Hebden wrote:Sailor wrote:
Says Irving: Ja, die feige deutsche Historikerschaft! (Yes, the coward German historians!)
We shall post Professor Nolte's opinion on Mr. Irving's book Hitler's War tomorrow.
The following comes from an original article
Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s published as one of a collection of essays in the book
Aspects of the Third Reich (ed. H.W. Koch, Macmillan, 1985):
A completely different motive is at the basis of the attempt at revision by another Englishman: David Irving's 1975 book
Hitler und seine Feldherren whose English version appeared only two years later under the title
Hitler's War. Irving's goal is undisguidedly a vindication of Hitler who, according to him, 'alone did not have any voice after 1945' whereas his friends and foes alike, through one-sided descriptions and genuine errors, gave an untrue picure of the war. It was characteristic that the German publisher refused to incorporate in the German edition the most controversial assertion by the author, that Hitler had not known anything about the 'Final Solution'. This is said to come from a telegram discovered by Irving in which, so he says, Hitler forbade the liquidation of Jews. [Irving reprints Himmler's note of a telephone conversation with Hitler on 30 November 1941, in which Hitler ordered a particular transport of Berlin Jews
not to be liquidated.
Ed.] But in reality this is the weakest point of the whole book since, seen in the true perspective, this telegram expresses the exact contrary, because it presupposes the fact of these widespread liquidations. However, not all of Irving's theses and references can be set aside so easily. What Irving suggests as a general impression is certainly more than questionable, namely that Hitler could have won the war if those surrounding him had better grasped his strategic ideas and had turned them into reality without hesitation and attempts at sabotage. But it can hardly be denied that Hitler had good reasons to be convinced of his enemies' determination to annihilate him much earlier than when the first information about Auschwitz came to the knowledge of the world. The 1940 pamphlet 'Germany must perish' by Theodore N. Kaufmann has often been mentioned in the literature, but I do not remember seeing it (sic) in any of the more important German books I have read about Chaim Weizmann's official declaration in the first days of September 1939, according to which Jews in the whole world would fight on the side of England. Anyway, I have to reproach myself for not knowing of this statement in 1963 and not having made use of it, although it can be found in the
Archiv der Gegenwart of 1939, and it might justify the consequential thesis that Hitler was allowed to treat the German Jews as prisoners of war and by this means to intern them. Equally Irving's
a priori thesis that the bomb attack on Hamburg in July 1943 bore witness to the Allies' will to destroy the German civilian population, and that this could not have its origin in any knowledge of the 'Final Solution', cannot be refuted. Irving's tendency to place Auschwitz as well into a more comprehensive perspective would be remarkable even if the counter-thesis were acknowledged as convincing, namely that not even the President of the Jewish Agency had the right to pronounce something like a declaration of war, and that the attack on Coventry preceded the one on Hamburg by three years. [However, there is now a general consensus that, apart from several specific 'retaliation' raids, of which Coventry was one, the
Luftwaffe's attacks were restricted to military and industrial targets. For the fact that Hitler opposed the attacks on civilian targets as late as August 1940, see p. 306 below.
Ed.]