From David Leslie Hoggan's "The Forced War", page 172
https://libgen.rocks/ads.php?md5=615415 ... 19B3F4E173
"Göring knew that “the vast sums of money for Britishrearmament” were either for British defenses or for a British preventive war against Germany. Göring confided that the Germans had reduced their arms expenditure after Munich until British measures prompted them to increase their own military budget. Göring [243] analyzed the current situation, and he claimed that German arms were costing less than British arms. 52"
This PDF doesn't have the index. I looked on archive.org - that version has no index either. WTF?
Anyway, does anyone know anything about a dip in Nazi arms production in 1938? Or any evidence of such an order that was later rescinded. This would be an important piece of evidence that Germany was planning on scaling down military spending in mid-1938, and would be a very useful piece of evidence against the "Nazi aggressor" narrative.
Nazis reduced military spending in mid-1938?
Moderator: Moderator
Forum rules
Be sure to read the Rules/guidelines before you post!
Be sure to read the Rules/guidelines before you post!
-
Otium
Re: Nazis reduced military spending in mid-1938?
Hoggan's book is only available in full in German online. The English editions omit the bibliography, index , notes etc.
Hoggan's book should always be read and checked with his sources. It should also be read in conjunction with Kurt Glaser's book 'Der Zweite Weltkrieg and die Kriegsschuldfrage' should also be consulted as it evaluated Hoggan's book and sources in depth (the only one to do so) and agrees more or less with his conclusions and refutes his most vocal critics - who I myself have evaluated on various points and found to be nothing short of blatant liars. However, even Hoggan (or his editors) found Glaser's book to be too anti-German, the bibliography of his sequel, 'Der Unnötige Krieg 1939-1945' makes such a remark in the description of Glaser's book in the bibliography.
I actually have a copy of Hoggan's 1948 Harvard PhD thesis on German/Polish relations which comes to the same conclusion as his 1961 opus, and is not criticised at all. Which should tell you something about how certain concessions are made.
Anyway. Having checked both the English and German editions of Hoggan's book I can confirm that he doesn't cite a direct source for this. But thankfully I am aware of the document he is referring to. It is a telegram of the British ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, to Lord Halifax on a conversation the former had with Göring on February 18, 1939. The telegram is dated 9:42 p.m. The relevant excerpt reads as follows:
The fact is, even if they increased spending, it would not prove any 'aggressive' intentions. This is a false argument with no logical basis. Germany was not in a position to either fight for or defend her interests without spending money on armaments, this cannot be taken as 'proof' of anything. Disparate as their positions are, both A.J.P. Taylor and the German historian Rolf-Dieter Müller both agree on this. From the latter:
Müller is still irrational, and thinks that Hitler desired to use this rearmament for war at some point to fulfil his 'plans' against Russia, for which he misquotes sources, distorts evidence, and derives conclusions from sources which say nothing in support of his pre-conceived beliefs. The point is that he also recognizes that this sort of rearmament would have to have been undertaken in any case.
According Georg Thomas, a member of the German resistance and Head of the Defence Economy and Armament Office in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) there was a 'struggle' between the idea of 'width and depth' of armaments. Hitler favoured the strategy of 'width' where as he, Thomas, thought 'depth' should be prepared for in order for Germany's preparations to be ready in case long-wars needed to be waged, particularly against the West. Hitler did not want this, simply because he didn't want war, nor did he count on it. This is revealed to us by Thomas' own words in a private address 'before the inspectors' on March 29, 1940:
Hitler refused planning for any sort of confrontation with the West (prior to the war against Poland, and did not desire even after), which he told Thomas again and again he didn't want (because he saw no necessity for it if the British really wanted to avoid war). The possibility after the Polish campaign of converting industry was rejected on the basis that the war would hopefully be over by Christmas. Thomas, in a memo, stated that 'it was impossible to produce all the programmes side by side and demanded that they focus on one thing' and the response was that 'No priorities can be set at present, since we do not know how the war will develop'. There are reasons for all of this, much too complicated to be explained here and now.
Thomas also states that it was during the Munich crisis that he received a telephone communication with the instruction that 'All preparations now for war against England, target 1942!', to which he notes the ammunition production plan which was drawn up was 'rejected because it would require tooling machines, raw materials, etc., which would require considerable foreign currency, as well as workers.'
Thomas complains overall that if 'we think back a year' the capacity of industry for arms and munitions production was underestimated, and preparations were on 'too small a scale'.
I will recommend you various books which are probably not perfect, but might be helpful to you.
See the article 'Review: An Inquiry into the Nazi War Economy' by Sidney Ratner.
See the following books:
Alan S. Milward, 'The German Economy at War'. (Published in German as 'Die Deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945' by the extremely prominent Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt publishing house, which is Germany's semi-official publishing house)
Alan S. Milward, 'War, Economy and Society 1939-1945'.
Berenice A. Carroll, 'Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich'. (Reviewed by Ratner)
Hoggan's book should always be read and checked with his sources. It should also be read in conjunction with Kurt Glaser's book 'Der Zweite Weltkrieg and die Kriegsschuldfrage' should also be consulted as it evaluated Hoggan's book and sources in depth (the only one to do so) and agrees more or less with his conclusions and refutes his most vocal critics - who I myself have evaluated on various points and found to be nothing short of blatant liars. However, even Hoggan (or his editors) found Glaser's book to be too anti-German, the bibliography of his sequel, 'Der Unnötige Krieg 1939-1945' makes such a remark in the description of Glaser's book in the bibliography.
I actually have a copy of Hoggan's 1948 Harvard PhD thesis on German/Polish relations which comes to the same conclusion as his 1961 opus, and is not criticised at all. Which should tell you something about how certain concessions are made.
Anyway. Having checked both the English and German editions of Hoggan's book I can confirm that he doesn't cite a direct source for this. But thankfully I am aware of the document he is referring to. It is a telegram of the British ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, to Lord Halifax on a conversation the former had with Göring on February 18, 1939. The telegram is dated 9:42 p.m. The relevant excerpt reads as follows:
I [Henderson] drew the Field Marshal's attention to our apprehensions of Germany's intentions in view of her unremitting and immense war preparations. She was working all out in this direction just as if Munich had never been . Field -Marshal Göring's answer was that German military activities had just begun to cease when we began feverishly to rearm but it was true that thereafter theirs had begun in self-defence again just as actively as before.
After some recrimination on this point I mentioned to Field-Marshal Göring a remark which the Prime Minister had made to me when in London as to [the] impossibility of our two countries going on indefinitely on these lines. The Field-Marshal entirely agreed. Though her rearmaments, he said, cost Germany less than England, she was a far poorer country, so that it came to the same thing. There was an immense amount to do in Germany and the Führer had, he said, vast plans for beautifying of Germany and improvement of social conditions just as the British Prime Minister had and his one desire was to prosecute them in peace.
DBFP, 3, IV, Doc. 118, p. 121.
The fact is, even if they increased spending, it would not prove any 'aggressive' intentions. This is a false argument with no logical basis. Germany was not in a position to either fight for or defend her interests without spending money on armaments, this cannot be taken as 'proof' of anything. Disparate as their positions are, both A.J.P. Taylor and the German historian Rolf-Dieter Müller both agree on this. From the latter:
It would be an equal misunderstanding to totally dismiss Hitler’s public slogans of peace and his understandable hope that there would be several years in which to rearm systematically. The risk of invasion from abroad remained high in this transitional phase. For that reason alone, the Reichswehr had to prepare for war at any time — even if only in the form of defence for the time being. So they placed great value on being able to factor 2 million militarily trained members of the SA into their calculations. . .
Rolf-Dieter Müller, Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p. 39.
Müller is still irrational, and thinks that Hitler desired to use this rearmament for war at some point to fulfil his 'plans' against Russia, for which he misquotes sources, distorts evidence, and derives conclusions from sources which say nothing in support of his pre-conceived beliefs. The point is that he also recognizes that this sort of rearmament would have to have been undertaken in any case.
According Georg Thomas, a member of the German resistance and Head of the Defence Economy and Armament Office in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) there was a 'struggle' between the idea of 'width and depth' of armaments. Hitler favoured the strategy of 'width' where as he, Thomas, thought 'depth' should be prepared for in order for Germany's preparations to be ready in case long-wars needed to be waged, particularly against the West. Hitler did not want this, simply because he didn't want war, nor did he count on it. This is revealed to us by Thomas' own words in a private address 'before the inspectors' on March 29, 1940:
Struggled for depth of armour. Rejected by Führer. Doesn't want war, just bluffing. "For that I need breadth."
Bundesarchiv, Freiburg; RW 19/1945
Hitler refused planning for any sort of confrontation with the West (prior to the war against Poland, and did not desire even after), which he told Thomas again and again he didn't want (because he saw no necessity for it if the British really wanted to avoid war). The possibility after the Polish campaign of converting industry was rejected on the basis that the war would hopefully be over by Christmas. Thomas, in a memo, stated that 'it was impossible to produce all the programmes side by side and demanded that they focus on one thing' and the response was that 'No priorities can be set at present, since we do not know how the war will develop'. There are reasons for all of this, much too complicated to be explained here and now.
Thomas also states that it was during the Munich crisis that he received a telephone communication with the instruction that 'All preparations now for war against England, target 1942!', to which he notes the ammunition production plan which was drawn up was 'rejected because it would require tooling machines, raw materials, etc., which would require considerable foreign currency, as well as workers.'
Thomas complains overall that if 'we think back a year' the capacity of industry for arms and munitions production was underestimated, and preparations were on 'too small a scale'.
I will recommend you various books which are probably not perfect, but might be helpful to you.
See the article 'Review: An Inquiry into the Nazi War Economy' by Sidney Ratner.
See the following books:
Alan S. Milward, 'The German Economy at War'. (Published in German as 'Die Deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945' by the extremely prominent Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt publishing house, which is Germany's semi-official publishing house)
Alan S. Milward, 'War, Economy and Society 1939-1945'.
Berenice A. Carroll, 'Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich'. (Reviewed by Ratner)
Re: Nazis reduced military spending in mid-1938?
RyanFaulk wrote: This would be an important piece of evidence that Germany was planning on scaling down military spending in mid-1938, and would be a very useful piece of evidence against the "Nazi aggressor" narrative.
I don't have any info on the military spending, but in regards to the "Nazi aggressor" narrative:
Why did Hitler invade so many 'neutral' European countries?
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12421
'Why Germany Invaded Poland', by John Wear / 'peaceful Poland' debunked
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12331
The Anschluss with Austria
viewtopic.php?t=12836
Why did Germany annex all of Czechoslovakia? / Anschluss of the Sudeten Regions
viewtopic.php?t=9569
CZECHIA: Why did Germany annex all of Czechoslovakia?
viewtopic.php?t=9569
USSR: Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack
viewtopic.php?t=7999
Aggressive Soviets violated numerous treaties with neighboring countries
viewtopic.php?t=12434
"There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principle is contempt prior to investigation."
NOTE: I am taking a leave of absence from revisionism to focus on other things. At this point, the ball is in their court to show the alleged massive pits full of human remains at the so-called "extermination camps." After 8 decades they still refuse to do this. I wonder why...
— Herbert Spencer
NOTE: I am taking a leave of absence from revisionism to focus on other things. At this point, the ball is in their court to show the alleged massive pits full of human remains at the so-called "extermination camps." After 8 decades they still refuse to do this. I wonder why...
Return to “WWII Europe / Atlantic Theater Revisionist Forum”
Who is online
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest
