephen G. Fritz, The First Soldier: Hitler as Military Leader (Yale University Press, 2018), p. 242.

And:

The Wehrmacht was to crush the Soviet Union and cut her off from her principal industrial centres. Sebastopol, which had been under siege since late October 1941, was finally to be taken. Then, Russian forces were to be destroyed west of the Don. After that, the main motorized and armoured forces would wheel south to break into the Caucasus and seize the passes and the oil-fields there; their flanks were to be secured through the capture of Voronezh and Stalingrad to the north and east. Only once this had been done should the Wehrmacht proceed to the next objective, which was the final strangulation of Leningrad and a link-up with the Finns nearby.

The centrality of the economic objectives was emphasized by Hitler on many occasions. ‘If I don’t get the oil of Maykop and Grozny,’ he warned the commander of the 6th Army, Friedrich Paulus, ‘then I must end this war.’ Contrary to later legend, Operation Blue did not envisage three diverging axes of advance towards Voronezh, Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The two cities were merely to be secured in order to defend the northern flank of the operation. Hitler did not even insist on the capture of Stalingrad, saying only that it should ‘at least be subjected to heavy artillery fire in order to knock it out as an armaments and communications centre’; no mention was made of any symbolic or political importance attached to the city. The main thrust was to be directed south, towards the oil-fields. It was a war for oil.

Brendan Simms, Hitler: Only the World was Enough (London: Allen Lane, 2019), p. 459.

Frederich Lenz wrote a wonderful book about Stalingrad, demolishing the myths, entitled 'Stalingrand: Der der „verlorene" Sieg'. A review from the monthly issue of Nation Europa summarizes this book as follows:

STALINGRAD was the outwardly blatant turning point of the Eastern campaign. We have asked the author of the book 'Stalingrad', Friedrich Lenz, to record in a few short sentences the reasons to which he attributes the defeat. Mr. Lenz is an autodidact; but even the military expert will have to admit that his idiosyncratic opinion is based on very thorough studies and is in any case worthy of examination and consideration. Mr. Lenz's opinion on the question: .Why was Stalingrad lost?' is:

(1) Because not only the contents of Hitler's instruction of November 11, 1941, from which the intention of an offensive in the spring of 1942 in the direction of the Caucasus had been betrayed to the Russians by the Red Chapel, but also the contents of the instruction of April 5, 1942, with all its operational details.

(2) Because the date of attack for this offensive had to be postponed by five weeks, since the Russians - prompted by agent reports - undertook an offensive under Timosdienko on 12 May 1942 in the sack of Isjium remaining from their January offensive, in order to smash our troop deployments in the Kharkov area. It had become known to them that Hitler intended to eliminate this sack at the beginning of the offensive. The great German victory then achieved by the destruction of Timoshenko's army had to be paid for too dearly with the aforementioned postponement of our offensive.

(3) Because on June 18, 1942, that is, ten days before the start of the offensive, the general staff officer of a division who was flying over the Russian front in violation of orders was shot down, so that the exact documents on how our attack was to be conducted to the east and southeast fell into enemy hands.

(4) Because the IV. Panzer Army, which had already come within 35 km of Stalingrad at Krasnoarmeysk on August 20, at first suspended its attack - allegedly because of a lack of petrol - and did not resume it until August 29. Due to the delay, it was not until 29 September that the link-up with the 6th Army, scheduled for the end of August, could be established.

(5) Because the Russians used this delay to build up an extensive system of positions in front of the city and - egged on by their Führer Stalin - prepared to hold the city bearing his name at any cost. They then fought in heroic fashion.

(6) Because, at the end of August 1942, Chief of Staff Halder withdrew part of the 11th Army from the Southern Front and transferred it to the Northern Front near Leningrad, and because troops had to be surrendered to the West.

(7) Because thanks to the following circumstances the Russians succeeded in their great encirclement of November 19:

a) The enormous troop concentrations made by the Russians for their attack in the area of Voronezh were not correctly reported by the German defence in their extent, on the other hand inaccurately claimed attack preparations on the central front.

b) The task assigned to Army Group B for weeks by the Supreme Command of building up the Don Front for defence was neglected by the Army Group, although, as the entries in the war diary prove, it was continuously urged from above.

c) A change in the weather - snowstorm with heavy frost - favoured the Russian attack and hindered the German defence.

d) The 48th PzK. under Lieutenant General Heim, which had been positioned behind the Romanian army in case of an offensive, could not fulfil its task of securing the front.

e) The Romanian troops lying at the breach sections failed.

(8) Because on 22 November 1942 General von Seydlitz, the commander of the 51st AK, without Paul's knowledge, ordered the evacuation of the fixed positions of the 94th Inf. Div.without it even being attacked. By withdrawing the wing on his own, he allegedly wanted to get the breakthrough to the west rolling. His actions had terrible consequences, because von Seydlitz had also ordered the destruction of all equipment as well as the "supply" and clothing depots.

(9) Because (in the opinion of Field Marshal Paul NE) the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Don, Field Marshal von Manstein, who had been charged by Hitler with the rescue of the 6th Army, committed the following errors:

(a) He delayed the relief attack from 6 to 12 December 1942.

b) He used the forces made available to him for the relief operation on other parts of the front.

c) He did not reach a clear agreement with Paulus on the procedure to be coordinated by both sides for the success of the individual action; in particular, he did not give an order to break out. d) He did not have the attack of Army Group Hollidt from the Chirbrücken Head, which was planned as the second phase, carried out at all in support of the Hoth relief group.

e) On 23 December 1942, he gave the order to stop the relief attack, although the top of the 6th Pz Div. carrying this attack was only 48 km away from the encirclement and had the intention and confidence to extend the liberating hand to the 6th Army on Christmas Eve. The transfer of the 6th Pz.Div. to a crisis site about 120 km away was not necessary because the crisis that had occurred there had already been averted by the time the 6th Pz.Div. arrived there.

(10) Because - The author, severely affected by long imprisonment, has put a dash here instead of stating what he considers to be the most serious reason; therefore the editor must step in: .Because in all too many key points there were people to whom the thought of a German victory - which would have strengthened the system they hated - was more unbearable than

a) a Red Army triumph,

b) the consequent surrender of hundreds of thousands of defenceless German women and children to their revenge,

c) the destruction of the Reich and the elimination of Europe from world politics, made the war aims of the two greatest enemy powers.' "

Nation Europa, 5/1960, p. 43.

Sorry but that's completely false, and they could have win specially if they didn't invade Russia at that time. Nazi germany made 3 big mistakes, the first one was Italia as a ally, nothing but dead weight, Hitler should had controlled the Italians right way from the start and when he did was too late, second declaring war on the United States and giving Churchill what he wanted, and third the Russian invasion. They could have won the war simply by maintaining the conquered territory and not engaging Russia until the right time cams. They were greedy instead of being patient cause if they took the time to defend the conquered territory and create more armament and not losing entire divisions they would conquered all Europe. They just wanted too much too quickly without enough resources.

As for much information coming from traitors that's also not true, we saw the outcome of these unnecessary battles, it's not rocket science, once you open multiple fronts you're up to defeat period. No nations who fought on multiple fronts won to this day, engaging Russia at that time was a mistake.

I'm sorry Johnnie, but your knowledge appears to be rather antiquated. Which I find rather surprising since you're on this forum. But much of what you write is certainly 'old hat' in historiography today. Just last October Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman published a book entitled 'Hitler's American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and the German March to Global War' which reassess Hitler's decision to declare war on the USA, and comes to the conclusion that "Hitler's intervention was not the inexplicable decision of a man so bloodthirsty that he forgot all strategy, but a calculated risk that can only be understood in a truly global context." And indeed, the USA was already unofficially at war with Germany prior to Hitler bringing it out into the open. You seem to be making the mistake of assuming that Hitler simply acted without thinking, when in reality he had good reasons for what he did, even if they didn't work out. Just because things do not work out, doesn't mean, based on the limited information you have, that they don't make sense for the time.

Hitler's declaration of war wasn't an aggressive act that disrupted the peace and widened the war, the extent of which had already been decided by Roosevelt who was intent on war with Germany since before the war broke out in 1939. The war was decided, and Hitler knew it.

William Shirer was told something rather interesting by an officer of the German High Command, alluding to the fact that Hitler knew of this intent on war, but would nonetheless try to open it on his own terms:

‘The clash [Between Germany and the USA] is as inevitable as that of two planets hurtling inexorably through the heavens towards each other. As a matter of fact, it may come sooner than almost all Americans at home imagine. An officer of the High Command somewhat shocked me the other day while we were discussing the matter. He said: “You think Roosevelt can pick the moment most advantageous to America and Britain for coming into the war. Did you ever stop to think that Hitler, a master at timing, may choose the moment for war with America – a moment which he thinks will give him the advantage?”

‘I must admit I never did.'

1 December 1940; William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), p. 592.

Hitler's decision didn't determine the United States' will to fight one way or another, it had already been decided. All he could do was try to determine the conflict at a time most beneficial to him. You seem to be under the illusion that Hitler could afford to do nothing, and that his enemies would simply not have opposed him had he not done so. This is folly, it was precisely they planned to oppose him that Hitler had to act and take risks to determine whether Germany had any freedom of movement in the future. The decision to act was not a mindless leap to catastrophe, but a risk which entailed furthering strategical grounds on which Germany could barter or win. There was no sense in doing nothing, which you presume to be the only option.

Regarding the USA, Ian Kershaw writes of why Roosevelt intended to wait to enter the war:

There were, however, good reasons to defer the moment of entry as long as possible. The longer America could remain out of the formal combat, the more advanced her military build-up and the mobilization of an arms economy would be. Moreover, a declaration of war would doubtless have resulted in domestic clamour to utilize the arms and equipment now being sent to Great Britain and the Soviet Union for the United States’ armed forces, leading to a weakening, not strengthening, of the resistance to Hitler on the European fighting front in the short term - perhaps with disastrous consequences. American shipping losses to preying U-boats in the Atlantic would, as an immediate consequence, probably have mounted sharply. There was also the real concern that a declaration of war against Germany would immediately bring Japan - Hitler’s ally under the Tripartite Pact - into the war. Having to fight in the Pacific would certainly complicate dealing with Hitler, which was consistently seen as the main event.

Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World 1940-1941 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 328.

That Hitler decided to formerly declare war on the USA was a no brainer, it was the only thing which made sense in terms of strategy, and was by no means as you seem to think, a "blunder" simply because it brought into the open another front of the war already being waged. Hitler you presume, held all the cards and could be the only one to determine victory or defeat. In your conclusions you ignore all the decisions taken by other powers and apply the only meaningful decisions to Hitler. This is a tremendous mistake. In reality Hitler had to contend with the decisions made by others which informed his position.

Kershaw admits that Roosevelt was waging an 'undeclared war' against Germany, providing materials to Britain and Russia:

His [Roosevelts] entire policy for more than a year had been directed at providing maximum help to Britain (and, more recently, the Soviet Union) as part of American defence, in the - diminishing - hope that the United States would be able to keep out of the direct fighting.

Ibid.

And

It seems as if Roosevelt had settled in autumn 1941 for as long a period as possible of partial, undeclared hostilities with Germany. Perhaps as justification for avoiding what Churchill had long been pressing for, the President told Lord Halifax that, in any case, ‘declarations of war were going out of fashion.

Ibid., p. 329.

The historians Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle write:

A further decision by Hitler that was to have a fateful impact on the course of the war also had nothing to do with an acute illness or his megalomania, as is often claimed,” namely the declaration of war on the United States of America on 11 December 1941. It is regarded » as a turning point in the war if for no other reason because of the fact that the military balance tilted clearly in favour of the Allies as a result. In fact, it was only a de facto recognition of a state of war that had existed between the two countries since summer 1941 following a series of incidents in the Atlantic. Germany merely anticipated the expected entry into the war by the USA on the side of Britain.*! For the Americans, the war against Britain in any case threatened the ' vital interests of the USA, prompting President Roosevelt to advocate active involvement. Consequently, he did nothing to de-escalate the situation in the Atlantic. As Kershaw describes it, the USA was already waging an undeclared war in summer and autumn 1941. According to the ‘Victory Program’ by the Roosevelt administration announced to the public in September 1941, it would be necessary to send millions of soldiers to Europe in order to destroy the Nazi regime. Hitler’s declaration of war merely determined the official beginning.*2

Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle, Was Hitler Ill?: A Final Diagnosis (Polity Press, 2013), p. 151.

Clearly Hitler was right to expect a conflagration at the expense of Germany from the major world powers. To pick to fight at the time he did was most opportune in terms of his likelihood of success. It was clear that the United States wasn't going to remain neutral in the event that Germany had to go to war, even on a limited scale. If she tried to obtain further concessions diplomatically which was bound to fail due to the increasing coalition stacked up against her, she was bound to run out of time with which to act. Hitler also judged this accurately, and so he went to war. This was the only logical move he could've made. He was right to do it. Kershaw writes that Roosevelt "gradually came to the conclusion that American involvement was both inevitable and necessary if Hitler were to be defeated." This could only mean there was never any real chance or hope of the United States not getting involved in war, Hitler couldn't afford to do nothing either during the war or prior. In both cases stagnation was death, he had to make a move no matter what. He was forced to do so in the summer of 1939 lest he run out of time, and he was in the same position in 1940 when he had to risk another war with Russia to fend off his enemies abroad. I cannot fault him for this.

[Otium]

The Hitler decisions being distorted by his generals it goes both ways, specially because some of his general were afraid to tell what was really going on and Hitler is also at fault because he didn't fully trust his generals. Hitler made several mistakes, like letting Goering finish the battle of Dunkirk, and keep pushing the invasion of Britain when they were having many losses. So there's ambiguity in those statements because Hitler gave great orders but he also made some big mistakes. Unfortunately I don't have the time to pull sources but this is a really good discussion even if I don't fully agree with some statements.

Even regarding Dunkirk, the halt order was strategic. As Irving shows, and many other historians too, Hitler was never seriously planning to invade Britain, the planning for such a thing didn't get very far, and was intended as a smoke screen for Barbarossa. If you read the Naval War Dairy, this is also clear.

As for my comments that Hitler knew what type of war he got germany into I'm talking late war, I'm talking last weeks when everything was doomed of course this was not the war he wanted in the very beginning but it escalated in something so big that's was really out of control. United States dropping two atomic bombs at the end of the war show how out of control this whole war was.

Okay, I would agree there.

I also don't agree with your statement that Poland was the excuse for Britain, France and USA to go to war with Germany because they could have done that with Sudetenland which include key Czechoslovak military defense positions. And USA didn't want to go to war, [...] As for Poland France and England had no choice to declare war because they were afraid, no one in Europe wanted a war at that point not even Hitler, the invasion of Poland was risky but it payed of. But like I've said they ended up wanting too much too quick and that led to their defeat, otherwise I think Germany would win the war.

The USA certainly did and Poland certainly did. This is a question beyond possible reproach, the documents thoroughly bare it out. The USA fully intended a war to break out, it was their intention to finish it. Pearl Harbour was merely their excuse to get embroiled in the war (the USA provoked this war with Japan, and they knew about Peal Harbour before it happened see the book by Percy L. Greaves, 'Pearl Harbour: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy' Greaves was directly involved in the Congressional Committee which investigated Pearl Harbour). And the Poles had admitted that they purposely allowed the war to come about in anticipation of British support. Beck had even admitted this as early as July 23rd to the League of Nation's high commissioner for Danzig, C. J. Burckhardt. He told him that he was playing a game "in which one hopes for the highest profit for Poland, a profit that is to result from an eventual and inevitable German catastrophe" (provoked by Poland) going on to state "for this reason the Germans are being driven into their misdeeds [intentionally by Poland who was unwilling to make concessions], and in Danzig the extremists are being allowed to triumph with pleasure" (C. J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission, p. 156). These facts, among many others, do not portray the slightest hesitation on Poland's side to provoke and fight a war against Germany. To believe they were "fearful", is to be, I'm sorry to say, incredibly misinformed as to the abundant nature of the evidence to the contrary which all pulls in one direction.

Regarding the United States, on January 16th, 1939, a dispatch received at the Polish embassy in the United States transmitted to Warsaw read that the Poles "have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal." on the condition that "France and Britain must put end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not let themselves in for any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes." (H. Hoover, Freedom Betrayed, pp. 132f.) In this connection too, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris, outlined the interventionist intentions of United States foreign policy to surreptitiously engage itself in European affairs at the expense of Germany in a secret report to Jozef Potocki dated February 1939 (between the 4th and 5th) Bullitt, on behalf of Roosevelt had told Łukasiewicz that “Should war break out, likely we shall not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall finish it.” (Jędrzejewicz (ed.), Diplomat in Paris, p. 168). This meant inducing obstinance from Britain, France and Poland which would inevitably provoke the Second World War by informing them of the USA's intention to fight and not remain neutral. Thus the Allies could depend on her involvement. It had nothing to do with fear, the reason given in Łukasiewicz's report was that the USA thought "that new successes of the Rome-Berlin axis would undermine the prestige and authority of France and England as imperial powers". Lord Halifax in a conversation with Bonnet on March 21, 1939 had been discussing just this reason behind their intention to "use threats" to get Poland on their side to oppose Germany. It had nothing to do with fear, but everything to do with using Poland against Germany for their own prestige (S. Newman, March 1939, p. 136.). Roosevelt's policy was geared for war, as had been proven in the detailed research of Dirk Bavendamm (see his books 'Amerikas Griff nach der Weltmacht' and 'Der Krieg des Präsidenten').

And Coulondre, the French Ambassador to Germany had told the Polish Ambassador Lipski that Danzig was the last issue with which the Allies could oppose Germany in Europe, not because it was moral, but because they could get involved over it. The advice given, duly taken up by the Polish ambassador was to "stand firm" and not concede anything to the Germans. All of this culminated in the provocation of Germany to act against Poland, regardless of the knowledge of the USSR's involvement, which didn't bother the Allies. If the Allies didn't want war, they should've conceded to Hitler's offers immediately after the outbreak of war, that they didn't only meant they desired war and were certainly not fearful of it, let alone anxious to avoid it. This is, like I previously stated, all the more evident by their insistence on war even after the Soviets had occupied their share of Poland, nullifying any possible chance of restoring Poland's independence to what it was prior to September 17 unless the West went to war with Russia too, which she wanted to avoid at all costs. Thus the war was not for Poland as the irresponsible British guarantee pretended - which was contradicted by the secret protocol in it's ratification - but for a war against Germany to which Poland was the only one capable of acting as a catalyst to provoke. This view is completely beyond reproach, all the evidence supports it.

Czechoslovakia was a moot point for there was little propaganda justification at that time to justify it to the public, and nobody was willing to die to save the mish-mash Czechoslovak state to which nobody really considered viable (Halifax had admitted that British commitments to the Czechs were "embarrassing" and better done away with by her dissolution). Particularly when so many states had claim to their own minorities in that country. Britain and France couldn't possibly go to war over her, for there was no practical way unless Soviet involvement was assured, which wasn't at all likely since it depended on allowing Russian planes to be given access over Romania and Poland. Confirming Hitler's fears that Czechoslovakia was an airstrip to be used against Germany, Bonnet had told Halifax in March 1939 that the French were willing to "fulfil her obligations" but it all would've been too late:

He (Bonnet) recalled that during the Czecho-Slovak crisis in May last he had told M. Litvinov that France would fulfil her obligations, and had asked what the Soviet Union would do. M. Litvinov replied that, in order to reach Germany, Russia had to have a passage through Poland and Roumania, it was therefore for France to arrange matters with those two States. If France could do so, the Soviet Union would fulfil her obligations to Czecho-Slovakia. M. Bonnet said that he had tried to arrange matters with Poland and Roumania, but had failed. When he had seen M. Litvinov at Geneva in September, M. Litvinov's attitude had been that in that event it would be necessary to consult the League Council, and that, if a majority of the Council were secured , the Soviet Union would be able to help by sending aircraft across Roumania (but not across Poland). To this M. Bonnet had replied that by that time Germany would already have succeeded in her aims, and it would be too late.

DBFP, 3, IV, Doc. 458, p. 426.

Poland however, was another story. The incident over the Czech remnant and the lie that Germany had threatened Romania was enough to rally support in favour of stifling further justified German grievances. Danzig and Poland became a symbol, and the last one at that.

The invasion of Poland was hardly a risk. It was a necessity. Hitler was fully aware of the practical futility of the Allies to make good on their promises (which he repeatedly explained in excruciating detail on no less than seven occasions that I know of, and probably more) , which he succeeded in proving were worthless, not only militarily, but also diplomatically. He had proven that their excuse to go to war had nothing to do with Poland, and thus he was right in his decision to act sooner rather than later in a bid to improve the position on which Germany could negotiate or use force to protect herself.

[JohnnieDarko]

Please do get me wrong but you stating some facts that didn't really happened in reality for example I've read declassified documents of Churchill being extremely mad that the Americans would not get into the war and Britain couldn't hold up much longer and Roosevelt said the Americans would not participate but would offer the full support and volunteers. And the public opinion in the USA was that people didn't want go to war. Some even claim that the Britains intercepted messages from the Japanese about pearl harbor and Churchill ommited then from the Americans because he knew that would bring the Americans into the war. And you telling me that this was a plan of the Americans and the poles?
That make little sense since Poland was one of the countries that suffered most with the war and no help came really until the end of the war for them and the whole country was a wreck.
And also saying the invasion of Poland was a necessity is not even revisionism it trying to re-write history, saying that Hitler foreshadow the plan of the Americans and the poles and there was a necessity to invade to improve his position doesn't make any sense either, because Hitler gambled the invasion, he didn't belive Britain and the French would risk go to war for Poland, there's a lot of Germans reports on that, he was even surprised. So these all seem to be conclusions taken after the facts and not based on what really happened, I cross-reference a lot of documents and books and some of the things you are stating don't really make sense considering the way things played out. So the Americans gamble with Poland Europe lol that's absurd since Hitler conquered almost the entire Europe that plan makes 0 sense. But I never read the sources you claim in your post, but I will sure read in the future but we can't belive in everything that is stated, same as the Holocaust, and when there is too much nonsense I find hard to belive in such plots that didn't played out.

Yes Dunkirk was strategy, bad one. Yes Hitler respected the Britain and was hoping to get then on their side against to fight Russia, but he made that decision more to show his generals that he was in charge and when he says stop they stop, that's when Goering saw his opportunity. Is not like they stopped the attack, luftwaffe was attacking and failed miserably...
And Hitler never made more serious plans to invade Britain because Goering failed his mission, RAF humiliated the luftwaffe so their was no way to invade Britain, because if the luftwaffe had succeeded their plan they would have invaded Britain there's german records of this, they were even constructing special boats for the invasion I forgot the name os these boats, but since Raf showed air superiority they never moved forward. Saying it was just a smoke screen for operation barbarossa doesn't make much sense since they lot a great amount of planes and good pilots during that time. Why not charge directly for Russia? They didn't need to make any diversion, Stalin until the invasion didn't belive the Germans would invade even being warned by their generals so why lose a ton o equipment and good pilots on a smoke screen? Again those sound like conclusion taken after the events to justify the facts but don't really make much sense.

This discussion was getting interesting but some of the "facts" presented diverge so much from reality, and I'm not saying mainstream history, but real actions taken by the people involved that is nonsensical only thing left to say was that the Germans were forced to go to war lol and it was all a big plot, Im all up for revisionism but re-writing history is another question. You have your sources I have my sources, in the end we belive in what we want to belive, and I can tell you firmly belive that those things happened that way (even if the real events tell different stories) so the discussion is pointless. I will check your sources though because citing a book is easy, reading the book and see what are the references for those informations is another story and that's why some books and authors don't hold up. And nothing against you but this hold up much time that I don't have and I don't think I was engage in a forum like this for years hehe maybe in the future we can create a topic dedicated only to these questions since this one is about how Hitler died!

Even regarding Dunkirk, the halt order was strategic. As Irving shows, and many other historians too, Hitler was never seriously planning to invade Britain, the planning for such a thing didn't get very far, and was intended as a smoke screen for Barbarossa. If you read the Naval War Dairy, this is also clear. So let's agree to disagree in a respectful manner, I don't belive this discussion will go any further than this exchange but hey at least it was interesting.

Tomorrow I will create a topic on a crazy subject I've been trying to get information but it's nearly impossible to prove, I hope you and hermod check it out I like your interactions even if he don't agree with each other.

Best Regards!